ROBERT F LAPOINT V PHILLIP HEILMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT F. LaPOINT,
UNPUBLISHED
November 12, 1999
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellant,
v
No. 209605
Chippewa Circuit Court
LC No. 95-001931 CK
PHILLIP HEILMAN and LOIS HEILMAN,
Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellees.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals from orders of the circuit court granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5) and (8) and denying plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse and remand.
Defendants in this case are the holders of a 1978 tax deed to forty acres of undeveloped land in
Chippewa County. Plaintiff filed suit to extinguish defendants’ title to the property, alleging that
defendants had failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements necessary to perfect the tax
deed. Plaintiff bases his interest in the property on five quit claim deeds he obtained from the alleged
heirs of the original property owners, Daniel and Maud Ortago .
The last record title holder was Maud Ortago, who died in the Province of Ontario, Canada, on
August 26, 1960. Mrs. Ortago’s last known address in 1978 was in Oakland County, though,
according to plaintiff, she was living in Chippewa County at the time of her death.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff contends that defendants failed to comply with the notice
provisions in MCL 211.140; MSA 7.198, and thus were not entitled to take possession of the property
in dispute under MCL 211.73a; MSA 7.119. We agree. This Court reviews a trial court's grant of
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456
Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
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This dispute may be resolved by focusing narrowly on plaintiff’s claim that defendants did not
obtain a certified return from the sheriff of Chippewa County indicating that the sheriff was unable to
locate the last grantee of record or the heirs, and that this failure to serve notice on those with an interest
in the property invalidated defendants’ notice by publication. We agree that defendants’ failure to
strictly comply with this portion of the statute nullifies their rights under the tax deed.
MCL 211.140(1); MSA 7.198(1) requires notice to be given to the last grantee or grantees in
the regular chain of title. It specifically requires that that notice be served by the sheriff of the county in
which the land is located:
A writ of assistance or other process for the possession of land the title to which
was obtained by or through a tax sale, except if title is obtained under section 131, shall
not be issued until 6 months after there is filed with the county treasurer of the county
where the land is situated, a return by the sheriff of that county showing service of
the notice prescribed in subsection (2). [MCL 211.140(1); MSA 7.198(1); emphasis
added.]
Thus, notice was required to be given by the sheriff of Chippewa County, the county where the
property is located. There is a provision for allowing a sheriff of another county to provide service
where the grantee lives in a different county:
If the grantee or grantees, or the person or persons holding the interest in the
land as prescribed in subsection (1) are residents of a county of this state other than the
county in which the land is situated, the return as to that person shall be made by the
sheriff of the county where that person or persons reside or may be found. [MCL
211.140(3); MSA 7.198(3).]
Thus, had Mrs. Ortago been living in Oakland County when defendants endeavored to serve the notice
required under the statute, then actual service on her by the Oakland County Sheriff would be adequate.
However, Mrs. Ortago was not, in fact, a resident of Oakland County at the time, having died nearly
twenty years before. Furthermore, nothing in subsection (3) indicates that that subsection is applicable
merely when the grantee’s last known address is in a different county. For that matter, the statute
suggests that substituted service is appropriate only when the sheriff of the county in which the property
is located makes a return that the grantee cannot be located:
If the sheriff of the county where the land is located makes a return that after
careful inquiry the sheriff is unable to ascertain the whereabouts or the post-office
address of the persons upon whom notice may be served as prescribed in this section.
[sic] The notice shall be published for 4 successive weeks, once each week, in a
newspaper published and circulated in the county where the land is located, if there is
one. [MCL 211.140(5); MSA 7.198(5).]
We read subsection (5) as providing that service by publication is triggered by a return from the sheriff
of the county in which the property is located indicating that the grantee cannot be located, not the
return of the sheriff of the county in which it is thought that the grantee may reside.
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In other words, section 140 requires service by the sheriff of the county in which the land is
located, with an exception that allows for service by the sheriff of the grantee’s county of residence
where the grantee is found to live in another county in this state. Because Mrs. Ortago was not, in fact,
found to be residing in Oakland County in 1978, the Oakland County Sheriff could not serve notice
upon her. Furthermore, service by publication was authorized under subsection (5) only after the
Chippewa County Sheriff returned service that he could not locate Mrs. Ortago.
The fact that the wrong sheriff was employed is relevant because strict compliance with the
statute is required. As this Court noted in Andre v Fink, 180 Mich App 403, 407-408; 447 NW2d
808 (1989):
Michigan courts have long held that, because the effect of proceedings under
the tax law is to divest the true owners of their title to property, strict compliance with
the notice requirements of the statute is required. McVannel v Pure Oil Co, 262 Mich
518, 522; 247 NW 735 (1933); St Helen’s Resort Ass’n, Inc v Hannan, 321 Mich
536, 543; 33 NW2d 74 (1948); Stein v Hemminger, 165 Mich App 678; 419
NW2d 50 (1988), lv den 430 Mich 896 (1988). Defendants’ failure to serve notice on
the last recorded grantees in the regular chain of title bars defendants from asserting title
by reason of their tax deed and tolls the running of the six-month redemption period.
MCL 211.73a; MSA 7.119. The fact that an unserved interest is void or has been
extinguished, as was the Swishers’, is irrelevant to the necessity of serving them notice.
Watters v Kieruj, 242 Mich 537; 219 NW 673 (1928); United States v Varani, 780
F2d 1296, 1299 (CA 6, 1986).
In Andre, the plaintiff had purchased the property in question on land contract from the Swishers in
1963. The Swishers deeded the property to plaintiff in 1982, which deed was not recorded, leaving the
Swishers as the last grantees in the regular chain of title. The defendants purchased the property at tax
sale in 1985. This Court held that the defendants failed to comply with MCL 211.140; MSA 7.198
because they had not served notice on the Swishers, concluding that the statute required such notice
because the Swishers were the last grantees of record. The fact that their interest had, in fact, been
previously transferred was irrelevant.
Also instructive is the decision in Stockwell v Curtis, 279 Mich 388; 272 NW 717 (1937). In
Stockwell, the notice was served by the defendant’s attorney rather than by the sheriff. It was
undisputed that the notice was actually received. The trial court ruled that there was substantial
compliance with the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that substantial compliance was
inadequate and that there must be strict compliance, relying on Teal Lake Iron Mining Co v Olds, 178
Mich 335; 144 NW 845 (1914) (wherein a notice was held to be inadequate where it overstated the
amount required for redemption by 89 cents).
We are of the opinion that if actual notice fails to comply with the statute because it was given
by the wrong person, then it must surely follow that that the failure to give notice by the wrong person
must also be inadequate to trigger substituted service.
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Furthermore, MCL 211.73a; MSA 7.119 sets out the penalty for failing to give notice within
the required time period:
In case of a failure to give the required notice for reconveyance within the
period of 5 years from the date the purchaser, his heirs or assigns shall become entitled
to a tax deed to be issued by the auditor general, the person or persons, claiming title
under tax deed or certificate of purchase shall be forever barred from asserting that title
or claiming a lien on the land by reason of a tax purchase . . . .
Because defendants’ right to claim under the tax deed was “forever barred” by their failure to
give the required notices within five years, summary disposition to defendants on the basis of the tax
deed was inappropriate.1
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Plaintiff may tax costs.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
We need not, and do not, address what interest, if any, was in fact conveyed to plaintiff by the
purported heirs of Maud Ortago. We merely conclude that defendants have lost their claim under the
tax deed by failing to give notice as required by statute. We need not and do not address who has
rightful title to the property beyond concluding that defendants do not under the tax deed. If defendants
have any other basis for asserting ownership, such as adverse possession (which was discussed at oral
argument), they may raise it on remand. .
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