PEOPLE OF MI V RAYMOND BERNARD FERGUSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 28, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 214342
Newaygo Circuit Court
LC No. 97-006601-FC
RAYMOND BERNARD FERGUSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Gribbs and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was tried by a jury for extortion in violation of MCL 750.213; MSA 28.410, and for
assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, as well as being an
habitual offender, fourth offense. Defendant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to imprisonment
of 20 to 40 years for the extortion offense and 10 to 15 years for the assault offense, to be served
consecutively to another conviction for which he was on parole at the time of the alleged instant
offenses. Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions and sentences. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed
to request a jury instruction on the defense of claim of right to the extortion charge. Defendant did not
move for a Ginther1 hearing. When there is no Ginther hearing in an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on record. People v Williams, 223 Mich
App 409; 566 NW2d 649 (1997).
In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove that: (1) counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that but for the unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.
People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 157-158; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). “This requires showing that
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.” Id. at 156. Defendant argues that he had a good-faith claim of right to the brown car to
which he demanded the title because, although the title was in his wife’s name, it was really his car and
he had a right to the title. Defendant further argues that if the jury had been instructed regarding a good
faith claim of right, it might not have convicted defendant of extortion. Defendant also argues that he did
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not ask for title to the van, as that was his wife’s vehicle, but that he just wanted to know where the title
to the van was located. MCL 750.213; MSA 28.410, which prohibits extortion, provides:
Any person who shall, either orally or by a written or printed communication, . . .
maliciously threaten any injury to the person or property or mother, father, husband,
wife or child of another with intent hereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage
whatever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do or refrain from doing
any act against his will, shall be guilty of a felony.
Claim of right, however, is not a valid defense to the crime of extortion. People v Maranian, 359
Mich 361; 102 NW2d 568 (1960). “The collection of a valid, enforceable debt does not permit
malicious threats of injury to one’s person, loved ones, or property if payment is not made. Such acts,
if proven, would constitute extortion within the framework of the statute under which defendant was
charged.” Id. at 369. Because defendant used threats to try to obtain titles to the two vehicles and to
obtain money, he had no valid defense to the crime of extortion. Therefore, defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is meritless because defendant did not show that counsel committed any
error. Similarly, defendant’s contention that the court should have sua sponte instructed the jury on the
defense of claim of right to the extortion charge is without merit because claim of right to the money or
property at issue is not a defense to extortion.
Next, defendant argues that the elements of assault with a dangerous weapon were not met
because defendant’s threat to break the jaw of his handicapped daughter was a figure of speech
intended to silence her but not intended to harm her. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a
criminal case, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
However, this Court should not interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of evidence or the
credibility of witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich
1201 (1992). A prosecutor need not negate every reasonable theory of innocence, but must only prove
his own theory beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant
provides. People v Quinn, 219 Mich App 571, 574; 557 NW2d 151 (1996). “The elements of
felonious assault are (1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) with the intent to injure or
place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App
499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999), MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277. The term “assault” is defined as “an
intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or force unlawfully directed toward
person of another, under such circumstances as create well-founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with
apparent present ability to execute attempt, if not prevented.” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed), p 147.
In this case, after defendant had “smashed up” the house with the baseball bat, his daughter, while
holding her three-year-old child, tried to get up from her chair. However, defendant, while holding the
baseball bat in his hand, pushed her back down into the chair and told her that if she moved again, he
would break her jaw with the bat. There is no dispute that a baseball bat is a dangerous weapon. The
victim testified that she was scared and believed that defendant would really break her jaw. Therefore,
in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, the jury could have rationally
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concluded that defendant’s guilt of assault with a dangerous weapon had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Finally, defendant argues that his sentence of ten to fifteen years imprisonment for assault with a
dangerous weapon and twenty to forty years imprisonment for extortion are disproportionate to the
defendant and the crimes. Appellate review of a claim that the sentence is disproportionate is for abuse
of the trial court’s discretion. People v Milbourn at 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). A
sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is disproportionate to the seriousness of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and offender. Id.
The statute governing assault with a dangerous weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82; MSA
28.277, provides for a penalty of imprisonment for not more than four years or a fine of not more than
$2,000, or both for a person convicted of felonious assault. The statute governing extortion, MCL
750.213; MSA 28.410, provides for a penalty of imprisonment of not more than twenty years or by a
fine of not more than $10,000 for a person convicted of extortion. However, defendant’s sentences
were subject to enhancement under the habitual offender, fourth offense statute and defendant was on
parole for a prison escape offense at the time of the instant offense. MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084
provides:
(1) If a person has been convicted of 3 or more felonies, . . . and that person commits
a subsequent felony within this state, the person shall be punished upon conviction as
follows:
(a) If the subsequent felony is punishable upon a first conviction
by
imprisonment for a maximum term of 5 years or more, or for life, then the court . . . may
sentence the person upon conviction of the fourth or subsequent offense to
imprisonment in a state prison for the term of life or for a lesser term.
(b) If the subsequent felony is punishable upon a first conviction by imprisonment for a
maximum term which is less than 5 years, then the court . . . may sentence the person to
imprisonment for a term of 15 years or a lesser term.
In applying the habitual offender penalties under the above statute, the maximum penalty for the assault
conviction increased from four years up to fifteen years as a result of being a fourth offender. The
maximum penalty for the extortion conviction increased from twenty years to any term of years up to life
in prison. In this case, the court gave defendant a sentence of imprisonment of 10 to 15 years for the
assault with a dangerous weapon conviction and 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment for the extortion
conviction. Therefore, both sentences fall within the statutory limits. When an habitual offender’s
underlying felony and criminal history demonstrate that he is unable to conform his conduct to the law, a
sentence within the statutory limits is proportionate. People v Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich
320, 326; 562 NW2d 460 (1997). In light of defendant’s extensive criminal history, there is no dispute
that defendant was unable to conform his conduct to the law. Therefore, defendant’s sentences are
proportionate.
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Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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