PEOPLE OF MI V THEOPHUS GOULD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 207868
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 97-000377
THEOPHUS GOULD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Collins, P.J., and Sawyer and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83;
MSA 28.278, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of one count of the
lesser offense of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and one count of felony-firearm, MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). As a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, defendant
was subject to an enhanced sentence pursuant to MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, and was sentenced to
one to eight years’ imprisonment for the assault conviction, to be served consecutive to the mandatory
two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal in
admitting the firearms and testimony concerning the firearms that were recovered by the police the day
following the incident for which defendant was charged. Defendant contends that the evidence was
irrelevant because there was no evidence linking the firearms to defendant or to the charged offense and
was highly prejudicial. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for
an abuse of discretion. People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 549; 581 NW2d 654 (1998).
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not. MRE 402; People
v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 497; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401; People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388;
582 NW2d 785 (1998). Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury,
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undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. MRE 403; People v
Sabin, 223 Mich App 530, 536; 566 NW2d 677 (1997). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there
exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.
Crawford, supra at 389.
To lay a proper foundation for the admission of real evidence, the article must be identified as
what it is purported to be and shown to be connected with the crime or with the accused. People v
O’Brien, 113 Mich App 183, 204; 317 NW2d 570 (1982). See, also, People v Jennings, 118 Mich
App 318, 322; 324 NW2d 625 (1982); People v Prast (On Rehearing), 114 Mich App 469, 490;
319 NW2d 627 (1982).
In this case, it was essential to the prosecutor’s case to establish a connection between
defendant and the weapon used on the night of the incident. There is no question that the .44 Ruger,
which complainants identified at trial as the gun defendant used on the night in question, was relevant to
show that defendant was in possession of a gun. Testimony that the police recovered the gun from an
apartment where codefendant lived, where complainants observed defendant firing the gun, where an
eyewitness saw defendant run after the gunfire ceased, and where defendant was seen and arrested the
following day was relevant to show the process by which the police recovered the gun defendant used
the day of the incident. Moreover, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court indicated that it was “not offended or inflamed by
seeing a weapon,” and none of the guns, other than the one identified by complainants, were
substantially linked to defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
contested evidence.
Next, defendant argues that the 204-day delay between the date of his arrest and trial deprived
him of his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.1 We disagree.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to criminal defendants by the federal and Michigan
constitutions, as well as by statute. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MCL 768.1; MSA
28.1024. In determining whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, this Court
considers (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the
right to a speedy trial, and (4) any prejudice to defendant. Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 530; 92 S
Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972); People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158
(1997). Here, defendant was arrested and incarcerated on December 24, 1996, and his trial
commenced on July 16, 1997. He did not assert his right to a speedy trial. Because the delay was less
than eighteen months, the burden is on defendant to prove prejudice resulting from the delay. People v
Collins, 388 Mich 680, 695; 202 NW2d 769 (1972); People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 51; 523
NW2d 830 (1994). Defendant’s general assertion that he was prejudiced because he “suffered
through a lengthy and personal prejudicial period of incarceration” is insufficient to sustain this burden.
See Gilmore, supra at 462 (a general allegation of prejudice caused by the delay is insufficient to
establish that a defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial). Under these circumstances, we
conclude that defendant was not denied a speedy trial.
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Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied him his statutory and
constitutional right to be present when it viewed the scene without the prior knowledge or consent of the
prosecution or defense. Defendant contends that the trial court’s conduct denied him a fair trial because
it created the possibility that the verdict was based on evidence other than that which was legally
admitted at trial.
A criminal defendant “has the fundamental right to be present at every stage of trial where his
substantial rights may be affected, including a jury view of the crime scene.” People v King, 210 Mich
App 425, 432-433; 534 NW2d 534 (1995), citing People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 247; 365
NW2d 673 (1984). Defendant has not cited, nor have we found, Michigan authority addressing the
issue of a trial court’s view of the crime scene in the absence of the defendant or his counsel. However,
federal and state courts have held that the same principles apply. See United States v Walls, 443 F2d
1220, 1221 (CA 6, 1971) (in narcotics prosecution, trial court reversibly erred when it viewed the
scene of the alleged crime without permitting the defendant or his attorney to attend); Payne v United
States, 697 A2d 1229, 1235 (DC, 1997), citing Lillie v United States, 953 F2d 1188, 1191 (CA 10,
1992) (although trial court erred when it visited the crime scene alone, the defendant was not
prejudiced).
In light of this authority, we conclude that the trial court erred when it visited the crime scene
without the knowledge or consent of counsel, thereby denying defendant his constitutional and statutory
right to be present at the scene. However, defendant’s absence from the trial court’s viewing of the
scene does not warrant reversal. A defendant’s absence from a part of a trial requires reversal of his or
her convictions only if there is any reasonable probability of prejudice. People v Woods, 172 Mich
App 476, 480; 432 NW2d 736 (1988).
Here, defendant has failed to demonstrate any reasonable probability of prejudice. The trial
court’s ruling merely indicates that it relied on its visit to the scene to obtain the approximate distance
between 1727 Elsmere, where defendant was allegedly standing, and 1808 Elsmere, the location of
complainants when the shots were fired. Viewed in context, the trial court’s ruling reveals that its visit to
the scene was to defendant’s benefit and resulted in his acquittal of the charged offense of assault with
intent to commit murder and his conviction of the lesser offense of felonious assault. The trial court
apparently found that the fact that the distance between the two locations, being “more than a hundred
feet,” was a key factor in determining that defendant did not possess the requisite intent to murder.
Therefore, reversal is not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
1
Defendant appears to have confused the issue of speedy trial with that of a 180-day rule violation,
MCL 780.131(1); MSA 28.969(1)(1); MCR 6.004(D). See People v Farmer, 127 Mich App 472,
478; 339 NW2d 218 (1983) (“[a]lthough the 180-day rule is a legislative enactment of speedy trial
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policy, consideration of a constitutional challenge to a delayed trial requires an analysis separate from
the 180-day issue”). To the extent defendant argues a violation of the 180-day rule, he failed to cite
authority to support his position and, therefore, has abandoned the issue on appeal. People v Hanna,
223 Mich App 466, 475; 567 NW2d 12 (1997). In any event, the 180-day rule does not apply to
defendant because there is no indication that he was incarcerated in a state facility as a result of a
conviction other than the untried information in question. People v Chambers, 439 Mich 111, 115
116; 479 NW2d 346 (1992).
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