PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL RAY WITHERELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 4, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 212487
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 97-072941 FH
DANIEL RAY WITHERELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., Gribbs and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(3); MSA 28.305(a)(3). He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12;
MSA 28.1084, to thirty to sixty years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony that he was
a suspect under surveillance and a composite drawing, stating “identity and information wanted” and
“the above composite is of a suspect.” Defendant contends that this evidence implicated him in prior
bad acts, by allowing the jury to infer that he was wanted for other crimes and that he had a propensity
to commit breaking and entering offenses. We disagree and hold that to the extent the contested
evidence could be characterized as other crimes, wrongs, or acts, it was properly admitted pursuant to
the res gestae exception to MRE 404(b).
Notwithstanding MRE 404(b), the common law continues to recognize that evidence of other
criminal acts is admissible where they constitute part of the res gestae of the charged offense. People v
Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 5; 532 NW2d 885 (1995); People v Cromwell, 186 Mich App 505,
508; 465 NW2d 10 (1990); People v Bowers, 136 Mich App 284, 293-297; 356 NW2d 618
(1984); People v Smith, 119 Mich App 431, 436; 326 NW2d 533 (1982). Thus, evidence of other
criminal acts is admissible when those acts are “so blended or connected with the [charged offense] that
proof of one incidentally involves the other or explains the circumstances of the crime.” People v Sholl,
453 Mich 730, 742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996), quoting People v Delgado, 404 Mich App 76, 83; 273
NW2d 395 (1978). Alternatively, “res gestae” has been defined as “the facts which so illustrate and
characterize the principal fact as to constitute the whole one transaction, and render the latter necessary
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to exhibit the former in its proper effect.” People v Robinson, 128 Mich App 3e8, 340; 340 NW2d
303 (1983), quoting People v Castillo, 82 Mich App 476, 479-480; 266 NW2d 460 (1978).
The case against defendant was based in large part on the testimony of several Jackson County
Police officers who had defendant under surveillance because he was a suspect in other potential
breaking and entering offenses in Jackson County. Evidence that defendant was a suspect under
surveillance was necessary to explain the events which ultimately led to his arrest, including how two
officers happened to spot defendant leaving the victim’s residence in Ingham County, the subsequent car
chase involving several surveillance officers, and the discovery of his vehicle in a parking lot. Thus, this
evidence was part of the res gestae of the crime and was needed to give the jury “an intelligible
presentation of the full context in which the disputed events took place.” Sholl, supra at 741. The trial
court also took steps to make the evidence less prejudicial by deleting references to “breaking and
entering” on the “wanted” poster and by prohibiting the officers from explaining why defendant was
under surveillance. Two officers merely explained that they were surveying defendant because they
were looking for a suspect based on a composite drawing. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the contested evidence.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict
because the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the
crime. We disagree. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a directed verdict, we view the evidence
presented by the prosecutor up to the time the motion was made in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 615-616; 591 NW2d
669 (1998).
The offense of second-degree home invasion by means of breaking and entering requires proof
that the defendant broke and entered a dwelling with intent to commit a felony or larceny therein. MCL
750.110a(3); MSA 29.305(a)(3); CJI2d 25.2b. Larceny, charged here, is the taking and carrying
away of the property of another with felonious intent and without the owner’s consent. People v
Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254, 257-258; 549 NW2d 39 (1996). It is well established that
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the
elements of the crime, including identity. Crawford, supra at 616.
In this case, two police officers testified that, shortly after observing defendant’s unoccupied
vehicle parked outside the victim’s rural residence, they saw him run from the area of the victim’s yard
at about 12:20 p.m. He was carrying what appeared to be a pillowcase – one of the items the victims
reported missing from her home. The officers, who were each parked approximately three hundred
yards from defendant’s vehicle, stated that defendant placed the pillowcase in the trunk and drove away
at a high rate of speed. The officers, including several others on the surveillance team, testified that the
subsequent chase ceased because defendant was driving recklessly by speeding through stop signs. A
short time later, the police found defendant’s vehicle at his girlfriend’s place of employment parked at
the far end of the parking lot with the license plate facing a fence. One officer also stated that the
girlfriend told him that defendant arrived there at about 2:00 p.m., “essentially demanded” the keys to
her vehicle, and left in it. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, this circumstantial
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evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was the perpetrator of the crime. See People v Bottany, 43 Mich App 375; 377-378; 204
NW2d 230 (1972) (the identity of the defendant as the person who committed a crime may be
established beyond a reasonable doubt by segments of circumstantial proof in combination, even if each
element standing alone might not be sufficient). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
Defendant next maintains that the trial court’s instruction defining reasonable doubt denied him a
fair trial because it diluted the presumption of innocence and relieved the prosecutor of the burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, defendant failed to preserve this issue for review
because he did not object to the instructions given. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545;
494 NW2d 737 (1993). Therefore, our review is limited to whether defendant has demonstrated a
plain error that affected his substantial rights, i.e. that could have affected the outcome of the trial.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Here, the trial court read a modified version of CJI 3:1:04, the former standard jury instruction
on reasonable doubt, the substance of which this Court has cited with approval. See People v
Jackson, 167 Mich App 388, 390-392; 421 NW2d 697 (1988); People v Nickson, 120 Mich App
681, 688; 327 NW2d 333 (1982). Even if we were to assume that the sentence defendant has
extracted from the lengthy instruction and contests on appeal was erroneous, we find that the instruction
as a whole adequately conveyed the definition of reasonable doubt to the jury. People v Bartlett, 231
Mich App 139, 143; 585 NW2d 341 (1998). In addition, the court separately instructed the jury on
the presumption of innocence, that “burden of proving guilt is on the prosecution throughout the entire
course of the trial,” and that “at no time does the burden of proof shift to the defendant.” We are
therefore convinced that the instructions fairly presented the concepts of reasonable doubt, the
presumption of innocence, and the prosecution’s burden to the jury and sufficiently protected
defendant’s rights. Id., 143-144; People v McFall, 224 Mich App 403, 412; 569 NW2d 828
(1997). Consequently, defendant has failed to demonstrate error, let alone outcome determinative
error, and has thus forfeited review of this issue.
Defendant next contends that his thirty to sixty year sentence is disproportionate. We disagree.
Because defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, the sentencing guidelines do not apply and
may not be considered on appeal in determining the appropriate sentence. People v Cervantes, 448
Mich 620, 625-626; 532 NW2d 831 (1995); McFall, supra at 415. Instead, our review is limited to
whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing defendant’s sentence. Cervantes, supra at
627; People v Elliott, 215 Mich App 259, 261; 544 NW2d 748 (1996). A sentence constitutes an
abuse of discretion if it is disproportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the
offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
In addition to several misdemeanors, defendant’s instant conviction represents his sixth felony
conviction, at least four of which are theft related. As the trial court noted, defendant’s criminal record,
which spans more than eighteen years, indicates that he is a career criminal whose earlier sentences
failed to effectively eliminate his repeated larcenous behavior. Given defendant’s criminal history and his
apparent inability to conform his conduct to the law, we conclude that the trial court imposed a sentence
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that was proportionate to the offense and the offender. See Cervantes, supra at 627-628 (a trial court
does not abuse its discretion in giving a significant sentence to habitual offender where it considered the
defendant’s extensive criminal history and his potential for rehabilitation).
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to strike inaccurate and
unsubstantiated information contained in the victim’s letter attached to the presentence investigation
report. We disagree. Here, the probation officer that prepared the report referenced letters from both
victims in the “victim impact” portion of the report. While a trial court must strike factual inaccuracies in
the objective portions of the PSIR prepared by the probation officer, see MCL 771.14(5); MSA
28.1144(5)1; MCR 6.425(D)(3), defendant has cited no authority nor have we found authority for the
unlikely proposition that a trial court must also strike inaccuracies contained within the “victim impact”
portion of the report.2 A victim of a crime has a right to submit written impact statements into the PSIR,
MCL 780.764; MSA 28.1287(764); People v Steele, 173 Mich App 502, 504-505; 434 NW2d 175
(1988), and absent authority to the contrary, we presume that such statements are clearly understood
by the Department of Corrections to contain nothing more than the victim’s subjective opinion. MCL
780.763(3); 28.1287(763).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
1
Currently MCL 771.14(6); MSA 28.1144(6), as amended by 1998 PA § 315.
2
Defendant’s reliance on People v Grove, 455 Mich 439; 566 NW2d 547 (1997) is misplaced. In
that case, the parties conceded that it was error to attach the challenged letters to the PSIR and the
contested letters, which made unsubstantiated allegations, were written by a police sergeant who
apparently was not a victim of the crime. Id. 452, 477.
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