CHRIS FASNAKIS V HARBHAJAN SINGH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHRIS FASNAKIS and RENEE FASNAKIS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 4, 2000
Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellees,
v
No. 210113
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-493972-CH
HARBHAJAN SINGH,
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Saad and Hoekstra, JJ
PER CURIAM.
Harbhajan Singh appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting injunctive relief to Chris and
Renee Fasnakis regarding a building they own in the City of Clawson, which they leased to Singh. At
issue is whether Singh effectively assigned his interest in the leased premises to a third party, Afhiq
Hussain.1 We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
On July 10, 1990, Singh leased a portion of a commercial building in the City of Clawson,
which the Fasnakises owned, to operate a gas service station, “C” store,2 and automobile repair facility.
The written lease was for five years, with two conditional, five-year options to renew and an assignment
provision that stated:
ASSIGNMENT - The Tenant covenants not to assign or transfer this lease or
hypothecate or mortgage the same or sublet said premises or any part thereof without
the written consent of the Landlord. Any assignment, transfer, hypothecation, mortgage
or subletting without said written consent shall give the Landlord the right to terminate
his [sic] lease and to re-enter and repossess the leased premises. Consent shall not
unreasonably [sic] withheld.
Subsequently, Singh sold his business and agreed to assign his interest in the leased premises to Hussain.
On January 3, 1995, Hussain took possession of the leased premises, subject to the lease. Whether
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Chris and/or Renee Fasnakis orally assented to assigning the lease to Hussain is in dispute. However,
the parties agree that, on or about March 15, 1995, the Fasnakises notified Singh in writing that they
were terminating the lease because of Singh’s breach of the lease assignment provision. The Fasnakises
then changed the locks on the doors of the gas station, denying Hussain entry. It is unclear whether
Singh ever received a set of keys to the leased premises after the Fasnakises changed the locks,
although the Fasnakises contend that they offered to give a set of keys to him.
Chris and Renee Fasnakis filed a complaint alleging that they did not consent to Singh’s
assignment of the lease to Hussain and seeking injunctive relief that would bar Hussain from the
premises. Singh filed a countercomplaint contending that the Fasnakises orally consented to the lease
assignment and that they then unreasonably withheld consent for that assignment, evidently by changing
the locks. Singh asked the trial court to order the Fasnakises to give consent to the assignment.
After holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the trial court made several, explicit findings
of fact, including: (1) the Fasnakises did not consent to the assignment in writing; (2) Singh did not
approach them about agreeing to an assignment until after Hussain had already taken possession of the
premises, failing to obtain advance consent in writing as the lease required; (3) the Fasnakises had never
met Hussain, nor did they have any financial information about him, such as a credit report; (4) the
Fasnakises did not unreasonably withhold consent to the assignment without this financial information;
(5) the Fasnakises did not consent to the assignment or create a license by giving the keys to Hussain at
the March 15 meeting because, by refusing to accept rent from Hussain on several occasions, they
demonstrated their unwillingness to accept him as a tenant; (6) there was waste on the property,
including accumulated refuse and doors removed from their hinges; and (7) what the Fasnakises did3
was an effort to mitigate damages. On the basis of those findings, the trial court found in favor of the
Fasnakises on the complaint and countercomplaint. With regard to Hussain’s status on the property,
the trial court concluded that, without a proper assignment, he was a trespasser. Accordingly, the trial
court declared the assignment to Hussain “void” and ordered Hussain “and his respective agents,
attorneys, and those persons who act in convert with him, including Defendant Harbhajan Singh, . . .
permanently enjoined from trespassing or remaining in possession of the premises . . . .” The trial court
also dismissed Singh’s countercomplaint.
The trial court, however, permitted the Fasnakises to file a supplemental complaint seeking to
terminate Singh’s lease and a writ of restitution in order to regain possession of the premises. Although
it is not clear that he received leave to do so, Singh also filed an additional countercomplaint for
damages alleging illegal lockout, tortious interference with contractual relations, denial of civil rights, and
seeking return of a security deposit. After a considerable period of litigation on these supplemental
complaints, including an attempted appeal as of right to this Court, which was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, the parties stipulated to dismiss this case without prejudice in order to appeal the trial
court’s injunction.
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II. Issues On Appeal
On appeal, Singh presents only a single issue for this Court to resolve:
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it issued an injunction enjoining
appellant’s assignee from operating at the leasehold where there was a lease provision
requiring appellees’ written consent to an assignment, but the record established verbal
consent to the assignment?
Substantively, Singh challenges the trial court’s failure or refusal to find oral consent to the assignment.
He contends that the trial court did not acknowledge that, even though the lease required written
consent to an assignment, foreign case law makes oral consent binding under an estoppel theory,
especially when economic gain4 is the motivation for withholding consent. Singh also argues that trial
court erred when ruling on the motions for summary disposition on the supplemental complaints filed in
this case. For the reasons outlined below, we only address whether the trial court properly issued the
original injunction in this case in light of Singh’s argument that the record demonstrates oral consent to
the assignment.
III. Preservation And Presentation Of The Issues
To preserve an issue for this Court’s review, a party must raise the issue in the lower court.
Miller v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co, 218 Mich App 221, 235; 553 NW2d 371 (1996). Here, Singh
opposed the complaint for injunctive relief. Therefore, Singh preserved his challenge to the injunction.
Insofar as Singh claims that the trial court erred by granting partial summary disposition, he has
not properly presented that argument to this Court for review. Ordinarily, this Court will not address an
issue if the appellant does not set it forth in the statement of questions involved. MCR 7.212(C)(5);
City of Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 351; 539 NW2d 781 (1995). As noted above,
Singh’s statement of the issue on appeal only challenges the trial court’s decision to issue the injunction
without contesting the trial court’s later ruling granting partial summary disposition. Thus, Singh’s
argument that the trial court erred in granting partial summary disposition does not conform to MCR
7.212(C)(5) and we do not address it.
IV. Standard of Review
“A trial court’s decision to grant injunctive relief is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Michigan State AFL-CIO v Secretary of State, 230 Mich App 1, 14; 583 NW2d 701
(1998). An abuse of discretion is found only in extreme cases in which the court’s decision is “so
palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of
will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion
or bias.” Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).
To the extent that this issue requires us to examine the trial court’s findings of fact, we review
those findings for clear error. MCR 2.613(C). “[A] finding is clearly erroneous when, on review of the
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whole record, this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich App 226, 234-235; 559 NW2d 342 (1996).
V. The Assignment Of The Leased Premises
A. Findings On Oral Consent
Preliminarily, we must note that the trial court did not make any explicit findings regarding oral
consent. However, after reading the trial court’s extensive findings, we have no choice but to conclude
that the trial court implicitly found that neither Chris nor Renee Fasnakis orally consented to the
assignment. Specifically, the trial court found that
the Fasnakis’s [sic] have not unreasonably withheld their consent. It is not unreasonable
that you not give a consent to a lease which has an ongoing obligation by another party
when you’ve never met them, whether you’ve never had financial – or that you have not
had a credit history. . . . [T]he Fasnakis’s [sic] have not unreasonably withheld their
consent.
The factual predicate to this conclusion is a finding that they did not consent to assignment in any
manner, whether written or oral. The trial court’s failure to make this finding explicit does not, in any
sense, render it less apparent on the record and in the context of the findings as a whole.
B. Evidence Of Oral Consent
The record bears out the trial court’s conclusion that there was no oral consent. At the January
1996 evidentiary hearing, from which the trial court made its findings of fact, Singh testified that he gave
Chris Fasnakis papers regarding the lease assignment to Hussain and that Chris Fasnakis verbally
consented to the assignment. However, Renee Fasnakis unequivocally testified that she never
consented to the assignment in writing or orally, which Singh never disputed. When defense counsel
examined Chris Fasnakis, he testified to the following with respect to oral consent:
Defense Counsel:
Did you tell him [Singh] that he could assign the lease to Mr.
Hussain?
Chris Fasnakis:
I go home and I take it to my wife to discuss, you know. I told
him this, yes.
Defense Counsel:
You didn’t tell him there was no problem, that he could assign
it?
Chris Fasnakis:
No, I didn’t tell him no problem. I didn’t tell him nothing.
Defense Counsel:
Have you given him permission in the past to assign the lease?
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Chris Fasnakis:
(Inaudible) yes, I mean, if he told me he was going to sell. He
brought a lot of people to work, I mean, that we were seeing
and some guy was supposed to rent, I don’t know what
happened, then the first thing I see, before even –
Defense Counsel:
Well, okay, answer my question please.
Trial Court:
Let’s move on.
Chris Fasnakis:
Did you every verbally tell Doctor Singh that he couldn’t assign
the property?
Defense Counsel:
That he what?
At this point, it became clear that Chris Fasnakis did not understand defense counsel. To help the
examination go more smoothly, the trial court asked the following questions.
Trial Court:
Am I correct, he [Singh] came to you.
Chris Fasnakis:
Yes.
Trial Court:
He gave you the papers.
Chris Fasnakis:
Yes.
Trial Court:
You said you wanted your wife.
Chris Fasnakis:
Yes.
Trial Court:
What else did you say.
Chris Fasnakis:
Nothing, nothing else.
Given the trial court’s opportunity to hear this testimony by the parties and to weigh their
credibility as witnesses to resolve their conflict account of the consent issue, MCR 2.613(C), we have
no basis on which to conclude that the trial court clearly erred in finding that neither Chris nor Renee
Fasnakis orally consented to the lease assignment. Accordingly, it is not necessary to determine
whether Michigan law holds that oral consent may waive an express provision of a lease to require
assignment in writing. Even if that rule does exist in Michigan, it would not apply to the facts of this
case.
C. The Injunction
In Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Ass’n v City of Detroit, 218 Mich App 263,
269; 553 NW2d 679 (1996), we explained that
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[a]n injunction represents an extraordinary and drastic act of judicial power that should
be employed sparingly and only with full conviction of its urgent necessity. Reed v
Burton, 344 Mich 126, 132; 73 NW2d 333 (1955). As a consequence, the courts
have fashioned an array of principles designed to clarify when such extraordinary
powers are appropriately exercised. Generally, three core elements must be established
by a party seeking an injunction: (1) justice requires that the court grant the injunction;
(2) a real and imminent danger of irreparable injury arises if an injunction is not issued;
and (3) there exists no adequate remedy at law. Peninsula Sanitation, Inc v
Manistique, 208 Mich App 34, 43; 526 NW2d 607 (1994).
After examining the record, we have no doubt that the trial court acted within the proper scope of its
discretion in issuing the injunction. The stakes in this case are, to the Fasnakises, extremely high in that
Singh attempted to force a new tenant on them without giving them any opportunity to inquire about
Hussain’s fitness as a tenant. Moreover, there was evidence that Hussain’s tenancy was not necessarily
harmless to the Fasnakises. In particular, they introduced photographic evidence at trial that apparently
demonstrated that the premises were not being kept in good repair and free from refuse during his
tenancy. Most critically, as the trial court noted, Hussain had no right to be on the property because
there was no assignment of the lease. Justice required this equitable relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
1
Hussain was also a defendant in one of the actions below, but is not a party to the present appeal.
2
Evidently, a “C” store is a convenience store.
3
Presumably, the trial court was referring to the decision to change the locks.
4
Singh contends that the Fasnakises wanted higher rent payments in return for consenting to the
assignment.
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