CORA DAVIS V GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CORA DAVIS, EVON GERLOFS,
JAMES H. PAGE, DIEGO GARZA,
GLENN BEARD, JAMES POWELL,
BARBARA UTTER, and ROBERT R. FOSTER,
UNPUBLISHED
January 18, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellants,
v
No. 212297
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 95-1539-CZ
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Kelly and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs are former employees of the General Motors Corporation (GM) who appeal as of
right from a May 29, 1998, order granting summary disposition of their age discrimination action in
favor of defendant GM. Plaintiffs contend that the court erred when it found they had failed to establish
factual issues to support their allegations that they had been fraudulently induced into releasing such
claim. We disagree.
Due to a decline in sales, loss of market share, and unprofitability in the late 1980’s and early
1990’s, GM determined that its metal stamping plant located in Kalamazoo would be closed. On
December 3, 1992, Thomas Brady, manufacturing manager for the Cadillac Luxury Car Division Metal
Centers, announced to the Kalamazoo workforce that GM would close the Kalamazoo stamping plant
at the end of 1995. It is undisputed that at the time Brady made the announcement, he unequivocally
indicated that the decision to close the plant was final and that GM would begin to phase out jobs
almost immediately.
As an alternative to job transfer or layoff, GM offered qualified employees an opportunity to
participate in what was known as the Special Accelerated Attrition Agreement (SAAA), an enhanced
retirement offer collectively bargained for with the United Autoworkers Union (UAW), which was being
made available to GM employees nationwide. Despite the proffered finality of the closing decision, in
the months that followed the closing announcement, the UAW repeatedly requested that GM reconsider
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its decision to close the Kalamazoo plant. As a result of national contract negotiations between GM
and the international UAW in mid-September 1993, GM agreed to extend the life of the Kalamazoo
facility to the end of the 1998 model year.
Plaintiffs allege that by indicating that the decision to close the Kalamazoo facility was “etched in
stone” or otherwise final, defendant compelled hundreds of older workers, concerned over finding other
employment, to give up their highly paid positions and accept retirement under the SAAA. Because the
life of the plant was subsequently extended through 1998, plaintiffs contend that their otherwise
voluntary retirements amount to age discrimination and constructive discharge in violation of Michigan’s
Civil Rights Act, Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq.
On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in finding that they failed to establish a
genuine issue of fact regarding their claims of fraud in the inducement and execution of the SAAA and its
accompanying release.
The SAAA conditions of separation form signed by each plaintiff provides in relevant part:
In consideration for participation in the Special Accelerated Attrition Agreement, I
hereby release and forever discharge GM and its officers, directors, and employees
from all claims, demands and causes of action, known or unknown which I may have
based on my employment or the cessation of my employment with GM. This release
specifically includes without limitation, a release of any rights or claims I may have under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which prohibits age discrimination, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment based on
race, color, national origin, religion or sex; the Equal Pay Act; state fair employment
practices or civil rights laws; and any other federal, state or local laws or regulations, or
any common law actions relating to employment discrimination. This includes without
limitation any claims for breach of employment contract, either express or implied, and
wrongful discharge. I further agree not to institute any proceedings against GM or its
officers, directors, agents, employees or stockholders, based on any matter relating to
my employment or the cessation of my employment at GM.
Such releases are enforceable in Michigan as a valid waiver of claims of employment discrimination
under the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Rowady v K Mart Corp, 170 Mich App 54; 428 NW2d 11
(1988).
A trial court's grant of summary disposition is reviewed de novo on appeal. Spiek v Dep't of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Amorello v Monsanto Corp,
186 Mich App 324, 329; 463 NW2d 487 (1990). The motion must specifically identify the issues
regarding which the moving party believes there is no genuine issue of material fact. MCR 2.116(G)(4);
Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 160; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). In ruling on the motion, the
trial court must consider not only the pleadings, but also any depositions, affidavits, admissions, or other
documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
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MCR 2.116(G)(5). Such evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998).
In presenting a motion for summary disposition, the moving party has the initial burden of
supporting its position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence.
Neubacher v Globe Furniture Rentals, 205 Mich App 418, 420; 522 NW2d 335 (1994). The
burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Id.
Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a nonmoving party, the nonmoving
party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to set
forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. MCR 2.116(G)(4); McCart v J
Walter Thompson, 437 Mich 109, 115; 469 NW2d 284 (1991). If the opposing party fails to present
documentary evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly
granted. McCormick v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 202 Mich App 233, 237; 507 NW2d 741 (1993).
In order to show fraud, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant made a material
representation, (2) that the representation was false, (3) that when the defendant made the
representation, the defendant knew that it was false, or made it recklessly without knowledge of its truth
or falsity, (4) that the defendant made it with the intent that the plaintiff would act on it, (5) that the
plaintiff acted in reliance on it, and (6) that the plaintiff suffered injury. Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc, 215
Mich App 198, 208; 544 NW2d 727 (1996).
In this case the trial court, in ruling on GM’s motion for summary disposition, held that there was
no evidence to demonstrate that as of December 1992, GM knowingly falsely represented that the plant
would close in 1995. Because proof of some false representation made with an intent to deceive is a
necessary element of the fraud claimed to invalidate the release, we agree with the circuit court's
reasoning that, without such evidence, plaintiffs were bound by the release.
Plaintiffs had the heavy burden of proving that in order to induce its employees to accept the
SAAA, GM falsely represented its intent to close the plant at the end of the 1995 model year. At the
very least, plaintiffs were obligated to produce some documentary evidence from which it could be
inferred that at the time GM announced its intent to close the plant, the company intended something
else. McCart, supra, 437 Mich 115. Plaintiffs, however, have failed to do so. With the exception of
speculation based solely upon the fact that the plant’s life was extended to 1998, plaintiffs offer nothing
to support their allegations that GM knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, fraudulently
induced them into accepting the SAAA and signing a release of all claims against GM. In fact, plaintiffs’
responses to deposition questions posed by GM clearly indicate a lack of specific facts or documentary
evidence in support of their position. In response to questions regarding the factual basis for their
allegations of fraud, plaintiffs merely speculated, based solely upon the subsequent decision to hold the
plant open for an additional three years, that GM had knowingly misrepresented its intentions. As
previously noted, mere allegation or speculation is not enough to establish an issue of material fact.
Although the determination of whether GM actually intended to close the Kalamazoo plant in
1995 when it announced its decision in December 1992 is a factual matter, plaintiffs have failed to
provide any documentary evidence to refute the various affidavits and deposition testimony of GM
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officials, including Tom Brady, stating that the company had no intent to defraud plaintiffs with respect to
that fact.
According to affidavits filed by production and engineering officials at the Kalamazoo plant,
immediately after the plant closing was announced in December 1992, GM began taking steps to
transfer ongoing production and associated press equipment to other metal stamping facilities. The first
movement of presses began near the end of January 1993, approximately seven weeks after the original
plant closing announcement. From December 1992, when GM first announced its decision to close the
plant, through October 1993, when it was announced that the life of the plant would be extended to
1998, a number of presses were moved out of Kalamazoo each month. It appears that throughout
1993, GM was working to close the plant; reallocating production, removing equipment, and
transferring employees. Plaintiffs offer nothing to combat GM’s assertion that the plant would have
been completely shut down by the end of the 1995 model year if not for the scheduled negotiations with
the UAW. Based upon the facts established by the record, it cannot be said that there was an issue of
fact upon which reasonable minds could differ. Consequently, we find that the trial court's grant of
summary disposition was proper.
Plaintiffs argue that they need not show that the plant closing announcement was false, but rather
need only show that the announcement was made recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth.
Plaintiffs contend this burden was met because Tom Brady, the person who announced the 1995
closing date, testified that he had not been involved in the decision making process that led up to the
plant closing decision, nor was he informed as to the rationale for the decision prior to his making the
announcement. Plaintiffs, citing Wettlaufer Mfg Co v Detroit Bank, 324 Mich 684, 692; 37 NW2d
674 (1949), argue that such conduct represents actionable fraud based upon a reckless
misrepresentation of fact made without knowledge of its truth. We disagree.
In Wettlaufer, the Court observed that an “unqualified affirmation of a fact not known to be
true may constitute fraud, subjecting the speaker to liability, even though he lacked actual knowledge of
its falsity and was himself deceived.” Id., 692, citing 37 CJS, Fraud, § 21, 255-257. We do not
believe this observation is applicable to the case at bar. In this case, the day before the announcement,
Brady was contacted by his superior and informed of the decision to close the Kalamazoo facility.
Brady was further informed that it was his duty to announce the decision to the employees. Although it
is true that Brady, at the time he announced the unqualified closing of the plant, did not know the basis
for his superior’s decision, to hold that his actions in reliance on orders from his superiors constituted
fraudulent behavior would stretch too far the rationale underlying fraud as a cause of action. As
previously noted, plaintiffs have offered no evidence to support a finding that GM intended something
other than to close the plant at the end of 1995. Likewise, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
Brady had no basis to believe that the plant closing announcement he made at the behest of his superiors
was not true.
Next, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in failing to consider plaintiffs’ allegation of fraud
in the execution of the SAAA documents. According to plaintiffs, one of the critical considerations
which caused plaintiffs to accept the SAAA was their understanding that the agreement included a
promise of health care benefits for the employee and his family for the duration of the employee’s life.
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Apparently, however, all benefit packages offered by GM, including those provided under the SAAA,
are subject to GM/UAW negotiation in the national contract that is collectively bargained for every three
years and as such are subject to modification. Plaintiffs claim to have been told that their benefits under
the SAAA would not be subject to change. However, the SAAA conditions of separation form signed
by each plaintiff clearly states the opposite:
I understand that GM and the UAW may be considering and in the future may agree to amend
GM’s benefit plans and make available different retirement or separation benefits for which I
may not be eligible. I further understand the GM benefits plans provide that the Corporation
reserves the right to amend, modify, suspend or terminate each plan. Neither this agreement nor
the provisions of the Special Accelerated Attrition Agreement limit or in any way modify these
provisions of the benefit plans or the UAW’s ability to negotiate regarding such modifications.
In light of this provision, we find unpersuasive plaintiffs’ argument that they were somehow
defrauded into executing an agreement that they did not intend to enter. As this Court has previously
stated, "[i]t is well established that a person cannot avoid a written contract on the ground that he did
not attend to its terms, did not read it, supposed it was different in its terms, or that he believed it to be a
matter of mere form." Rowady, supra, 60.
Moreover, plaintiffs have again failed in their burden to provide the evidentiary support required
under MCR 2.116(G)(4). In support of their claims of fraud regarding the extent of benefits provided
under the SAAA, plaintiffs offer no specific instance wherein an authorized member of GM management
explicitly informed them that their benefits would be unreduced for the duration of their lives. Rather,
plaintiffs attempt to support their allegations merely by asserting that they were so informed by “GM
management” or by UAW benefits representatives. As previously noted, such conclusory allegations
are not enough to establish an issue of material fact.
Plaintiffs next challenge the validity of the release under federal law. Specifically, plaintiffs argue
that the release relied upon by GM is in violation of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA), 29 USC 626, and is therefore invalid and unenforceable. We find this challenge to be
without merit.
In 1990, Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), by adding 29
USC 626(f), the OWBPA, which regulates employee waivers and releases under the ADEA. The
OWBPA provides that "[a]n individual may not waive any right or claim under [the ADEA] unless the
waiver is knowing and voluntary," and that "a waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary
unless at a minimum" it conforms to certain specific statutory requirements. 29 USC 626(f)(1). Thus,
an employee may not waive an ADEA claim unless the employer complies with the specific duties
imposed upon it by the statute. See Oubre v Entergy Operations, Inc, 522 US 422; 118 S Ct 838,
841; 139 L Ed 2d 849 (1998). For example, an employer requesting a waiver in connection with a
termination program offered to a group of employees must give the employee a period of at least forty
five days in which to consider the waiver agreement, see 29 USC 626(f)(1)(F)(ii), and must inform the
employee of certain facts about the group of individuals eligible or selected for the program, including
their job titles and ages. Id.; 29 USC 626(f)(1)(H). The required information must be given to the
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employee "at the commencement of the period" which the employee is given to consider the waiver. 29
USC 626(f)(1)(H).
In the present case, plaintiffs argue that because GM failed to comply with the requirement that
each employee be given 45 days in which to consider the agreement, and because GM did not provide
them with the specified information regarding the job titles and ages of other employees involved in the
same termination program, the release relied upon by GM is invalid and unenforceable under the
OWBPA. Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the OWBPA is misplaced. Failure to comply with the OWBPA
does not invalidate release of plaintiffs’ claims under the Civil Rights Act, since the provisions of the
OWBPA apply only to the ADEA and not to state law claims. Branker v Pfizer, Inc, 981 F Supp
862 (SDNY, 1997); see also Carr v Armstrong Air Conditioning, Inc, 817 F Supp 54 (ND Ohio,
1993)(finding violations of OWBPA to invalidate release as to federal ADEA claim, but leaving release
intact as to state law claims). Therefore the release remains effective as to plaintiffs’ claims of
discrimination under Michigan’s Civil Rights Act.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
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