PEOPLE OF MI V LEE SIMMONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 28, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 207772
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-152180 FC
LEE SIMMONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Saad and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff charged defendant with assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA
28.278, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2). A jury convicted defendant of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and felony
firearm, for which the trial court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms of one to four years and two
years, respectively. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.
I
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the
charge of assault with intent to commit murder, as well as the lesser offense of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm less than murder. The elements of the offense of assault with intent to commit murder
are “(1) an assault, (2) with an actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing
murder.” In re Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 657; 599 NW2d 736 (1999). Similarly, assault with
intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder requires proof of (1) an assault accompanied by (2)
an intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575
NW2d 316 (1997). Specifically, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish
the element of intent.
After reviewing the record de novo, we disagree. People v Hammons, 210 Mich App 554,
556; 534 NW2d 183 (1995). Minimal circumstantial evidence of intent is sufficient because of the
difficulty in proving an actor's state of mind. People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168; 603 NW2d 95
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(1999). It is not necessary that the state of mind be directed at any particular victim. Abraham, supra,
658.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence of defendant's conduct,
including his use of a weapon naturally adapted to produce death, was sufficient to enable a rational trier
of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to kill a police officer but did not
succeed because his shooting was inaccurate. People v Warren (After Remand), 200 Mich App 586,
588; 504 NW2d 907 (1993); People v Drayton, 168 Mich App 174, 177; 423 NW2d 606 (1988).
We likewise conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish an intent to do great bodily harm less
than murder. People v Mitchell, 149 Mich App 36, 39; 385 NW2d 717 (1986).
Furthermore, defendant’s argument must fail because it is based in part on the now obsolete
Vail rule. People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 464; 227 NW2d 535 (1975). In Vail, our Supreme Court
held that when a jury is permitted to consider a charge not supported by the proofs, the error is
necessarily prejudicial because the possibility of a compromise verdict decreases the defendant’s
chance of an acquittal. Relying on Vail, defendant contends that the higher charges of assault with intent
to murder and assault with intent to commit great bodily harm were unsupported by evidence, and thus
might have induced the jury to compromise on the lesser felonious assault conviction instead of
acquitting d
efendant. However, in People v Graves, 458 Mich 476; 581 NW2d 229 (1998), our
Supreme Court overruled Vail and rejected its “automatic reversal” rule. Id., 481-482. Instead, the
Court applied the current standards for preserved nonconstitutional error and concluded that reversal is
not justified unless it is more probable than not that a different result would have ensued without the
error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Lukity, 460 Mich
484, 494-495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). The Graves Court held that “[w]here a jury acquits a
defendant of an unwarranted charge . . . and a lesser included warranted charge . . . before convicting
of a still lesser charge . . ., we find that it is highly probable that the erroneous submission of the
unwarranted charge did not affect the ultimate verdict.” Id., 487. The Court noted, however, that
reversal may be warranted where “sufficiently persuasive indicia of jury compromise are present”, such
as where “1) logically irreconcilable verdicts are returned, or 2) there is clear record evidence of
unresolved jury confusion, or 3) . . . where a defendant is convicted of the next-lesser offense after the
improperly submitted greater offense.” Id., 487-488.
None of these three circumstances exists here. There are no irreconcilable verdicts or record
evidence of unresolved jury confusion. There is also no indicia of jury compromise. Were we to find
that the assault with intent to murder charge was unwarranted, reversal would not be necessary because
the jury rejected the intermediate great bodily harm charge and convicted defendant of felonious assault.
This claim is without merit.
II
We also find that defendant has not established any basis for relief due to instructional error.
Defendant claims that the trial court’s “state-of-mind” instructions improperly shifted the burden to the
defendant, but this claim is not preserved for appeal because defendant did not object to the instructions
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on this ground at trial. People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393, 398; 551 NW2d 478 (1996).
Therefore, defendant must show plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra at 774.
The jury's acquittal on the charge of assault with intent to commit murder belies defendant's
claim that the court’s state-of-mind instructions prejudiced his defense. Further, defendant is wrong
when he contends that the state-of-mind instructions shifted the burden of proof to defendant or created
a mandatory presumption regarding his intent. People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261, 273-274; 378 NW2d
365 (1985). In accordance with the law, the trial court stated that the jury “may” infer that defendant
intended the usual results that follow from the use of a dangerous weapon; the trial court did not, as
defendant suggests, instruct the jury that it must draw this inference. People v Wright, 408 Mich 1,
20-22; 289 NW2d 1 (1980). The jury instructions as a whole fairly presented the intent issue to the
jury and sufficiently protected defendant's rights. People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139, 143-144;
585 NW2d 341 (1998). We find no basis for reversal.
III
Defendant next argues that he must be resentenced because the trial court failed to articulate its
reasons for the sentences. We disagree. Defendant has not established that the sentences are invalid.
In re Dana Jenkins, 438 Mich 364, 369 n 3; 475 NW2d 279 (1991), abrogated in part on other
grounds, People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 176; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). Further, the articulation
requirement was satisfied under the contextual approach in People v Lawson, 195 Mich App 76, 78;
489 NW2d 147 (1992). The two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction was imposed
because it was mandatory and, while the trial court did not explicitly refer to the guidelines when
imposing its sentence for the felonious assault conviction, it is apparent from the record that the trial
court sentenced defendant in accordance with the guidelines. Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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