PEOPLE OF MI V STACIE LYNN MUNDAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 14, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 213776
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007526 FH
STACIE LYNN MUNDAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Gribbs and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of delivery and conspiracy to deliver less than
fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), MCL 750.157(a);
MSA 28.354(1). The trial court sentenced defendant for two to twenty years’ imprisonment on each
conviction. Defendant appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial for several reasons.
For a defendant to successfully establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, she would have been acquitted. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643; 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1995). There is a strong presumption that
counsel’s decisions were a matter of sound trial strategy. Id. at 687. Because there is no lower court
ruling regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court’s review is essentially, de novo, limited to
mistakes apparent on the record below. People v Nantelle, 215 Mich App 77, 87; 544 NW2d 667
(1996).
First, defendant contends that defense counsel should have either sought to limit Lorrie Ann
Huffman’s written statement to the police to its relevant portions for impeachment purposes, not
questioned her regarding this statement, or at the very least, not introduced it into evidence. According
to defendant, by questioning Huffman about her statement and admitting it into evidence, the prosecution
was able to ask Huffman about other irrelevant portions of her statement. Second, defendant maintains
that defense counsel should have known through proper investigation and discovery that defense
witness, Karen Ramsey, had prior contacts with the police. Defendant reasons that had defense
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counsel obtained this information, he could have limited the admission of this information or not called
her as a witness so that the prosecution would not have been able to use this information and attack the
witness’ credibility at trial. Finally, defendant claims that defense counsel should have requested an
addict-informer instruction, CJ2d 5.7, so that the jury would have been able to more closely examine
the credibility of Huffman’s testimony.
In regard to her first two arguments, defendant has failed to overcome the strong presumption
that defense counsel’s decisions were sound trial strategy. Id. Huffman was the primary witness against
defendant. Defense counsel’s decision to impeach Huffman with her written statement and to introduce
it into evidence to attack her credibility was a matter of trial strategy. People v Stacy, 193 Mich App
19, 24; 484 NW2d 675 (1992). In addition, defense counsel called Karen Ramsey as a witness to
attack the credibility of Huffman. This, too, was a matter of trial strategy. People v Mitchell, 454
Mich 145, 162; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). Further, although defense counsel may not have known about
Ramsey’s prior involvement with the police, defense counsel did attempt to limit the admission of this
particular information. Finally, defendant’s argument, that defense counsel’s performance was deficient
for failure to request an addict-informer instruction is not supported by the record; counsel requested
the instruction.
Even if defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
defendant failed to provide evidence that had defense counsel not made these decisions, the outcome of
the case would have been different. Stanaway, supra. There was strong circumstantial evidence to
support defendant’s convictions and the errors of which defendant complains were not particularly
prejudicial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that defendant was not deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting finger scales and a
vial containing cocaine residue into evidence. To the extent that defendant claims that these items were
inadmissible under MRE 404(b)(1) and MRE 401, this claim is unpreserved for review because
defendant failed to establish that plain error occurred at trial regarding these claims. People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Defendant did, however, argue that these items were inflammatory; that is, their probative value
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under MRE 403, and the trial court
disagreed. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for a clear abuse of
discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). We conclude that the
probative value of the items was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under
MRE 403. These items had strong probative value because, as the trial court correctly determined,
they indicated that it was likely that cocaine was being distributed from the home of defendant and
Rezendes. Further, these items created little, if any, risk of unfair prejudice against defendant. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence.
Defendant finally argues that Huffman’s testimony, that Rezendes told her on the phone that
defendant would deliver cocaine to her in a parking lot of a bar, was hearsay under MRE 801(d)(2)(E).
Specifically, defendant argues that Huffman’s testimony regarding this statement by Rezendes was
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hearsay because there was no independent proof before this testimony that defendant conspired with
Rezendes to deliver cocaine to Huffman. Defendant reasons that, excluding this statement, there was
insufficient evidence to support her conviction for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. As stated previously,
we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. Starr,
supra at 494.
Under MRE 801(d)(2)(E), a statement is not hearsay if it is “a statement by a coconspirator of
a party during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy on independent proof of the
conspiracy.” People v Cotton, 191 Mich App 377, 392; 478 NW2d 681 (1991); People v Gay,
149 Mich App 468, 470; 386 NW2d 556 (1986); People v Moscara, 140 Mich App 316, 319; 364
NW2d 318 (1985). The standard of proof for establishing independent proof of a conspiracy is a
preponderance of the evidence. People v Vega, 413 Mich 773, 782; 321 NW2d 675 (1982). After
reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that Huffman’s
testimony regarding what Rezendes told her over the telephone was not hearsay under MRE
801(d)(2)(E); there was independent proof of a conspiracy between defendant and Rezendes before
her testimony. As the trial court correctly determined, there was strong circumstantial evidence that a
conspiracy existed because Huffman testified that she called Rezendes to purchase cocaine, and that
defendant delivered it to her the same day.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
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