HELEN BURROUGHS V PAUL G RAND III
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HELEN BURROUGHS,
UNPUBLISHED
November 2, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204279
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 95-3654 CH
PAUL G. RAND, III and BERNADINE M.
RAND,
Defendant-Appellants,
and
STERLING BANK AND TRUST formerly known
as STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a federal savings
bank,
Defendant.
.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and McDonald and White, JJ.
McDONALD, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I dissent in part from my colleagues’ opinions and would reverse the trial court’s decision.
The decision of a trial court in an equity action is subject to de novo review. Day v Lacchia,
175 Mich App 363, 372; 437 NW2d 400 (1989). A trial court’s decision in an equity action will not
be reversed unless its findings are clearly erroneous or the reviewing court is convinced that it would
have reached a different result. Id. Citing McDonald Ford Sales, Inc v Ford Motor Co, 165 Mich
App 321, 325; 418 NW2d 716 (1987). If sitting as the trial court I would have reached a different
result.
A license gives permission to do some act or series of acts on the land of the licensor without
any permanent interest in the land. McCastle v Scanlon, 337 Mich 122, 133; 59 NW2d 114 (1953).
Defendants did not give plaintiff permission to use the gravel road or the well. Moreover, any license
plaintiff may have had from the previous owners of defendants’ land was revoked when the property
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was conveyed to defendants. Fletcher Oil Co v Bay City, 346 Mich 411, 417; 78 NW2d 205
(1956). Even if defendants had given plaintiff a license and plaintiff expended some money in reliance
upon the license, it was defendants’ prerogative to revoke the license at any time. McCastle, supra, at
pp 128 and 133.
The lead opinion’s reliance on Hunter v Slater, 331 Mich 1; 49 NW2d 33 (1951), is
misplaced and not applicable to the facts in this case. In Hunter the licensee owned the land adjacent
to the property over which he sought an easement for access to his property. The licensor promised in
writing to “complete any arrangements that maybe necessary” to give the licensee a road across its
property. In reliance upon this written promise the licensee expended approximately $1,000 to
construct a road to his property. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s findings that the intent of
the parties was to create an easement and not a mere naked license.
In the present case, plaintiff had no interest in any real property and could not receive an
easement under any circumstances. Plaintiff did not build the road or sink the well in this case. Further
plaintiff did not claim reliance on any promises made orally or in writing by defendants. Thus plaintiff
had a mere naked license at best which was revocable at any time by the defendants.
I agree with the lead opinion’s disposition of the remaining issues but I would reverse.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
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