PEOPLE OF MI V DONALD MICHAEL SIMMONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 21, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204006
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-004759
DONALD MICHAEL SIMMONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Saad and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA
28.797, and felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277. The trial court sentenced defendant to
twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction and a concurrent term of two to
four years’ imprisonment for the assault conviction. Defendant now appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant first contends that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, had no warrant or
consent to enter his residence, and therefore that evidence regarding his subsequent participation in a
police line up must be suppressed as the product of the illegal arrest. A person’s right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by both the state and federal constitutions. See
People v Smith, 420 Mich 1, 18-19; 360 NW2d 841 (1984), quoting Const 1963, art 1, § 11 and
US Const, Am IV. Without a warrant, a police officer may arrest a person when a felony has in fact
been committed, and the officer “has reasonable cause to believe [that] the person committed it.” MCL
764.15(1)(c); MSA 28.874(1)(c); People v Suchodolski, 22 Mich App 389, 394; 178 NW2d 524
(1970). Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts available to the officer at the moment of arrest would
justify a fair-minded person of average intelligence to believe that the suspected person has committed a
felony. People v Oliver, 417 Mich 366, 374; 338 NW2d 167 (1983); Suchodolski, supra at 394.
When an officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and reasonable cause
to believe that the defendant committed that felony, the arrest is lawful. People v Romano, 35 Mich
App 135, 140; 192 NW2d 271 (1971).
The facts reveal that an eyewitness gave police the license plate number of the vehicle driven by
the perpetrator. Detroit police investigator Shanahan traced the vehicle’s plate number to a car rental
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agency, which indicated that it had rented the vehicle to a Daniel Simmons. Shanahan then spoke to
Daniel Simmons, who informed him that he did not rent the car in question. Indeed, Daniel told
Shanahan that he had seen his brother, Donald Simmons, driving a car similar to that involved in the
offense and that his brother had used Daniel’s name on his driver’s license. Daniel then gave Shanahan
a photograph of his brother, the instant defendant. Detroit police officers Cook and Cole, who were
dispatched to arrest defendant, had been informed by other officers that defendant was suspected of an
armed robbery and felonious assault that occurred on January 14, 1996. Under these circumstances,
probable cause existed to believe that a felony had been committed and that defendant was the
perpetrator. Oliver, supra.
Defendant further claims that the arresting officers’ warrantless entry into his apartment without
consent rendered the arrest illegal. Even assuming that the officers’ arrest was illegal, however, no error
requiring reversal has occurred. Rather, defendant’s sole remedy would constitute the suppression of
any evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest. People v Rice, 192 Mich App 240, 244; 481
NW2d 10 (1991). The invalidity of an arrest does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to try a defendant.
Id.; People v Dalton, 155 Mich App 591; 400 NW2d 689 (1986). Defendant sought to suppress the
victim’s identification of him at a line-up that was precipitated by his arrest. While evidence of the line
up identification was admitted at trial, the victim also provided an in-court identification. The victim
testified repeatedly that she based her in-court identification on her close range observance of defendant
over a period of approximately ten minutes while he struggled to steal her purse. The victim’s in-court
identification of defendant was not suppressible as the fruit of any allegedly illegal arrest. United States
v Crews, 445 US 463, 472-473; 100 S Ct 1244; 63 L Ed 2d 537 (1980). Therefore, even if the
police officers improperly entered defendant’s apartment to effectuate the arrest, any impropriety was
harmless in light of the victim’s in-court identification of defendant. Rice, supra.
Defendant also challenges the photographic identification procedure employed by Shanahan.
Defendant claims that Shanahan impermissibly suggested to the victim that defendant was her assailant
when he showed her five photographs, one at a time, instead of presenting a full array of photographs
for the victim to view simultaneously. A photographic identification procedure can be so suggestive that
it deprives the defendant of due process of law. People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92
(1998). The fairness of an identification procedure is evaluated in light of the total circumstances.
People v Lee, 391 Mich 618, 626; 218 NW2d 655 (1974). The test is whether the procedure was so
impermissibly suggestive that it creates a substantial likelihood of misidentification. People v Kurylczyk,
443 Mich 289, 306; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). In determining the likelihood of misidentification, factors
to consider include the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation. Id. The display of a single photograph combined with an indication that the person
depicted has been arrested for the offense can be unduly suggestive. Gray, supra at 111. If a pretrial
identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, testimony regarding that identification is
inadmissible at trial. Kurylczyk, supra at 303.
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The photographic identification procedure in this case was not impermissibly suggestive. Prior
to the photographic identification procedure, the victim was not told that the suspect’s photograph
would be among the array. Additionally, Shanahan did not suggest that the victim select any of the
photographs. The mere fact that the victim was shown one photograph at a time as Shanahan placed
them on her kitchen table did not render the photographic identification procedure impermissibly
suggestive. This is not a case in which the victim viewed only a single photograph. Compare Gray,
supra. Moreover, no evidence indicated that defendant’s photograph stood out somehow from the
other photographs in a manner suggesting that defendant was the perpetrator. Importantly, the victim
testified that she got a good, close look at defendant during the incident in question. Furthermore, the
photographic identification procedure occurred only three weeks after the incident. Because the totality
of the circumstances reveals nothing impermissibly suggestive about the photographs or the way they
were shown to the victim, we conclude that the trial court properly ruled that the photographic
identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. Kurylczyk, supra.
With respect to defendant’s statement that the line-up conducted at the police station was
impermissibly suggestive because Shanahan told the victim prior to the line-up that “we think we have a
suspect,” we note that “[w]henever a witness is called in for a lineup that witness may infer that the
lineup will contain possible suspects. The fact that the police stated the obvious hardly can be seen as
an inducement of the witness to pick someone out of the lineup.” People v Smith, 108 Mich App 338,
343-344; 310 NW2d 235 (1981).
Next, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motions
for a mistrial and for new trial based on the prosecutor’s failure to comply with a discovery order.
People v Manning, 434 Mich 1, 7; 450 NW2d 534 (1990) (The grant or denial of a motion for
mistrial rests in the trial court’s sound discretion.); People v Jones, 236 Mich App 396, 404; 600
NW2d 652 (1999) (A trial court’s decision whether to grant a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.); People v Davie (After Remand), 225 Mich App 592, 597-598; 571 NW2d 229 (1997)
(The trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate remedy for noncompliance with a discovery order
requires inquiry into all the relevant circumstances, including the causes of the noncompliance and any
showing by the objecting party of actual prejudice, and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.).
Because it appears from the record that the prosecutor did not know that witness Alice Wilder had
participated in a photographic identification procedure, this case does not involve an intentional
discovery violation. Furthermore, because defendant elicited from Wilder on cross-examination the
circumstances surrounding the identification procedure and Wilder’s failures to identify defendant,
defendant suffered no prejudice from the prosecutor’s failure to disclose this information before trial.
See People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999) (“[A] preserved, nonconstitutional
error is not a ground for reversal unless ‘after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively
appear’ that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.”). Because the
allegedly exculpatory evidence was fully presented to the jury, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motions for a mistrial and for new trial.
Defendant additionally raises several alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct during
closing argument. We have considered defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct and we
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conclude that he was not denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336,
342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). The comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument
responded to issues raised by defense counsel during his closing argument, and therefore do not
constitute reversible error. People v Sharbnow, 174 Mich App 94, 100-101; 435 NW2d 772
(1989).
Defendant further avers that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony from the victim that
violated a pretrial order prohibiting “reference to complications/consequences of injury to [the victim’s]
fetus or anything associated with delivery as result of alleged offenses.” We note, however, that the
victim testified only that she was hooked up to a fetal monitor. She did not testify that she suffered any
pregnancy complications or that her baby was injured during the armed robbery and assault. Even if the
reference to the fetal monitor qualifies as somewhat improper, it was so fleeting and innocuous that it did
not deny defendant a fair and impartial trial given the other substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt
presented at trial. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096; Lukity, supra.
Next, we reject defendant’s claim that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence. As defendant admits, the evidence in question, the testimony of an alleged alibi
witness, his girlfriend, was not newly or recently discovered. Defendant concedes that he was fully
aware of his girlfriend’s potential testimony prior to trial. Therefore, he is not entitled to a new trial on
the basis of newly discovered evidence. People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352, 362-363; 255 NW2d 171
(1977); People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 559; 496 NW2d 336 (1992).
Lastly, defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to subpoena defendant’s girlfriend, Soyna Harris, to provide alibi testimony. Because
there was no evidentiary hearing on defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court’s
review is limited to mistakes apparent on the existing record. People v Darden, 230 Mich App 597,
604; 585 NW2d 27 (1998). This Court must determine whether the existing record reveals that
defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the
representation so prejudiced defendant that it deprived him of a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich
298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
There is a presumption that counsel provided effective assistance, and the defendant bears the
heavy burden of overcoming that presumption. People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d
809 (1995). The defendant must also overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s assistance
constituted sound trial strategy.” People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
The decision whether to present a particular witness is a matter of trial strategy that may constitute
ineffective assistance only when a failure to present the witness deprives the defendant of a substantial
defense. People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 537-538; 462 NW2d 793 (1990).
Defendant claims on appeal that Harris would have offered testimony to indicate that he was
with her at the time of the charged offense. Although nothing in the lower court record supports this
contention, defendant attached to his brief on appeal two unsworn, recorded statements Harris made,
one dated November 30, 1996, before trial, and one dated June 2, 1997, after trial and sentencing.
Both of these statements contain Harris’ contention that defendant was present with her during the early
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morning hours of January 14, 1996, the time period when the crimes occurred. Defendant also
attached to his brief on appeal an affidavit of his trial counsel, who acknowledged that before trial he
had filed an alibi notice listing Harris as an intended witness. While defendant and his counsel had
knowledge of Harris, defense counsel’s affidavit indicates that he did not present Harris as a witness
because “[p]rior to trial, I was informed by Ms. Harris that she did not intend to testify on the
Defendant’s behalf in support of his defense of alibi due to some animosity that had arisen between Ms.
Harris and the Defendant.” Defendant in his brief on appeal and Harris in her second recorded
statement acknowledge that they had a falling out. This Court will not second guess trial counsel on
matters relating to trial strategy. Pickens, supra at 330. In light of the undisputed fact that defendant
and Harris had a falling out prior to trial and that Harris bore animus against defendant, we cannot
conclude that the decision not to call Harris represents unsound trial strategy.
Defendant also argues, in a pro se supplemental brief, that counsel was ineffective for failing to
seek suppression of Alice Wilder’s in-court identification of defendant after defense counsel discovered
a tainted pretrial identification procedure, and when the record clearly indicated that Wilder had no
independent basis for making an in-court identification of defendant. Our review of the record reveals
that even if the photographic identification process was tainted, however, Wilder’s testimony sufficiently
demonstrates that she possessed an independent basis for her in-court identification of defendant.
Therefore, defense counsel was not required to make a motion to suppress her testimony on the
grounds that there was no independent basis for Wilder’s in-court identification. Counsel is not required
to argue a frivolous or meritless motion.1 Darden, supra at 605.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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To the extent that defendant additionally argues that defense counsel should have moved to suppress
the car rental agent’s in-court identification, after reviewing the record we likewise find no error in this
respect. Even assuming arguendo that defense counsel unreasonably failed to object to the car rental
agent’s in-court identification of defendant, in light of the other evidence presented at trial we find no
reasonable likelihood that defendant suffered any prejudice or was deprived of a fair trial. Pickens,
supra.
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