DANIEL JAMES CRONIN V WILLIAM H OHLE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DANIEL JAMES CRONIN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 29, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 212817
Emmet Circuit Court
LC No. 97-004309 NI
WILLIAM H. OHLE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Neff and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This negligence action was filed in 1997 and arises from an automobile accident that occurred in
Emmet County in 1994. Following two extensions of the time granted to plaintiff to serve the complaint
and summons, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(3). Plaintiff appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
On July 21, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint in the instant action. The summons issued with the
complaint expired on October 20, 1997. In early October 1997, plaintiff attempted service of process
and learned that defendant was deceased.1 Nonetheless, on October 15, 1997, plaintiff petitioned the
court for, and subsequently was issued, a second summons on the basis that plaintiff was unable to
locate defendant despite “repeated attempts.”2
Shortly before the second summons expired on January 21, 1998, plaintiff requested an
extension of the summons, averring that defendant was deceased and additional time was necessary to
serve process on the yet unnamed personal representative of defendant’s estate. The court amended
the second summons, extending it to April 10, 1998. Service was effected on the personal
representative on April 9, 1998. Defendant moved for summary disposition on the ground of insufficient
service of process, contending that plaintiff could not demonstrate good cause for the extensions of time
to serve defendant, as required under MCR 2.102(D).
-1
II
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding whether good cause existed to extend a
summons for an abuse of discretion. Bush v Beemer, 224 Mich App 457, 464, 466; 569 NW2d 636
(1997). The court’s underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id . at 465.
MCR 2.102(D) provides in relevant part:
Expiration. A summons expires 91 days after the date the complaint is filed.
However, within that 91 days, on a showing of good cause, the judge to whom the
action is assigned may order a second summons to issue for a definite period not
exceeding 1 year from the date the complaint is filed. If such an extension is granted,
the new summons expires at the end of the extended period. The judge may impose
just conditions on the issuance of the second summons. [Emphasis added.]
In Bush, supra at 462-464, this Court construed the phrase “good cause” and concluded that
“good cause” to extend a summons requires a showing of due diligence in attempting service of
process. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing good cause. Id. at 464.
In this case, the trial court identified three periods of delay, which together, demonstrated a lack
of due diligence to effect service of process. The first was the initial delay of over sixty days between
the filing of the complaint by plaintiff’s initial counsel and the transfer of the case to local counsel in
northern Michigan, with no effort to accomplish service. A second delay occurred between October
13, 1997, the time successor counsel discovered that defendant was deceased, and January 7, 1998,
when counsel sent probate documents to plaintiff to open defendant’s estate. The third delay occurred
between January 7, 1998 and February 23, 1998, in obtaining plaintiff’s signature on the probate
documents.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiff failed to
establish good cause for the extensions of the summons. During the first sixty days after filing the
complaint, plaintiff’s initial counsel in Mt. Clemens made no effort to serve the summons and complaint.
Rather than immediately seeking a process server in northern Michigan, who could have attempted
service, counsel apparently spent the time searching for competent local counsel to represent plaintiff.
Following the discovery that defendant was deceased, plaintiff spent the next three months
doing legal research regarding opening an estate, contacting the wrong probate court and failing to make
the correct inquiries to ascertain the status of defendant’s estate, and hiring a private investigator who
ultimately provided plaintiff with information already at his disposal. Finally, service of process was
delayed because plaintiff apparently failed to inform counsel of his change of address which prevented
the timely signing of probate papers necessary to open the estate.
Plaintiff’s lack of any concerted effort to serve process supports the trial court’s finding that
plaintiff failed to establish good cause. Bush, supra at 464. Additionally, when plaintiff moved for the
initial extension of the summons, he inaccurately represented to the court that he had made “repeated”
-2
efforts to serve process, but had been unable to locate defendant’s whereabouts. Plaintiff admittedly
made only one initial attempt to serve process, learning at that time that defendant was deceased. The
expenditure of time searching for counsel and researching how to open an estate is analogous to
researching a claim to determine whether it is meritorious, and this Court held in Bush, supra at 464,
that such efforts did not constitute good cause for delayed service. Finally, the passage of nearly two
months while plaintiff’s counsel waited for plaintiff to sign the petition to open an estate further
evidences a failure to exercise due diligence.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider the lack of prejudice to
defendant in determining whether good cause exists. The trial court evaluated plaintiff’s claim regarding
the lack of prejudice and rejected it. We do not find this to be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
While dismissal of this case will work a harsh result because plaintiff’s complaint may now be time
barred by the statute of limitations, this Court has held that “[t]he due diligence requirement applies even
‘when dismissal results in the plaintiff’s case being time-barred due to the fact that the statute of
limitations on the plaintiff’s cause of action has run.’” Bush, supra at 463, quoting Lovelace v Acme
Markets, Inc, 820 F2d 81, 84 (CA 3, 1987).
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
Although plaintiff was unclear as to the exact timing of these matters, the lower court determined that
the process server attempted service on October 4, 1997, learned that defendant was deceased, and
communicated this information to plaintiff’s counsel on or before October 13, 1997. We accept these
findings.
2
Plaintiff filed ex parte petitions for both the second summons and the amended second summons.
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.