PEOPLE OF MI V TERRY DEWAYNE HARDRICK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 28, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 211575
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 97-082608-FH
TERRY DEWAYNE HARDRICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Hoekstra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant Terry DeWayne Hardrick of delivery of less than 50 grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). The trial court sentenced Hardrick as
a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084, to eight to sixteen years’ imprisonment.
Hardrick appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
On October 28, 1997, at approximately 5:30 p.m., undercover police officer Kenneth Rochell
met with confidential informant Ray Glenn. Glenn had arranged a meeting with Hardrick at 6:00 p.m. in
the city of Jackson at the King Center so Rochell could purchase drugs. Rochell and Glenn arrived at
the King Center a few minutes after 5:30 p.m. and waited approximately ten minutes, but Hardrick did
not appear. Rochell and Glenn then left the King Center and drove around the area looking for
Hardrick before driving to Hardrick’s home.
When Rochell and Glen arrived at Hardrick’s home at approximately 6:00 p.m. Rochell parked
in front of the house and Glenn went inside for a minute or two before returning to the car with
Hardrick. At Hardrick’s suggestion, Rochell drove the two other men around the block for two or
three minutes and, as they were driving, Rochell purchased eight rocks of crack cocaine from Hardrick.
Rochell let Hardrick out of the car at the intersection of Martin and Moore Streets in Jackson at
approximately 6:03 p.m.
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At trial, the defense presented three witnesses; however, only the testimony of two of these
witnesses—Hardrick and Robert Knapp—is germane to this appeal. Knapp, defendant’s employer,
testified that, during the week of October 25, 1997, Hardrick was working for him at the Central
Wesleyan Church installing a new roof. Knapp explained that the crew at the Church would work on
the roof until dark, around 5:15 p.m. or 5:20 p.m., when the pastor arrived to lock the church. At that
time, ordinarily, the men would clean up and talk with one another or with the pastor for about ten or
fifteen minutes before leaving the job site between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Knapp noted that
Hardrick’s house was approximately ten to fifteen minutes away from the job site. He did not know
when Hardrick left the job site on October 28, 1997 or what Hardrick did after he left work that day.
Hardrick testified that he worked at the church during the week of October 25, 1997.
However, contrary to Knapp’s recollection, Hardrick said that he worked on the roof until
approximately 5:30 p.m. every night and then, after he cleaned up and talked with Knapp or the church
pastor, he left the job site after 6:00 p.m. Further, with respect to October 28, 1997, Hardrick
specifically stated that he did not leave the job site until well past 6:00 p.m. Then he went home,
immediately changed his clothes, and visited a friend at her home that evening; it took him approximately
ten to twenty minutes to get home from the church.
During his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the testimony delivered by the defense
witnesses. He stated:
What did we generally learn, through, from the testimony that was presented
today by the individuals that the defense brought in? We have Mr. Knapp who stated
that they generally quit sometime between 5:15 and 5:30. If you remember correctly,
he said the pastor usually wandered out about 5:15 to make sure the church was locked
up.
Now all of a sudden defense counsel wants to stand up here in closing and
inform you that gosh, they must have gone on until 6:00 or 6:30 at night, but that’s not
what Mr. Knapp said. If you go back in your minds and review the testimony that he
gave, he generally stated that they were beginning to wrap up around 5:15 or 5:30.
Secondly, you have the defendant and his sister, they both take the stand.
Neither one of them can remember October 28 specifically. I don’t know what to say
about that. Mr. Engle [defense counsel] wants you to feel sorry for the fact that they
can’t remember October 28 specifically. I don’t know whether you can or not, and I
don’t think that really matters.
***
So I don’t know what to say on the people on why they can’t remember what
happened on October 28, 1997. I do know that when you go back to the jury room,
you have that burden as jurors to think about the witness’s credibility, the sister of the
defendant, the defendant, what they have to say, what they do and don’t remember.
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Subsequently, the jury convicted Hardrick and the trial court sentenced him. The only issue on
appeal is whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing arguments.
II. Preservation And Standard Of Review
Ordinarily, to review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct “this Court examines the pertinent
portion of the record and evaluates the prosecutor's remarks in context in order to determine whether
the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Legrone, 205 Mich App 77, 82; 517
NW2d 270 (1994). However, “[a]ppellate review of improper prosecutorial remarks is generally
precluded absent objection by counsel because the trial court is otherwise deprived of an opportunity to
cure the error.” People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
Hardrick’s trial counsel did not object to any of the prosecutor’s closing arguments.
Accordingly, we would be obligated to address this challenge only if failure to consider it would result in
a miscarriage of justice. People v Rivera, 216 Mich App 648, 651; 550 NW2d 593 (1997).
Nevertheless, we choose to address Hardrick’s arguments, Paschke v Retool Industries (On
Rehearing), 198 Mich App 702, 705; 499 NW2d 453 (1993), rev’d on other grounds 445 Mich 502
(1994), while keeping in mind that even if we conclude that the prosecutor did commit misconduct we
will not find a miscarriage of justice if a timely curative instruction could have eliminated any prejudicial
effect of the remarks, id. at 651-652; People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 575; 540 NW2d 728
(1995). Furthermore, a nonconstitutional error is not a ground for reversal unless, after an examination
of the entire case, it affirmatively appears that it is more probable than not that the error determined the
outcome. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
A. The Characterization Of Knapp’s Testimony
Hardrick first argues that prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments by
mischaracterizing Knapp’s testimony. He contends that prosecutor incorrectly stated that Knapp
testified that he and Hardrick usually stopped working at 5:15 p.m., which suggested to the jury that
Hardrick could have arrived home in time to commit the crime for which he was convicted.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Knapp testified that he and his employees
“generally quit sometime between 5:15 and 5:30” and that they began “to wrap up around 5:15 or
5:30.” The prosecutor also argued that Knapp’s testimony did not parallel defense counsel’s argument
that “they must have gone on until 6:00 or 6:30 at night.” Both remarks correctly restated Knapp’s
testimony that he and his employees usually worked on the church’s roof until dark, which was about
5:15 or 5:20 p.m. At that time, Knapp and his employees cleaned up and chatted before leaving the
job site between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.
In view of this testimony in the record, it is clear that the prosecutor did not misstate or
mischaracterize Knapp’s trial testimony. Rather the prosecutor was arguing the evidence, as was
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proper. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich. 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). As a result, Hardrick is not
entitled to relief on this basis.
B. The Characterization Of Hardrick’s Testimony
Hardrick also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he incorrectly stated that
Hardrick did not recall the events of October 28, 1997, the date the crime was committed. Hardrick
argues that his testimony clearly shows that he remembered the events of that day and that the
prosecutor’s misstatement on this issue denied him due process of law.
The record clearly indicates that the prosecutor misstated Hardrick’s testimony to the jury.
Hardrick testified at trial that he remembered that he did not leave the job site on October 28 until after
6:00 p.m. and that he remembered going to a friend’s house after he arrived home that night. It is well
settled that a prosecutor may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is unsupported by the
evidence. Stanaway, supra at 686. Hardrick’s counsel, however, never objected to any of the
prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument. In this case, the prosecutor’s misstatement and any
prejudicial effect could have been cured by a timely instruction from the trial court reminding the jury of
Hardrick’s testimony. Thus, although the prosecutor’s comments were improper, Hardrick has not
shown that a miscarriage of justice resulted, warranting reversal of his conviction in this case. Rivera,
supra at 651-652.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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