PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT EARL LEE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 28, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 207543
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 97-2079 FC
ROBERT EARL LEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and O’Connell and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL
750.83; MSA 28.278, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84;
MSA 28.279, intentional discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, MCL 750.234a; MSA 28.431(1), and
intentional discharge of a firearm at a building, MCL 750.234b; MSA 28.431(2). Defendant was
sentenced to twenty to forty years in prison for the assault with intent to commit murder conviction, a
concurrent term of five to ten years in prison for the assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less
than murder conviction, and two concurrent terms of thirty-two to forty-eight months in prison for the
intentional discharge of a firearm from a vehicle conviction and the intentional discharge of a firearm at a
building conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant's convictions arose from a drive-by shooting that occurred in Battle Creek on March
27, 1997, in which the gunman shot into a group of people at a barbecue. One witness identified
George Reed as the person firing the weapon. Certain witnesses told the police that defendant was the
driver. A short time after the shooting, the police spotted a car that matched the description of the car
involved. Four people were in the car, including George Reed. Defendant was driving the car. Officer
William Bohannon searched the inside of the car and found a box of ammunition for an assault rifle in the
glove compartment, two live shells in the passenger seat, and one spent casing underneath the seats.
The day after the shooting, the assault rifle that apparently was used in the shooting was found on the
ground a short distance from where the shooting occurred.
On appeal, defendant first contends that the prosecutor misstated the law with respect to the
intent required for aiding and abetting, and that the misstatement denied him a fair trial. We disagree.
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The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.
People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 283; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). When reviewing a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must examine the pertinent portions of the record and evaluate the
prosecutor’s remarks in context. Id. Here, defendant did not object to the challenged remarks of the
prosecutor. While review of allegedly improper prosecutorial remarks generally is precluded absent an
objection, an exception exists if a curative instruction could not have eliminated the prejudicial effect or if
failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich
643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
To convict a defendant of assault with intent to commit murder, the prosecution must prove (1)
an assault, (2) with an actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.
People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997). To prove aiding and abetting a
specific intent crime, the prosecution must show that defendant intended the commission of the crime or
had knowledge that the principal had the intent to commit the crime. People v King, 210 Mich App
425, 431; 534 NW2d 534 (1995).
Defendant argues that certain statements made by the prosecutor implied that defendant’s mere
presence or defendant's failure to stop the shooting was sufficient to prove the intent required for
conviction on an aiding and abetting theory. First, defendant claims that the prosecutor’s statement, “If
he drove the car, that’s enough,” misstated the intent required. However, when taken in context, the
remark did not misstate the law. Two sentences earlier, the prosecutor told the jury that defendant “has
to have the intent to kill or he had to have assisted, knowing that George Reed intended this crime.”
When read in context, it is clear that the prosecutor was arguing that, if defendant drove the car with the
intent to kill or with knowledge that the shooter intended to kill, the fact that he was not the shooter, but
merely drove the car, did not mean that he was not guilty of assault with intent to commit murder.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor misstated the intent required when he commented that
the gun was placed across defendant’s chest, pointing out the window, because the statement indicated
that defendant's failure to stop the shooting was sufficient to find him guilty as an aider and abettor.
However, after having reviewed the remarks, we find no error. The statement was made while the
prosecutor was summarizing the facts that supported a conclusion that defendant intended, and knew
that Reed intended, to commit murder: defendant drove the car down the street at two to five miles per
hour, the shooter leaned across defendant's seat to point the semi-automatic rifle out the window, and
ammunition for the assault rifle was found in the glove compartment. The prosecutor’s argument simply
explained to the jury how it could infer that defendant either intended that the murders be committed or
knew that Reed intended to commit murder. Thus, we find no error.
Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor implied that knowledge of Reed’s intent was not
required when she said, “What did he know after the shooting that he didn’t know before?” This
statement was made in the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, after defense counsel had argued that, at
most, defendant was guilty only as an accessory after the fact. The prosecutor’s statement did not
misstate the knowledge required, but rather, was part of the prosecutor’s summary of the evidence
supporting an inference that defendant knew Reed had the intent to kill. Defendant has not shown that
he was denied a fair and impartial trial by the prosecutor’s remarks.
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Defendant next argues that the jury instructions misstated the intent required to prove aiding and
abetting. We disagree. A trial court is required to instruct the jury concerning the law applicable to the
case and to fully and fairly present the case to the jury in an understandable manner. MCL 768.29;
MSA 1052; People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 80; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995);
People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 14; 577 NW2d 179 (1998). Jury instructions should be
considered as a whole rather than extracted piecemeal to establish error. Daoust, supra at 14. Even if
the instructions were somewhat imperfect, there is no error if the instructions fairly presented the issues
to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant's rights. Id. Because defendant failed to object to
the jury instructions at trial, he has waived any error unless relief is necessary to avoid manifest injustice.
People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 376; 572 NW2d 666 (1997).
Here, the court instructed the jury that it had to find that defendant “gave his encouragement or
assistance intending to help another commit that crime.” It later instructed the jury regarding the
elements of aiding and abetting, including the following instruction regarding the knowledge required:
And third, the defendant must have intended the commission of the crime
alleged or must have known that the other person intended its commission at the time of
giving the assistance.
The quoted instruction is an accurate statement of the intent required for an aiding and abetting
conviction. See King, supra at 431. Reading the instructions as a whole, we cannot say that the jury
was misled with respect to the intent required for an aiding and abetting conviction. Thus, we find no
manifest injustice.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied the ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation prejudiced
the defendant to the extent that it denied him a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303;
521 NW2d 797 (1994). To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Stanaway, supra at 687-688. Defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
assistance constituted sound trial strategy. Id. at 687. Because defendant did not move for a new trial
or a Ginther1 hearing, our review is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v Barclay,
208 Mich App 670, 672; 528 NW2d 842 (1995).
First, defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel argued that if the jury believed Nelson’s testimony, then it should find defendant guilty.
However, when read in context, defense counsel’s argument was not improper:
If you believe Antonio Nelson, who lied under oath, who lied at a prior hearing and who
gave a false statement to the police six months ago, then my client’s guilty as charged.
There’s no doubt about it.
Her whole theory rests on whether you believe a little liar on the stand. That’s it.
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***
The whole crux is if you believe Antonio he [defendant] then had a reason or knew
about the shooting. Antonio is nothing but a liar, and there is no other evidence to say
my client knew what was gonna [sic] happen. That’s the argument.
It is clear from the record that defense counsel’s argument did not concede defendant's guilt.
Although defense counsel stated that if the jury believed Nelson’s testimony, it should find defendant
guilty, defense counsel also argued that Nelson’s testimony should not be believed for numerous
reasons. Defense counsel’s argument was trial strategy, which we will not second-guess. People v
Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court’s instructions
regarding the intent required for aiding and abetting. However, we have already concluded that these
instructions were correct. Defense counsel was not required to make meritless objections. People v
Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411, 425; 564 NW2d 149 (1997).
Next, defendant asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel failed to introduce evidence of Nelson’s juvenile record to impeach him. However, the decision
not to impeach a witness, or to impeach by one means as opposed to another, is trial strategy. We
decline to second-guess defense counsel’s strategy, which apparently was to cross-examine Nelson
with respect to his inconsistent prior statements, instead of introducing juvenile adjudications. Rice,
supra. Furthermore, defendant has not demonstrated that the juvenile adjudications would have been
admissible under MRE 609(e) or that he was prejudiced by the alleged error.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements by
the prosecutor characterizing the offense as one taking place between gangs. However, a prosecutor
may argue the evidence and make reasonable inferences from that evidence. People v Kelly, 231 Mich
App 627, 641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). The prosecutor presented testimony that there were gang
related problems in the area, that the car involved in the shooting belonged to a gang, and that there
were some people at the party affiliated with a rival gang. The prosecutor’s argument that defendant
was connected in some way with a gang that was involved in the shooting was a reasonable inference
from the evidence and was not improper. Thus, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object
to this argument.
In a related argument, defendant contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
Nelson’s testimony that people in “these groups” carry assault rifles and to the prosecutor’s argument
that “George Reed was there to settle a score,” and that Reed “was gonna kill ‘em. That’s what they
do.” Defendant asserts that Nelson’s testimony was inadmissible under MRE 404(b), which governs
the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. However, Nelson’s testimony was
introduced in the context of Nelson explaining why, when he had only seen the barrel of the weapon, he
concluded that it was an assault rifle. Furthermore, there was evidence connecting defendant with a
gang. Evidence of gang membership and misconduct by the gang may be admitted to show intent or
knowledge. MRE 404(b)(1); People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 585; 540 NW2d 728 (1995).
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Here, the evidence was admissible and the prosecutor’s comments were proper inferences from the
evidence. Turner, supra.; Kelly, supra. Defendant has failed to show that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the court failed to resolve his
challenges to the presentence report. We disagree. Whether the trial court properly resolved
defendant's challenges to his presentence report is a question of law, which we review de novo. People
v Connor, 209 Mich App 419, 423; 531 NW2d 734 (1995).
The use of inaccurate information at sentencing may violate a defendant's constitutional right to
due process. US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 533
534; 462 NW2d 793 (1990). A defendant may challenge the accuracy of the information contained in
the presentence report at the time of sentencing. MCL 771.14(6); MSA 28.1144(6); Hoyt, supra.
Here, the trial court considered defendant's challenges to the presentence report, but
determined that the report was accurate. The presentence report contained information that defendant
had seven juvenile adjudications, including three that resulted in periods of confinement, and eleven
misdemeanor convictions as an adult. During the sentencing hearing, defendant objected to the
statement in the presentence report that he had been committed five times as a juvenile, saying that he
was confined “about once.” We first note that, although the presentence report indicates that several of
the juvenile adjudications resulted in commitments to the juvenile home, the report also indicates that
certain commitments were suspended. Furthermore, the court commented that the periods of
confinement indicated that several of the periods were served concurrently and that defendant might
recall the concurrent periods as one period of detention. Thus, we find no error in the sentencing
court’s conclusion that the presentence report was accurate with respect to defendant's juvenile record.
Similarly, defendant stated that he did not recall a number of the misdemeanor convictions. However,
we agree with the sentencing court’s conclusion that defendant did not made a sufficient objection to
cause the court to change the report.
Finally, defendant claims that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court sentenced him
on the basis of a desire to send a message to the community rather than imposing an individualized
sentence. We disagree. This court reviews sentencing challenges for an abuse of discretion. People v
Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 653; 461 NW2d 1 (1991).
Defendant's sentence for the assault with intent to commit murder conviction was within the
guidelines. Thus, the sentence is presumptively proportionate. People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 354
355; 408 NW2d 789 (1987). Defendant’s contention that the court was trying to send a message to
the community rather than impose an individualized sentence is based on the last two sentences of the
court’s statement before it imposed sentence and ignores the fact that the court went on at length about
defendant’s extensive criminal history, the fact that he was on probation at the time he participated in the
instant offenses, and the fact that he was an active participant in the assaults. We conclude that
defendant's sentence was based on proper factors and find no abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
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/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-444; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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