PEOPLE OF MI V ANDREDA CHAPMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 207956
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 97-000465
ANDREDA CHAPMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Gribbs and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from her convictions of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA
28.277, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2), entered after a bench trial. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
At trial, complainant testified that defendant pointed a gun at him. Complainant indicated that
the object was made of metal, was a revolver, and appeared to be a real gun. Complainant
acknowledged that he could not be certain that the gun was real. A second witness testified that he
observed the gun held by defendant and assumed that it was real; however, he could not be certain.
The witness stated that when the gun was pointed in his direction he backed away from the scene.
The trial court found defendant guilty of felonious assault and felony-firearm. The court found
the witnesses’ testimony regarding the gun to be credible. Subsequently, the court denied defendant’s
motion for a new trial.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. People
v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 27; 592 NW2d 75 (1999). A new trial may be granted when the
verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. MCR 6.431(B); People v Plummer, 229 Mich
App 293, 306; 581 NW2d 753 (1998). However, the crux of defendant’s argument is that the
prosecutor introduced insufficient evidence to convict her of either offense.
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When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial, we view the
evidence presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and determine whether a rational trier of
fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 379-380; 465 NW2d 365 (1990). The trier of fact may make
reasonable inferences from evidence in the record, but may not make inferences completely
unsupported by any direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.
The trial court found defendant guilty of felonious assault and felony-firearm. The elements of
felonious assault are: (1) an assault; (2) with a dangerous weapon; and (3) with the intent to injure or
place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery. People v Avant, 235 Mich App
499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). The elements of felony-firearm are: (1) the defendant possessed a
firearm; (2) during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. People v Davis, 216 Mich
App 47, 53; 549 NW2d 1 (1996).
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions
because the prosecution failed to prove that a gun was used in the alleged assault. We disagree and
affirm. A person in possession of a toy gun may not be convicted of felony-firearm. People v Broach,
126 Mich App 711, 714; 337 NW2d 642 (1983). However, a person can be convicted of felony
firearm even if a gun is not introduced into evidence. People v Hayden, 132 Mich App 273, 296; 348
NW2d 672 (1984). The same reasoning permits conviction for felonious assault when the prosecutor
does not produce a weapon at trial. Here, the trial court found as fact that defendant possessed a gun
during the incident. The court based its finding on the witnesses’ statements that they thought the gun
was real, and on their actions during the incident. The trial court’s finding of fact was not clearly
erroneous. MCR 2.613(C). Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence would
allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant possessed a firearm during the assault. People v
Smith, 231 Mich App 50, 52-53; 585 NW2d 755 (1998). The evidence was sufficient to support
defendant’s convictions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for
a new trial. Plummer, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Helene N. White
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