LEELANAU TRAILS ASSN V NOEL J FLOHE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LEELANAU TRAILS ASSOCIATION and RLTD
RAILWAY CORPORATION,
UNPUBLISHED
February 8, 2000
Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellees,
v
No.210544
Leelanau Circuit Court
LC No. 96-003895-CZ
NOEL J. FLOHE, MARY L. FLOHE, WALTER J.
HINES, THELA HINES, LOUIS DEYOUNG,
ELLY C.M. DEYOUNG, MAGDALENA K.
LUINSTRA, JUDSON A. AMMONS, LARRY
PRICE, KENNETH W. DEZUR, GEORGE J.
HERMAN, MARY C. HERMAN, CHARLES
BELANGER, JUDITH BELANGER, JAMES
MEBERT, STUART D. WHITTAKER, VELVET A.
WHITTAKER, WARREN J. RAFTSHOL, and
MARIAN E. WERNER,
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs,
and
AUGUST SHARNOWSKI and BARBARA
SHARNOWSKI,
Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellants.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Gribbs and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
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Defendants appeal as of right from judgment quieting title to a strip of land in the names of
plaintiffs. We affirm.
The trial court ruled that a 1902 deed between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ predecessors in
interest was unambiguous and created a determinable fee, subject to a condition subsequent, and that
any reversionary interest held by defendants was extinguished by the Possibilities of Reverter and Rights
of Entry Act, MCL 554.61 et seq.; MSA 26.49(11) et seq., and certain inter vivos transfers. The
court addressed defendants’ de facto condemnation claim, but ruled it was inapplicable in light of the
lack of ambiguity in the deed.
Defendants first argue that the trial court erred in ruling that the 1902 deed conveyed a
determinable fee and not merely an easement. Actions to quiet title are equitable in nature and are
reviewed de novo by this Court. Dobie v Morrison, 227 Mich App 536, 538; 575 NW2d 817
(1998). The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Sackett v Atyeo, 217 Mich App
676, 680; 552 NW2d 536 (1996). The trial court did not err in ruling that the 1902 deed created a
determinable fee, subject to a condition subsequent because such an interest is unambiguously created in
the conveyance. In light of the this lack of ambiguity the trial court did not err in refusing to use extrinsic
evidence to explain the deed or find de facto condemnation. Further, the trial court did not err in ruling
that no de facto condemnation occurred.
Initially, we note the confusion stemming from decades of Michigan case law regarding whether
a condition subsequent gives rise to a possibility of reverter or a right of entry and the distinction
between the two. As Ludington & N R Co v Epworth Assembly, 188 Mich App 25, 36; 468 NW2d
884 (1991), pointed out, traditionally a possibility of reverter referred to the future interest remaining in
a grantor where a fee simple determinable was created; while a right of entry referred to the interest
remaining in the grantor where an estate with a condition subsequent has been created. Id. However,
many cases discuss a possibility of reverter in cases involving a condition subsequent. See Schoolcraft
Community School Dist No 50, Kalamazoo Co v Burson, 357 Mich 682, 687; 99 NW2d 353
(1959); Juif v Dillman, 287 Mich 35, 38; 282 NW 892 (1938); Dolby v Dillman, 283 Mich 609,
613-614; 278 NW 694 (1938); Oakland Co v Mack, 243 Mich 279, 286; 220 NW 801 (1928).
The parties in this matter have consistently referred to the interest as a reversion, or right or reverter, so
we will as well.
As a general rule, courts follow the plain language in a deed if there is no ambiguity. If,
however, there is an ambiguity, or if the deed fails to express the obvious intention of the parties, the
courts will try to arrive at the intention of the parties. Taylor v Taylor, 310 Mich 541, 545; 17 NW2d
745 (1945); Farabaugh v Rhode, 305 Mich 234, 240; 9 NW2d 562 (1943). The primary object in
interpreting deeds is to determine the intention of the parties from the instrument itself. Thomas v
Jewell, 300 Mich 556, 559-560; 2 NW2d 501 (1942). The general rule is that where a deed is
absolute in its terms, parol evidence tending to show a different agreement or meaning is inadmissible.
Bennett v Eisen, 64 Mich App 241, 244; 235 NW2d 749 (1975); Paskvan v Kuru, 5 Mich App
374, 376; 146 NW2d 677 (1966).
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Additionally, interests which extinguish a fee estates are not favored by the law; therefore,
provisions that forfeit estates, such as conditions subsequent, are strictly construed. Central Land Co
v Grand Rapids, 302 Mich 105, 112; 4 NW2d 485 (1942).
In Quinn v Pere Marquette R Co, 256 Mich 143, 151-153; 239 NW 376 (1931), a deed to
a railroad was determined to unambiguously create a determinable fee subject to a condition
subsequent. The grantors provided a warranty deed to the railway, providing a strip of land one
hundred feet wide for railroad purposes only. Id. at 146-147. The Quinn deed did not contain
reversionary language. The Court noted that “right-of-way” had two meanings in railway parlance,
potentially meaning both the strip of land upon which the track is laid and the legal right to use the strip.
Id. The Court reasoned that the grant was for a determinable fee when the deed contains an express
intended purpose for the grant and a reverter clause. Id. at 154-155. Additionally, in Epworth
Assembly v Ludington & N R Co, 236 Mich 565, 574; 211 NW 99 (1926), the Supreme Court ruled
that deeds created a condition subsequent, also known as a determinable fee, when they provided that
land shall “be used for railroad purposes only” and called for reversion if the land ceased being used for
railroad purposes.1 Id. at 574.
We find the Quinn, supra, and Epworth, supra, rulings persuasive authority that the Groessers
conveyed a determinable fee because the deed mentions both the purpose of the grant and the
reversion. Like the Quinn conveyance, the 1902 deed did not mention the word easement.
Additionally, the 1902 deed contains words of absolute conveyance. The wording in the Epworth
deeds was also similar to the 1902 deed in this matter. While it is true that the 1902 Groesser deed
references a right-of-way, the Quinn decision makes clear that in railroad usage, the term “right-of
way” can refer to both the purchase of the land or the purchase of an easement to use the land. Id. at
146-147. The trial court did not err in ruling the 1902 deed unambiguously conveyed a determinable
fee, subject to a condition subsequent.
Defendants argue that the railway’s acquisition of the strip constituted de facto condemnation of
the Groesser property granting the railway merely an easement. Pursuant to Michigan Central R Co v
Garfield Petroleum Corp, 292 Mich 373, 388; 290 NW 833 (1940), a railway acquires only an
easement when land is condemned.2 Defendants urge this Court to look behind the language of the
deed to the circumstances of the 1902 transaction.
Private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation. US Const., Am V;
Const 1963, art 10, §2. A “taking” means that government action has permanently deprived the
property owner of any possession or use of the property. Jack Loeks Theatres, Inc v Kentwood,
189 Mich App 603, 608; 474 NW2d 140 (1991), modified in part 439 Mich 968 (1992). There is no
litmus test for when a de facto taking has occurred; however, there must be some action by the
government specifically directed toward the plaintiff’s property that has the effect of limiting the use of
the property. In re Acquisition of Virginia Park, 121 Mich App 153, 160; 328 NW2d 602 (1982).
These are no similar Michigan cases that address the type of de facto condemnation defendants claim.
The Railroad Act of 1873, under which the Traverse City, Leelanau and Manistique Railroad
was incorporated, permitted a train corporation to condemn private property for the purposes of the
railway. The railroad commenced such a proceeding against the Groessers in 1902. The Act further
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provided that a certified copy of the final order confirming the condemnation shall be filed with the
register of deeds. Under the Act, only when the final order is filed in this manner was the condemnation
complete and title transferred. The act did not require condemnation to be completed by a warranty
deed. Under the statutory scheme, all that was required was registration of the final order. Defendants
concede that the 1902 condemnation proceedings were not completed because no final order was filed
with the register of deeds.
Defendants have failed to establish a de facto condemnation. While the railroad started
condemnation proceedings for the land, the Groessers voluntarily entered into a warranty deed
conveying a greater estate than the railroad could have taken under eminent domain. The Groessers
were represented by counsel during the proceedings, yet signed a deed creating a determinable fee, as
opposed to an easement. Extrinsic evidence will not be permitted to create an ambiguity in an
unambiguous deed.
Next defendant argues that reversionary interest created in the 1902 deed was not extinguished
either by the common law or the Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry Act. The interpretation
and application of statutes is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. McAuley v General Motors
Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998).
Pursuant to the common law, the Groessers’ four inter vivos transfers of the section twenty-nine
property extinguished defendants’ reversionary interest. A grantors’ attempted conveyance of a
possibility of reverter or right of entry nullifies the possibility of reversion or entry. Juif, supra at 38;
Dolby, supra at 613-614; and Oakland, supra at 284-286. The right to the reversion or entry cannot
be conveyed before the grantee has breached the condition and any attempt to transfer the interest inter
vivos nullifies the condition, even for the grantor. Oakland, supra at 286. At common law only the
grantor’s transfer to his heirs at death could pass on a right of reversion. Id. at 286. This harsh
common law rule reflected the disfavor with which divesting conditions were held. Id. at 287. Here,
the Groessers made four inter vivos transfers, in 1941, 1947, 1971, and 1978. These inter vivos
transfers extinguished the right of reversion.
We note that the common law rule was abrogated by statute in 1931. MCL 554.111; MSA
26.851; Schoolcraft Community School Dist No 50 v Burson, 357 Mich 682; 99 NW2d 353
(1959). The statute provides:
The reversionary interest in lands conveyed on a condition subsequent may be
granted, conveyed, transferred or devised by the owner of such interest, and by the
subsequent grantees or devisees thereof, either before or after the right of re-entry
becomes effective: Provided, That this act shall not affect any such interest created
before it takes effect. [MCL 554.111; MSA 26.851.]
The statute specifically does not apply to reversionary interests created before the law was
enacted. The fact that a number of the Groessers’ transfers occurred after the effective date of the
statute has no bearing on the applicability of the common law rule. See Schoolcraft, supra at 683
685. Because defendants’ reversionary interest was created in 1902, before the statute was enacted,
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the common law rule applies. Therefore, defendants’ interest in the reverter clause of the 1902 deed
was extinguished by the Groessers’ inter vivos transfers.
In light of this ruling, it is not necessary to address defendants’ arguments related to the
applicability and constitutionality of the Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry Act. The ruling of
the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
1
These interests have been called variously a fee subject to divestment by re-entry for breach of
condition. Dolby v State Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich 609, 613; 278 NW 694 (1938).
2
This is opposite to the status of land condemned by the government. Land obtained by the state
pursuant to eminent domain power is taken in fee simple, with no reversionary rights remaining in the
original owner. Community College Dist of Monroe Co v Lennard, 204 Mich App 597, 601; 516
NW2d 146 (1994). In that case the state took property for the use of a state owned railway. The
tracks and the state railroad were later sold to a private railroad and eventually purchased by defendant
who claimed a fee title interest in the property used for the railroad. This Court agreed ruling that the
state had acquired clear title to the land that it later passed on to the subsequent purchasers.
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