GARY MEYERS V DR JEROME W CIULLO MD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GARY MEYERS,1
UNPUBLISHED
December 10, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 209718
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-646574 NH
JEROME W. CIULLO, M.D., and SPORTS
MEDICINE CENTER OF METRO DETROIT,
P.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion in limine to disqualify plaintiff ’s expert witness from
giving standard of care testimony regarding a hemi-arthroplasty that defendant, Dr. Ciullo, performed on
plaintiff ’s shoulder. Because plaintiff had no other evidence by which to establish damages resulting
from a failure by Dr. Ciullo to comply with the recognized standard of care applicable to him, the court
also granted summary disposition to defendants. Plaintiff now appeals by right. We affirm.
Dr. Ciullo is a board certified orthopedic surgeon and world recognized expert in shoulder
surgery. Plaintiff presented to Dr. Ciullo complaining of pain, instability, and internal derangement of his
left shoulder. Dr. Ciullo performed a diagnostic arthroscopy, and subsequently performed a hemi
arthroplasty, which included implanting a shoulder prosthesis. Apparently the hemi-arthroplasty was
unsuccessful in eliminating plaintiff ’s difficulties and eventually, Dr. Ciullo recommended additional
surgery. Plaintiff sought another opinion, and was told that the left shoulder prosthesis implanted by Dr.
Ciullo was loose and its base was eroding his humerus bone. Moreover, the head of the prosthesis was
sitting too high, forcing plaintiff’s rotator cuff to ride over the head of the prosthesis. Plaintiff sued Dr.
Ciullo and the clinic from which he works, based on the theory that the present condition of his shoulder
resulted from, or was exacerbated by, the professional negligence of Dr. Ciullo.
On the day of trial, defendants moved to preclude standard of care testimony by plaintiff ’s
proposed expert witness, Dr. Arthur Lorber, who had been deposed four days earlier by telephone.
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Dr. Lorber testified to being in private practice as an orthopedic surgeon since 1970. He completed his
residency in orthopedic surgery at the University of Kentucky in 1972 and was board certified in
orthopedic surgery in 1973. He did not complete any fellowships following the completion of his
residency. Dr. Lorber testified that he ceased all hospital affiliations in 1991 or 1992, and has since
been doing office practice, consultations and evaluations.
During the time period that Dr. Ciullo performed the hemi-arthroplasty on plaintiff, Dr. Lorber
was no longer performing surgeries. Although Dr. Lorber’s special interest was the spine, he is a
general orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Lorber is not a member of American College of Orthopedic Surgeons,
nor a member of the American Shoulder and Elbow Surgeon Society. Dr. Lorber never performed a
total arthroplasty of the shoulder, although he did do shoulder surgeries such as rotator cuff repair,
acromioplasty, excision of the distal clavicle, and repair of the anterior capsule and labrum. He did
participate in hemi-arthroplasties during his residency and has read about and seen many cases done by
other physicians. He reads every issue of the monthly Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery.
The trial court expressed its concern that, pursuant to MRE 702, Dr. Lorber did not appear to
be sufficiently familiar with the procedure at issue to express an expert opinion on the standard of care
applicable to Dr. Ciullo. The trial court found that any opinion Dr. Lorber might render regarding
whether Dr. Ciullo properly diagnosed plaintiff ’s problems and performed the hemi-arthroplasty
correctly, derived solely from the benefit of hindsight and the fact that the hemi-arthroplasty was not
successful in eliminating plaintiff ’s shoulder problems -- not from any personal knowledge or skill that
Dr. Lorber had regarding this procedure. Consequently, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to
preclude Dr. Lorber from giving expert testimony. Immediately thereafter, defendants brought an oral
motion for summary disposition on the basis that, with the exclusion of Dr. Lorber, plaintiff had no
evidence to establish that Dr. Ciullo had not complied with his applicable standard of care. The trial
court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
Plaintiff contends that because Dr. Lorber, like Dr. Ciullo, was a board certified orthopedic
surgeon, he was qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, to testify, pursuant to
MRE 702, as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case involving orthopedic surgery. We are
mindful that, at the time the trial court rendered its decision, MCL 600.2169; MSA 27A.2169, a statute
that sets specific qualifications for experts giving standard of practice testimony in a medical malpractice
action, had been determined by this Court to be unconstitutional. McDougal v Eliuk, 218 Mich App
501, 505-506; 554 NW2d 56 (1996), rev’d sub nom McDougal v Schanz, 461 Mich 15; 597 NW2d
148 (1999). We are also aware that the statute in question expressly provides: “This section does not
limit the power of the trial court to disqualify an expert witness on grounds other than the qualifications
set forth in this section.” MCL 600.2169(3); MSA 27A.2169(3). Consequently, as a threshold
matter, we must determine if the trial court properly excluded the challenged testimony under MRE 702.
We review the court’s decision in this regard only for an abuse of discretion. Bahr v Harper-Grace
Hosps, 448 Mich 135, 141; 528 NW2d 170 (1995). “An abuse of discretion exists where an
unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court made its decision, would conclude
that there is no justification for the ruling made.” Carpenter v Consumers Power Co, 230 Mich App
547, 562; 584 NW2d 375 (1998).
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In professional malpractice cases, expert testimony is usually required to establish the standard
of care, breach of that standard and causation. Locke v Pachtman, 446 Mich 216, 223-224; 521
NW2d 786 (1994). “A party offering the testimony of an expert witness must demonstrate the witness’
knowledge of the applicable standard of care.” Bahr, supra at 141.
MRE 702 provides:
If the court determines that recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
For purposes of a medical malpractice claim, a doctor is a specialist by virtue of advanced
training and board certification in a particular field of medicine, not by virtue of a practice concentrated
on one part of the body. Jalaba v Borovoy, 206 Mich App 17, 21-22; 520 NW2d 349 (1994).
Consequently, Dr. Lorber was a specialist in the same field of medicine as Dr. Ciullo, orthopedic
surgery. However, that fact alone is not dispositive, in light of the evidence that Dr. Lorber lacked
significant familiarity with the procedure at issue (i.e., shoulder hemi-arthroplasty). Although the weight
and credibility of a qualified expert’s testimony is for the jury to determine, Carpenter, supra at 561,
the initial matter of qualification is left to the trial court, MRE 104; MRE 702; MRE 403. See, also,
Bahr, supra at 141. Because an unprejudiced person would have serious reservations as to whether
Dr. Lorber was sufficiently qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, to provide
expert testimony as to the standard of care applicable to Dr. Ciullo in the performance of the procedure
in question, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to qualify Dr. Lorber, under
MRE 702, to provide standard of care testimony in this case.
Because we hold that the court properly excluded the challenged testimony under MRE 702,
we find it unnecessary to address whether the testimony would also have been properly excluded under
MCL 600.2169; MSA 27A.2169.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
1
Sharon Meyers was dismissed as a plaintiff, below, with prejudice, by stipulation of the parties, prior
to the entry of the order being appealed.
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