SHARON LYNN JANNARO V ALLEN SCHAMP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHARON LYNN JANNARO,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 1999
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 210740
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-739184
ALLEN SCHAMP,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order denying his motion to terminate a
personal protection order. We affirm.
Respondent is the father of petitioner’s child. According to petitioner, respondent has used
abusive language, been violent, threatened to kill petitioner and her family, been physically and
emotionally abusive, and has been removed from her property by the police. Petitioner sought and was
granted a personal protection order (“PPO”) under MCL 600.2950; MSA 27A.2950. Respondent
filed a motion to terminate the PPO, which the trial court denied.
A personal protection order is an injunctive order. MCL 600.2950(30)(c); MSA
27A.2950(30)(c). Granting injunctive relief is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Holland v
Miller, 325 Mich 604, 611; 39 NW2d 87 (1949); Kernen v Homestead Development Co, 232 Mich
App 503, 509; 591 NW2d 369 (1998). Thus, we review a trial court's decision for an abuse of
discretion. Kernen, supra at 510. An abuse of discretion occurs where an unprejudiced person,
considering the facts upon which the trial court acted, would say there was no justification or excuse for
the ruling. Auto Club Ins Ass'n v State Farm Ins Cos, 221 Mich App 154, 167; 561 NW2d 445
(1997).
This Court has not been provided with a copy of the hearing transcript as provided by MCR
7.210(B)(1). Because the standard of review requires that this Court review the trial court’s decision
for an abuse of discretion and respondent has not filed the transcript of the trial court’s decision with this
Court, this Court is unable to consider respondent’s claim that the PPO should have been terminated.
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Meagher v Wayne State University, 222 Mich App 700, 725; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). On the basis
of the trial court's order and the record that was provided, however, no error is apparent.
Respondent alleges that, at the motion hearing, witnesses testified as to the events that occurred
days prior to petitioner seeking the PPO. According to respondent, the Friend of the Court had issued
its recommendation regarding changes to a consent judgment concerning a child born to the couple out
of wedlock. In that recommendation, respondent was no longer to have parenting time every Sunday,
but, rather, would be limited to parenting time every other weekend. The recommendation had not yet
been adopted or entered by the trial court. Yet, when respondent arrived to pick up the child on
December 7, 1997, petitioner and her husband refused to allow respondent to exercise parenting time
based on the Friend of the Court recommendation, which it appears they mistook as an order changing
the prior visitation schedule. When petitioner refused visitation, respondent admits that he became
angry, swore, and threatened petitioner’s husband. Respondent admits that police were called and,
after the officers read the prior visitation order and the Friend of the Court recommendation, and spoke
to respondent, respondent left. Based on this alleged testimony, respondent argues that the trial court
erred by denying his motion to terminate the PPO because petitioner had unclean hands, he was
exercising his constitutionally protected right to parent his child, and the PPO infringed on his right to
free speech. We disagree.
Personal protection orders are governed by MCL 600.2950; MSA 27A.2950. The
Legislature passed the statute as a package of laws intended to curb and prevent domestic violence.
1994 PA 61; 1994 PA 402. The statute empowers the court to issue a personal protection order to
restrain or enjoin certain conduct, including “[a]ny other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or
interferes with personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.” MCL
600.2950(1)(h); MSA 27A.2950(1)(h). Specifically, the statute provides as follows:
The court shall issue a personal protection order under this section if the court
determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained
or enjoined may commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1). In determining
whether reasonable cause exists, the court shall consider all of the following:
(a) Testimony, documents, or other evidence offered in support of the request for a
personal protection order.
(b) Whether the individual to be restrained or enjoined has previously committed or
threatened to commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1).
Based on the petition and the verified statement regarding the PPO action, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the PPO. Petitioner stated acts sufficient to establish
reasonable cause to believe that respondent may commit a prohibited act. With that in mind, we will
review respondent’s arguments for terminating the PPO.
The fact that petitioner mistook the FOC recommendation as an order, a mistake apparently
also made by the police who responded to the scene, does not mean petitioner had “unclean hands.”
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"[The clean hands maxim] is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one
tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper
may have been the behavior of the defendant." Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 109 n 23; 580
NW2d 845 (1998), quoting Stachnik v Winkel, 394 Mich 375, 382; 230 NW2d 529 (1975).
Refusing visitation based on the mistaken belief that the FOC recommendation was controlling does not
constitute grounds for terminating a PPO.
We are not persuaded by respondent’s argument that he only threatened petitioner’s husband
and not petitioner herself, or that he was exercising a constitutionally protected right when he shouted,
swore and threatened petitioner’s husband on December 7, 1997. The United States Supreme Court
has long recognized that parents have a constitutionally protected interest, with certain constraints, in
raising their children without state interference. Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248, 256-262; 103 S Ct
2985; 77 L Ed 2d 614 (1983) (citations omitted). It is the relationship between the parent and child
that triggers significant constitutional protection. In re Clausen, 442 Mich 648, 682; 502 NW2d 649
(1993).
However, the PPO does not restrain respondent’s parenting rights, but rather, only places
constraints on his behavior in relation to petitioner. Moreover, this Court has recognized that
Michigan’s anti-stalking laws do not impinge on a defendant's right of free speech under the United
States and the Michigan Constitutions. People v White, 212 Mich App 298, 309; 536 NW2d 876
(1995) (citation omitted). Therefore, we find no violation of respondent’s constitutionally protected
rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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