IN RE HOWARD J DEMING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________________________
In re HOWARD J. DEMING TRUST.
SUZANNE B. LAVERTY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 4, 2000
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 212638
Washtenaw Probate Court
LC Nos. 97-110930 ML
97-111424 CG
HOWARD J. DEMING and NBD BANK,
Respondents-Appellees.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Gribbs and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals as of right from the trial court’s opinion and order awarding respondent
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), thereby dismissing petitioner’s petitions for
appointment of a guardian and conservator for respondent and seeking to set aside the 1997
amendments to the Howard J. Deming Trust Agreement. We reverse and remand.
I. Factual Background
This case involves a dispute between petitioner and respondent Deming regarding the Howard
J. Deming Revocable Living Trust Agreement. Petitioner is respondent’s only child and, prior to April
2, 1997, was named as the residuary beneficiary of the trust. Respondent was born on October 29,
1911, executed the trust in 1980, and amended it in 1982 and 1988 by amendments not here in dispute.
Following the 1988 amendments, respondent and NBD Bank were co-trustees, while respondent’s
wife, petitioner, and NBD Bank were named as successor co-trustees. Respondent’s wife died in
1995, leaving petitioner and NBD Bank as the successor co-trustees.
During the summer of 1996, respondent’s family and the bank officer who was respondent’s
principal contact at NBD Bank noticed changes in respondent’s behavior, ultimately causing petitioner
and the bank officer to request that respondent’s personal physician at that time, Dr. Alan Dengiz, an
internist, and Dr. Barbara Day, a psychiatrist with experience in geriatric medicine, evaluate
respondent’s mental competence pursuant to § 1.6 of the trust agreement, which provides:
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1.6
Incapacity of Grantor.
If, due to physical or mental incapacity as determined by a court having
jurisdiction over such matters or as unanimously determined in writing by two medically
licensed doctors, one of whom shall be the Grantor-Trustee’s personal physician, if
possible, the Grantor-Trustee is unable to carry out his responsibilities as Trustee
hereunder including the custody and management of the Trust principal and income, then
in such event the Successor Trustees named herein shall become Trustee without any
additional action or permission of any kind from the Grantor-Trustee. The Successor
Trustees shall then possess all the rights, duties and obligations to the same extent as the
original Trustee possessed under the terms of this Trust and shall from time to time,
distribute to or expend for the benefit of the Grantor and those dependent upon him the
income and sufficient principal, which, together with funds known to the Successor
Trustee to be available from other sources for such purposes, will in the sole discretion
of the Successor Trustees and consistent with the value of the Trust maintain Grantor
and those dependent upon him as nearly as possible in the mode of living to which he
and they were accustomed prior to his becoming incapacitated. During the period of
time that the Grantor-Trustee shall remain so incapacitated as evidenced either by court
order or by the written opinion of two medically licensed physicians, as the case may
be, the Trust Agreement shall be irrevocable and not amendable and the GrantorTrustee shall, during this period, have no reserved power or rights under the Trust
Agreement such as the right to direct investments or withdraw amounts of principal or
income.
By letter of September 27, 1996, Drs. Dengiz and Day stated that respondent was not mentally
competent to be independently handling his own financial affairs and recommended that his personal
finance decisions be turned over to the bank. Upon receipt of this letter, petitioner and the bank
assumed the role of co-trustees pursuant to § 1.6 of the trust agreement.
In March and April 1997, respondent’s attorney obtained letters from two physicians attesting
to respondent’s capacity to carry out his responsibilities as trustee. Pursuant to amendments to the trust
executed after receipt of these letters, respondent named himself as trustee, provided that a bank would
be co-trustee if he chose, and selected a bank as successor trustee. These amendments explicitly made
no provision for petitioner, thus effectively eliminating her as a beneficiary of the trust.
Petitioner refused to recognize the trust amendments as valid, petitioning the trial court to find
that, because Drs. Dengiz and Day had previously declared respondent to be incompetent to handle his
financial affairs, the trust agreement thereby became permanently irrevocable and incapable of
amendment. The court rejected that argument, ruling that the trust agreement’s language permitted
respondent to regain capacity after a period of incapacity.
Petitioner then petitioned the court for appointment of a guardian for respondent as an allegedly
legally incapacitated person, for appointment of a conservator for him, and to set aside the 1997 trust
amendments. After respondent had been evaluated by medical personnel and discovery was
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completed, the court granted respondent summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10)
regarding all petitions.
II. Guardianship
Petitioner first argues that the trial court erred by awarding summary disposition regarding her
petition for appointment of a guardian because Dr. Dengiz’ opinions created sufficient issues of material
fact to entitle her to proceed to trial. We agree. A trial court’s decision regarding a motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is reviewed de novo. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460
Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition based on
MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court must examine the documentary evidence presented below and, drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists. Id. at 454-455 and n 2; Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 361-362; 547
NW2d 314 (1996). The party opposing the motion may not rest on the mere allegations or denials
contained in the pleadings, but must come forward with evidence of specific facts to establish the
existence of a material factual dispute. Quinto, supra at 362, 371. A question of fact exists when
reasonable minds could differ regarding the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Glittenberg v
Doughboy Recreational Industries (On Rehearing), 441 Mich 379, 398-399; 491 NW2d 208
(1992). If the nonmoving party fails to establish that a material fact is at issue, the motion is properly
granted. Quinto, supra at 363.
MCL 700.443(1); MSA 27.5443(1) provides:
A person in his or her own behalf, or any person interested in the person’s
welfare, may petition for a finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian. The
petition shall contain specific facts about the person’s condition and specific examples of
the person’s recent conduct that demonstrate the need for the appointment of a
guardian.
MCL 700.444(1); MSA 27.5444(1) provides, in pertinent part:
The court may appoint a guardian if it is satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence that the person for whom a guardian is sought is a legally incapacitated person,
and that the appointment is necessary as a means of providing continuing care and
supervision of the person of the legally incapacitated person.
Finally, MCL 700.8(2); MSA 27.5008(2) defines a “legally incapacitated person” as
a person . . . who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical
illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause, to the
extent that the person lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate informed decisions concerning his or her person.
The sole ground alleged in the petition for appointment of a guardian is “mental deficiency.”
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The trial court noted that, although respondent’s memory and attention were somewhat
impaired, his orientation, comprehension and judgment were average. Having viewed respondent’s
lengthy videotaped deposition, the court concluded that respondent “offers a rationale for decisions he
makes” and “is currently capable of making and communicating informed choices about his life.” The
court stated that “contrary to the general allegation in the petition, there is evidence [respondent] is
making informed choices concerning medical care,” and added that petitioner “cannot meet her burden
of establishing [respondent] is a legally incapacitated person . . . .”
If petitioner is to survive respondent’s motion for summary disposition regarding this issue, she
must do so on the basis of evidence furnished by Dr. Dengiz. According to Dengiz’ August 18, 1997,
affidavit, he had known respondent since 1986 and was his physician from September 1993 until
October 1996. In his May 14, 1998, affidavit, he states, “I evaluated [respondent] on November 21,
1997. Based on this evaluation, it is my opinion that [respondent] is suffering from dementia and that he
has either Alzheimer’s disease or a multi-infarct dementia that will progress.” In ¶ 8 of this affidavit,
Dengiz avers, “Based on my interactions with [respondent] through November 1996, my evaluation of
[respondent] on November 21, 1997, and my evaluation of [respondent’s] videotaped deposition
testimony it is my professional opinion that [respondent] currently is not capable of handling his personal
or financial affairs and that he is currently in need of a full guardian and conservator.” These averments,
if believed, would support petitioner’s contention that summary disposition was improvidently granted
because Dengiz’ affidavits create a genuine issue of material fact regarding respondent’s ability to make
or communicate informed decisions concerning his person. While Dr. Dengiz’ opinion does not settle
the issue, it certainly creates a genuine issue of material fact. In short, the trial court erred by weighing
the evidence and reaching a conclusion of fact. That conclusion is within the purview of the trier of fact
following a trial. In light of the contested issues regarding respondent’s capacity, summary disposition
was not appropriate.
III. Conservatorship
Petitioner next claims that the trial court erred by awarding summary disposition for respondent
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) regarding the petition for appointment of a conservator. We agree.
The applicable statute, MCL 700.461(b); MSA 27.5461(b), provides:
Appointment of a conservator or other protective order may be made in relation
to the estate and affairs of a person if the court determines that the person is unable to
manage his or her property and affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness,
mental incompetency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic
intoxication, confinement, detention by a foreign power, or disappearance; and the
person has property which will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is
provided, or that funds are needed for the support, care, and welfare of the person or
those entitled to be supported by the person and that protection is necessary or
desirable to obtain or provide funds.
The sole ground alleged in the petition for appointment of a conservator is respondent’s alleged
“mental incompetency.” Petitioner contends that the trial court ignored Dr. Dengiz’ affidavit and
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deposition testimony to the effect that Dengiz believed that respondent was then not capable of handling
his financial affairs and needed a conservator. We agree.
In addition to Dr. Dengiz’ opinion, petitioner contends that the trial court overlooked substantial
evidence supporting her petition. Petitioner points to such items as respondent’s request to the trust for
$20,000 for an alleged tax liability later found not to exist, the termination of a credit card for apparent
failure to make timely payments on several occasions, and occasional late utility payments. While these
items are certainly not dispositive, they do represent issues to be resolved by the trier of fact following
trial. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition.
IV. Trust Amendments
Petitioner lastly maintains that the trial court erred by awarding respondent summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) regarding her petition to set aside the 1997 trust amendments.
Respondent’s attorney who handled these amendments testified that at the time that respondent initially
executed trust amendments on January 20, 1997, she was not aware of petitioner’s claim that the trust
had become irrevocable, and that when she became aware of this claim she obtained determinations
from two physicians that respondent was competent and then re-executed the trust amendments on
April 2, 1997. She also testified that she found no evidence of undue influence, coercion, fraud or
mistake in the execution of the amendments.
After citing this evidence, the trial court noted that petitioner “has not presented any evidence of
any other physician who saw [respondent] during the time frame of April or March, 1997, and the court
must assume there is none.” Concluding that respondent “undoubtedly has testamentary capacity,” the
court added, “This new estate plan was dealt with during [respondent’s] deposition: he provided a
rationale for each bequest and understood the purpose of the trusts for his niece’s children. . . . . There
is no showing the trust amendments – for lifetime management and [testamentary] disposition – are not
perfectly consonant with [respondent’s] present wishes.”
Again, petitioner points to Dr. Dengiz’ evidence. Again, while Dr. Dengiz’ opinion is not
necessarily determinative of respondent’s capacity when he amended the trust, it is for the trier of fact
following trial to make such determination. After hearing all of the evidence, the trier of fact can
determine whether to accept Dr. Dengiz’ opinion and petitioner’s position, or whether respondent was,
in fact, competent at the time.
In sum, while respondent may ultimately prevail, it was premature for the trial court to make
such a determination at the summary disposition stage. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding
respondent’s capacity, both now and at the time of the trust amendments. Accordingly, the trial court
should have allowed the matter to proceed to trial.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Petitioner may tax costs.
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/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
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