PEOPLE OF MI V DOUGLAS FRISHETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 11, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 217322
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 97-040511-FH
DOUGLAS FRISHETT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Kelly and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the January 8, 1999 order of the trial court granting
defendant Douglas Frishett’s motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.
Defendant was originally charged with criminal sexual conduct, fourth degree, MCL 750.520e;
MSA 28.788(5), and attempted criminal sexual conduct, third degree, MCL 750.520d(1)(a); MSA
28.788(4)(1)(a), MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287. On the day of trial, defense counsel moved to withdraw
as counsel, giving as his reason for wanting to withdraw defendant’s failure to keep appointments in
order to prepare for trial. He also informed the court that he and defendant had a difference of opinion
as to defendant’s innocence. The court warned defendant that if it allowed counsel to withdraw, it
could order defendant jailed to ensure that he was available for any new counsel. It then ordered
defendant and defense counsel to meet in a nearby conference room in order to discuss an apparent
plea offer. The prosecutor accompanied them at defense counsel’s request. When the parties
emerged, they announced an agreement; defendant would enter a plea of nolo contendere to CSC IV,
and the attempted CSC III charge would be dismissed. The court accepted defendant’s plea and later
sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to two to three years’
imprisonment.
Defendant later moved to withdraw his plea, contending that his plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily. Defendant maintained h was effectively coerced into the no contest plea
e
because of the conduct of his lawyer. At the hearing on defendant’s motion, Edward Anderson,
defendant’s trial counsel, testified that his strategy had been to attempt to get the attempted CSC III
charge dismissed. The CSC IV charge was supported by a written statement signed by defendant
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admitting his complicity. Anderson hoped to avoid substantial incarceration for defendant. He had
moved to withdraw as counsel because defendant had changed his position on the charges, saying that
he wanted to contest both charges. When the court ordered them to discuss a plea offer, Anderson
told defendant that sexual assault cases were not a very popular issue due to a recent highly publicized
case in the area involving the kidnapping and murder of a child; the victim in plaintiff’s cases was a
fourteen-year-old girl.
Defendant presented a somewhat different version of events. He denied ever admitting guilt in
the CSC IV case; he had told the polygraph examiner that he may have touched the victim’s breast, but
not “in a meaning manner or anything,” apparently meaning that any touching was inadvertent. He
claimed that Anderson had told him that he would move to withdraw as counsel because he did not
want to take the case to trial. Defendant also said that he did not understand that a plea of nolo
contendere meant that he would not be able to contest the charges; however, he later admitted that the
court explained the legal significance of the plea.
The court granted defendant’s motion to withdraw the plea, finding that, although counsel’s
representation did not fall below an objective standard of effectiveness, the conduct of counsel, together
with the trial court’s failure to administer an oath to defendant before advising him of the consequences
of his plea and the failure to inform defendant that the court had discretion to set a maximum punishment
that was lower than the maximum allowable for the offense, rendered defendant’s plea involuntary.
We review a trial court’s decision to set aside a plea-based conviction for an abuse of
discretion. People v Ovalle, 222 Mich App 463, 465; 564 NW2d 147 (1997). To set aside a guilty
plea, a defendant must show error in the plea proceeding. MCR 6.311(B); People v Montrose, 201
Mich App 378, 380; 506 NW2d 565 (1993). However, not all errors in plea proceedings entitle a
defendant to withdraw his plea; the errors must be such that a defendant’s plea was not accurate, or
was made involuntarily or without understanding. See In re Oakland Co Prosecutor, 191 Mich App
113, 120, 122; 477 NW2d 455 (1991). This Court may consider the record as a whole to determine
whether a plea was voluntary. See People v Bettistea, 181 Mich App 194, 197; 448 NW2d 781
(1989).
I. CUMULATIVE ERROR
The trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea is premised upon a
cumulative error analysis. Otherwise harmless error may result in reversal when the cumulative effect of
a number of errors is found to have denied defendant of his right to a fair trial. People v Skowronski,
61 Mich App 71, 77; 232 NW2d 306 (1975). A prerequisite to a finding of cumulative error is actual
error in the proceedings. Mere irregularity in the proceedings does not constitute error. As more fully
set forth below, because we find that defense counsel was not ineffective and we find no error in the
court’s failure to inform defendant of the court’s discretion to impose a sentence less than the maximum
term of incarceration, we find that a cumulative error analysis cannot support the trial court’s decision to
allow defendant to withdraw his plea.
II. CONDUCT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
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Plaintiff contends that the court abused its discretion by considering the conduct of counsel in
determining that the plea was involuntary, since the court had already determined that counsel was not
ineffective. 1 We agree. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel defendant must show
that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing norms.
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 309; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Moreover, under Michigan law,
counsel's ineffective assistance must be found to have been prejudicial in order to reverse an otherwise
valid conviction. Id. at 314. In this case, the court specifically found that counsel’s assistance was not
ineffective because it did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thus, the court’s
consideration of counsel’s “less than optimal” assistance is irrelevant to t e issue of whether there
h
existed error in the plea proceedings. Montrose, supra at 380.
Moreover, there is no indication on the record that trial counsel’s assistance was inadequate in
any way. Counsel sought to withdraw from the case because defendant had refused to cooperate in
contacting witnesses and wanted counsel to change his trial strategy. There is also some indication in
the record that defendant wanted counsel to offer perjured testimony. Therefore, we find that the trial
court abused it’s discretion by considering counsel’s performance in determining that defendant’s plea
was involuntary.
III. FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF COURT’S DISCRETION TO SENTENCE
BELOW THE MAXIMUM TERM OF INCARCERATION
We also find that the trial court improperly considered its failure to inform defendant of the
court’s discretion to sentence him to less than the maximum term of incarceration. We again reiterate
that defendant must demonstrate error in the plea proceedings. Montrose, supra at 380. However,
there is no requirement that the court inform a defendant that it has discretion to impose a sentence less
than the maximum term of incarceration. The Supreme Court held in Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96,
118; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), that a judge is not required “to inform the defendant of all sentence
consequences - only the maximum sentence, any mandatory minimum and . . . if he is on probation or
parole, the possible effect on his status as a probationer or parolee.” See also MCR 6.302(B)(2),
which incorporates this holding.
IV. FAILURE TO PLACE DEFENDANT UNDER OATH AT THE PLEA PROCEEDING
The trial court also held that the failure to place defendant under oath before his plea contributed
to its finding that defendant’s plea was involuntary. Because we have found that the court improperly
considered the other two factors, we must determine whether the sole fact that defendant was not under
oath at the plea proceeding requires a finding of involuntariness. MCR 6.302(A) requires that the court
place the defendant under oath before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Plaintiff argues that
under Guilty Plea Cases, supra, the failure to administer an oath does not render the plea involuntary.
However, Guilty Plea Cases merely stopped the practice of automatically reversing convictions for
technical violations of the rules concerning the taking of guilty pleas. Guilty Plea Cases did not strip
trial courts of the discretion to determine that a rule violation in a particular case served to render a plea
involuntary. The court must find that as a result of the rule violation, the plea was rendered involuntary.
In this case, the court specifically held in its order denying the motion for reconsideration that the failure
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to place defendant under oath “deprived the court of an important mechanism . . . in determining
whether defendant was telling the truth [at the time of his motion to withdraw his plea or at the plea
proceeding.]”2 In so holding, the trial court found either: (1) defendant’s statements under oath relating
to the motion to withdraw his plea were more credible than his statements at the plea proceeding; or (2)
that the court could not find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was truthful when he
offered his plea. This Court cannot resolve questions of credibility or conflicting evidence; such
questions must be resolved by the trial court. See People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28; 592
NW2d 75 (1998). We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The failure to
place defendant under oath at the plea proceeding constituted error and the trial court’s findings support
the conclusion that the plea was not voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly made.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
1
We note that defendant has challenged the court’s conclusion that counsel was not ineffective.
Because defendant did not file a claim of cross-appeal, he has presented nothing for review. MCR
7.207(B).
2
Admittedly, defendant’s testimony at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea was conflicting
and contradictory, especially with respect to his understanding of the meaning of a nolo plea. He first
testified that he believed that he would still be able to contest the charges; on cross-examination,
however, he admitted that the trial court had explained the meaning of a nolo plea to him. Evidently, the
trial court concluded that it would take as true defendant’s sworn testimony.
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