PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES PRESTON WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 8, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 212138
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC Nos. 97-009328-FH;
97-009329-FH
CHARLES PRESTON WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Hoekstra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions, in separate cases, of two counts of
delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv).
Defendant was sentenced to two to twenty years in prison for each conviction, the sentences to run
concurrently with each other. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that evidence of prior bad acts, specifically Trooper Cox’s testimony
regarding defendant’s presence in a car with another person who was involved with narcotics and
Cox’s testimony regarding other prior observations of defendant, was improperly admitted and that the
trial court erred in its denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the admission of this evidence.
We disagree.
To preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal, a party must object at trial and specify the same
ground for objection that it asserts on appeal. MRE 103(a)(1); People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 545,
553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Defendant did not object to Trooper Cox’s testimony regarding
defendant’s presence in a car with another person involved with narcotics and did not address this
testimony during his motion for a mistrial. The issue of Cox’s testimony regarding defendant’s presence
in a car is therefore not preserved for appeal. Id. However, defendant did object to Cox’s testimony
regarding his prior observations of defendant and subsequently moved for a mistrial based on this
testimony. Defendant has thus preserved the issue of Cox’s testimony regarding the prior observations.
People v Connor, 209 Mich App 419, 422; 531 NW2d 734 (1995).
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“A motion for a mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights
of the defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217,
228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). This Court reviews the trial court’s decision regarding a motion for
mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 36; 597 NW2d 176 (1999).
A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion and, by
definition, a decision on a close evidentiary issue cannot be an abuse of discretion. People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 289; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Evidence is relevant and generally admissible if it tends to make the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the action more or less probable than it would be otherwise. MRE 401; People v
Mills, 450 Mich 61, 66-67; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod on other grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person, or to
show that a person acted in conformity with the other acts. MRE 404(b)(1); People v VanderVliet,
444 Mich 52, 63-64; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), mod on other grounds 445 Mich 1205 (1994). The
VanderVliet decision established that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts should be examined in
the following manner:
First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that
it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative
value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the
trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury. [Id. at 55.]
Finally, VanderVliet added the requirement that the prosecution must provide reasonable notice in
advance of trial, or during trial, if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of
any other acts evidence it intends to introduce at trial and the rationale for admission. Id. at 89; MRE
404(b)(2); see also VanderVliet, 445 Mich 1205.
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Trooper Cox’s prior
observations of defendant, and the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial. 1 This
evidence was used to support the trooper’s identification of defendant and not to prove that defendant
acted in conformity with these prior acts. Proof of identity is one of the specifically designated proper
purposes for which other acts evidence may be presented. MRE 404(b)(1). The prosecution elicited
testimony regarding prior observations with defendant only on redirect examination, in an attempt to
rehabilitate Cox’s identification of defendant after defense counsel focused entirely on the issue of
identification during cross-examination. The testimony of the trooper regarding these prior two
observations was relevant for identification purposes as it established that Cox had more than two
opportunities to view defendant.2 The evidence was therefore relevant and admissible because it was
presented for a proper purpose, identification, that was a disputed issue at trial.
The probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. MRE 403. Defense counsel made it clear in his closing argument that identity was the only
issue in this trial. Therefore, testimony that was relevant to the trooper’s ability to identify defendant
was highly probative in this matter. Moreover, because this evidence was directly related to
identification, the sole issue in the trial, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. People v Oswald
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(After Remand), 188 Mich App 1, 8; 469 NW2d 306 (1991). Finally, although defendant did not
request a limiting instruction, VanderVliet, supra at 75, the trial court instructed the prosecutor not to
draw any inferences from this testimony and the prosecutor did not.
Defendant also argues that he was not given proper notice of the prosecutor’s intent to use
evidence of other acts, as required by MRE 404(b)(2). We disagree. The prosecutor provided
defendant with reasonable notice of her intention to present evidence of the trooper’s prior observations
by providing reports regarding these events to defendant the morning of the day before trial, immediately
after the trial prosecutor discovered these events. Because the prosecutor presented this information to
defendant before trial, she was not required to demonstrate good cause for late notice. MRE
404(b)(2). Additionally, we note that defendant was presumptively aware of these two prior
observations because Trooper Cox was questioned about them by defense counsel at the preliminary
examination. We therefore find that the prosecution provided proper notice.
Based on the importance of identity evidence in this matter, we do not find the admission of the
other acts evidence to be an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for
mistrial was proper because there was no irregularity that was unfairly prejudicial to defendant or
impaired his right to a fair trial. Haywood, supra at 228.
Defendant’s second issue on appeal is that his trial attorney failed to provide him with effective
assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not object to the admission of testimony concerning
the photographic lineup. We disagree. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue for our review
by moving for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing in the trial court, our review is limited to errors by
counsel evident in the existing record. People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 181; 577 NW2d 903
(1998). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and defendant bears a heavy burden of proving
otherwise. People v Plummer, 229 Mich App 293, 308; 581 NW2d 753 (1998). To overcome this
presumption, defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and
that defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s defective performance. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298,
303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
Where a defendant is not in custody, there is no right to counsel at the lineup stage of the
investigation. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 302; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). Our Supreme Court
in Kurylczyk declined to extend the right to counsel to cases where the defendant is the focus of the
investigation because, at the early stage of an investigation, it is impossible to know whether a
photographic lineup will build a case against a defendant or extinguish a case against an innocent
bystander. Id.
While defendant was the focus of the investigation, he was not in custody at the time of the
photographic lineup. Because defendant was not in custody, he was not entitled to counsel for the
photographic lineup. Id. A motion by defense counsel for exclusion of this evidence would have been
meritless. Counsel is not required to argue frivolous or meritless motions. People v Darden, 230 Mich
App 597, 605; 585 NW2d 27 (1998). Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to
argue a motion to exclude the photographic lineup identification.
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Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
1
The prosecutor argues, in part, that Trooper Cox’s testimony did not involve other acts evidence since
it only amounted to statements of prior identification. While we agree that statements of prior
identification alone do not ordinarily constitute other acts evidence, in this case Trooper Cox’s testimony
implied that the prior identifications occurred during previous drug purchases involving Cox and other
unnamed parties, perhaps including defendant.
2
Although the trooper testified that the first contact with defendant occurred after the trooper called “to
set up a purchase,” the testimony did not go into any detail regarding other drug purchases. Instead, the
trooper merely stated that on the first occasion he observed defendant walking to a gas station from a
distance of about twenty feet, and that on the second occasion he was face-to-face with defendant.
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