DAWN SHARYLL SUCHECKI V DAVID JOSEPH SUCHECKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAWN SHARYLL SUCHECKI,
UNPUBLISHED
January 7, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 211777
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 96-026254 DO
DAVID JOSEPH SUCHECKI,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this divorce action, plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court's entry of an amended
judgment of divorce consistent with the recommendations of the Ottawa Circuit Court Referee. We
affirm.
Plaintiff and defendant were married when they were both nineteen years of age, and after
thirty-four years of marriage, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce. During their marriage, the couple
started SOS Engineering, which at the time of divorce, had been in operation for over twenty years.
After a bench trial, the court issued a judgment to which plaintiff took exception. Following a hearing
before the Ottawa Circuit Court Referee, the court issued an order amending its original judgment
consistent with the referee's recommendations. In pertinent part, the amended order included that:
plaintiff was awarded the marital home; defendant was awarded both the building and the business of
SOS; no alimony was awarded to plaintiff but the court reserved alimony if circumstances changed; and
defendant was awarded three vehicles while plaintiff was awarded the vehicle in her possession. The
court valued defendant’s assets at $966,818 and plaintiff’s assets at $149,937. The court held that an
equal division would result with each having $558,378 and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $408,441.
Because most of the parties’ assets were derived from the family business, SOS Engineering,
defendant was not able to pay cash up front to plaintiff without selling the company or leveraging it to
the point where it could not operate. Ultimately, therefore, the court imposed a payment structure
pursuant to which defendant was to pay plaintiff $110,000 upon entry of the judgment and the balance
of $298,441 over a term of thirteen years at seven percent interest. The court ordered that a pledge of
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stock of the company and a lien on the business assets of the company be given to plaintiff as security
for the $298,441 that defendant owed to plaintiff.
On appeal, plaintiff first agues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to provide
adequate security for payment to plaintiff of the property settlement provisions of the divorce decree.
Next, plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion in denying alimony. Plaintiff additionally argues
that the trial court erred in failing to award plaintiff a vehicle free of obligations; that the trial court
abused its discretion in dividing the parties’ property equally, rather than apportioning the property
favorably to plaintiff; and, that the trial court clearly erred in valuing the marital home and the business
real estate because it used two different valuation dates. We find no merit in plaintiff’s various
arguments and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Property settlements in divorce cases are reviewed de novo by this Court. Ackerman v
Ackerman, 163 Mich App 796, 807; 414 NW2d 919 (1987). However, this Court will not substitute
its own judgment for that of the trial judge unless there has been an abuse of discretion or it is convinced
that, had it been sitting in the trial court’s position, it would have reached a different result. Id. “The
goal of the court when apportioning a marital estate is to reach an equitable division in light of all the
circumstances. Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 114; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). Although
each spouse need not receive a mathematically equal share, any significant departure from equality must
be clearly explained by the trial court. Id. at 114-115. To reach an equitable division, the trial court
should consider the duration of the marriage and each party’s contribution to the marital estate, station in
life, earning ability, age, health, needs, fault, past misconduct, as well as any other equitable
circumstance. Id. at 115. The significance of each factor will vary from case to case and depending
upon the circumstances, each factor need not be given equal weight. Id.
Regarding plaintiff’s argument that she did not receive adequate security, plaintiff contends that
the trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff a mortgage against the real property in which the family
business operated. “[T]here is no rigid rule of division of property in divorce proceedings, the major
consideration being the security of living for the wife. . . . Each case must be decided upon its own
facts.” Ross v Ross, 24 Mich App 19, 30; 179 NW2d 703 (1970). Although it reviewed the
proposition of giving plaintiff a lien on the commercial building of the company, the trial court decided
that this was not a feasible solution as it would have made plaintiff landlord and defendant tenant of the
building in which SOS operates its business. The court noted that this proposal would have put
defendant at plaintiff’s mercy if defendant needed to borrow money on the building to fund day-to-day
operations of the business, as defendant had done in the past during periods of tight cash flow.
While the court did not accede to plaintiff's request that she receive a lien on the commercial
building, plaintiff’s award was nevertheless adequately secured through the provision of a security
interest on the company stock and on the business assets of the company. Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that this security is insufficient, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to secure plaintiff with a mortgage on the commercial building. Ackerman,
supra.
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We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff alimony at the time
it entered judgment. At the time of entry, the court reserved the issue of spousal support in the event
plaintiff could show change in circumstance. Subsequent to filing this claim of appeal, plaintiff moved for
modification of the support provision alleging change of circumstance. The trial court swiftly granted
plaintiff’s motion, awarding alimony and arrearages to the date of the motion. The initial denial of
spousal support, conditioned by a reservation of the issue to plaintiff, was based on the court's reasoned
determination that plaintiff could readily maintain her standard of living on her anticipated earnings as she
pursued her new real estate career as well as interest earned on assets awarded. This reasoned
determination presents no abuse of discretion. Moreover, in quickly granting modification on plaintiff’s
showing that her beginning career earnings were lower than anticipated, the court supported the
propriety of its initial decision. As regards any continuing claim of error, this Court will not generally
review moot issues or decide moot cases. In re Wayne Co Election Comm, 150 Mich App 427,
432; 388 NW2d 707 (1986). “An issue is moot where circumstances render it impossible for the
reviewing court to grant any relief." Id. Because the trial court has now awarded plaintiff alimony,
further review of this issue is precluded because it is impossible for this Court to grant relief.
Plaintiff’s next argument, concerning the court's failure to award her a car free of obligation, is
likewise without merit. Pursuant to the property settlement, plaintiff was awarded the car that she was
driving, along with its debt. Outstanding debts also existed against the vehicles defendant was awarded.
Along with all other current circumstances, the various net values of the vehicles identified as marital
assets were appropriately taken into consideration in the overall financial settlement. Byington, supra
at 115. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, that the court did not award plaintiff the use of vehicle free of
obligation does not render this settlement inequitable. Id. at 114.
Regarding plaintiff’s next contention, that the court erred in dividing the parties' property equally
in the absence of consideration of fault, this court will not reverse dispositional rulings unless this court is
left with a firm conviction that the division of assets was inequitable. Welling v Welling, 233 Mich App
708, 709; 592 NW2d 822 (1999). Although the court's written opinion did not specifically address
fault as related to defendant's behavior, the court did address the issue orally, finding that defendant’s
behavior did not constitute fault. Under the circumstances presented, we conclude that the trial court’s
decision regarding the division of the parties’ assets was fair and equitable. Id. at 713.
Finally, plaintiff’s contention of clear error in the valuation of the marital home and the business
real estate is also without merit. The question of valuation of marital assets was addressed in detail in
Byington, supra at 114, n 4. Typically, marital assets are valued either at the time of trial or at the time
judgment is entered but, at the discretion of the trial court, can be valued at a more appropriate date.
Id. Here, plaintiff stipulated to the valuation of the business real estate at the time of the hearing on the
matter. Though not disputing this stipulation, plaintiff contends that because this stipulation reflected the
value of the business realty as of the time of the filing of the complaint, it was error for the trial court to
value the marital home as of the time of trial. Plaintiff argues that mortgage payoffs during the intervening
time period resulted in an
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asset valuation discrepancy favorable to defendant. In determining the property settlement the court
was bound by the stipulation as to the valuation of the business realty. Given our conclusion that in light
of all the circumstances the court reached an equitable division of the marital estate, plaintiff has not
shown that valuing the marital home as of the time of trial was an inappropriate exercise of discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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