TWP OF OXFORD V PHILIP HANDLEMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TOWNSHIP OF OXFORD,
UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 1999
Plaintiff,
and
GERALD R. BENTLEY, ARLINE BENTLEY,
RICHARD J. CALOIA, LISA A. CALOIA,
CHARLES W. GARDNER, JUNE V. GARDNER,
JULIA HICKMOTT, DENNIS A. JAMEYFIELD,
DIANN C. JAMEYFIELD, JESSIE G. REYNOLDS,
HARWOOD L. ROWLAND, SANDRA A.
ROWLAND, JOHN D. SHAW, ADELE K. SHAW,
BRUCE WYNKOOP, SUSAN WYNKOOP,
HAROLD ZUSCHLAG and PENNY ZUSCHLAG,
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
PHILIP HANDLEMAN, Successor-in-Interest to
PIERCE E. WOODWORTH,
No. 206581
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 80-209683 CE
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Murphy and J. B. Sullivan*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Intervening plaintiffs appeal by leave granted from an order striking a 1981 injunctive prohibition
against guest flights on defendant Philip Handleman’s property in Oxford Township. We affirm.
This case dates back to 1980, when plaintiff Oxford Township ("plaintiff") sought to enjoin
former defendant Pierce Woodworth from developing an airport on his property located in Oxford
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Township. Intervening plaintiffs are residents living in the surrounding area who were allowed to join in
the action. This matter was originally assigned to Oakland Circuit Court Judge Farrell E. Roberts.
Following a bench trial, Judge Roberts ruled that Woodworth had a vested right to operate a private
airport on his property, but was permanently enjoined from operating the airport as a public facility.
The court expressly limited the use of the airport to Woodworth, his wife, and his children, for personal
use only. This Court subsequently affirmed the trial court’s decision and issuance of a permanent
injunction. Twp of Oxford v Woodworth, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 21, 1983
(Docket No. 59030).
In 1988, Philip Handleman purchased the Woodworth property. Judge Fred Mester, the
successor to Judge Roberts, subsequently held that the 1981 injunction applied to Handleman. In May
1997, Handleman filed a motion to set aside the 1981 injunction based upon changes in state law that
vested exclusive control over airport operations in the Michigan Aeronautics Commission ("MAC"), a
state agency. After entertaining arguments, Judge Mester agreed that the portion of Judge Roberts'
1981 injunction that limited the use of the private airport to the property owner and his immediate family
was invalid and unenforceable and, therefore, entered an order striking the invalid portion of Judge
Roberts' order from the 1981 injunction. Intervening plaintiffs moved for rehearing, but their motion
was denied. This Court subsequently granted intervening plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal.1 We
now affirm.
Defendant Handleman sought relief from the 1981 injunctive order pursuant to MCR
2.612(C)(1)(e). This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant relief from a judgment for an abuse
of discretion. Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm'r, 218 Mich App 351, 354; 554 NW2d 43
(1996). "In civil cases, an abuse of discretion exists when the decision is so violative of fact and logic
that it evidences a defiance of judgment and is not the exercise of reason, but rather, of passion or bias.
Id. at 355.
Intervening plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the trial court's decision to grant Handleman
relief from the injunction and it is that order that has been appealed in this case. A motion for rehearing
or reconsideration under MCR 2.119(F) requires the moving party to "demonstrate a palpable error by
which the court and the parties have been misled and show that a different disposition of the motion
must result from correction of the error." This Court reviews a trial court's decision to deny a motion for
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. In re Berlinger Trust, 221 Mich App 273, 279; 561
NW2d 130 (1997).
Intervening plaintiffs contend that they had a vested right to the continuation of Judge Roberts'
1981 injunctive order, which prohibited Handleman from allowing guest flights on the subject property.
We disagree. In general, there is a strong policy favoring the finality of judgments. However, this case
is distinguishable from a typical civil judgment in that the 1981 judgment included the permanent
injunctive order that had prospective application. Under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(e), a court may grant a
party relief from the effect of an injunctive order if it is no longer equitable for that judgment to apply
prospectively. Sylvania Silica Co v Berlin Twp, 186 Mich App 73, 76; 463 NW2d 129 (1990). An
injunction is always subject to modification or dissolution by a trial court if the facts merit such action.
Opal Lake Ass'n v Michayw¢e Ltd Partnership, 47 Mich App 354, 367; 209 NW2d 478 (1973).
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Thus, a party that procures a permanent injunction against another party does not have a vested right in
the continuation of that injunction if the facts or law no longer support continuation of the injunction. We
therefore reject intervening plaintiffs’ argument that they had a vested right to the continuation of the
1981 injunction as a matter of procedure.
Turning to the merits of Handleman's request for relief from the 1981 injunctive order, we agree
that it was no longer equitable for the court to continue the injunction insofar that it prohibited guest
flights on Handleman’s property. The MAC was created pursuant to MCL 259.26(1); MSA
10.126(1). In 1996, legislation was adopted that resulted in significant changes to the Aeronautics
Code. See 1996 PA 370. Significantly, in § 51(1) of the Aeronautics Code, it was established that the
MAC has exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautical activity within the state. MCL 259.51; MSA 10.151,
which became effective July 3, 1996, states:
(1) The commission has general supervision over aeronautics within this state,
with exclusive authority to approve the operation of airports, landing fields, and other
aeronautical facilities within the state, so as to assure a uniformity in regulations covering
aeronautics. The commission shall encourage, foster, and participate with and provide
grants to the political subdivisions of this state in the development of aeronautics within
this state. The commission shall establish and encourage the establishment of airports,
landing fields, and other aeronautical facilities. The commission shall promulgate rules
that it considers necessary and advisable for the public safety governing the designing,
laying out, location, building, equipping, and operation of airports and landing fields. In
order to implement this act, the commission may establish programs of state financial
assistance in the form of grants, leases, loans, and purchases, or a combination of
grants, leases, loans, and purchases, for assisting political subdivisions or other persons.
The commission shall not grant an exclusive right for the use of an aeronautical facility. .
..
Before this 1996 amendment, §51(1) did not contain language stating that the MAC had exclusive
authority to approve the operation of airports and landing fields within the state.
This Court has recently held that the Legislature intended for the MAC (along with airport
authorities) to have exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautical activities throughout the state to assure
uniformity in laws regulating aeronautics for the public good. Capitol Region Airport Authority v
Charter Twp of DeWitt, 236 Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 201181, issued July 23,
1999), slip op at 7-8. This Court concluded that, because exclusive authority for aeronautical activities
was granted to the state agency, that agency was not subject to local land use ordinances or regulations
if those ordinances or regulations related to aeronautical activities. Id., slip op at 6-8. Therefore, even
if a local township had been granted broad powers to regulate local land use under the Township
Planning Act, MCL 125.321 et seq.; MSA 5.2963(101) et seq., the township's authority was
subservient to the agency's authority in matters related to the agency's expertise. Id. However, the
township's authority over local land development could include airport property to the extent that the
authority asserted by a township involves only non-aeronautical uses or development of the land. Id.,
slip op at 9.
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On the basis of the above authority, intervening plaintiffs' argument that the township zoning laws
were effectively repealed as a result of the trial court's interpretation of MCL 259.24a; MSA 10.124a
and MCL 259.51(1); MSA 10.151(1) lacks merit. Townships may still determine the locations of
airports and landing areas, and control non-aeronautical activities, but may not determine what
aeronautical activities take place on the property. The 1996 amendments to the Aeronautics Code
simply operated to clarify the law in an area where townships had never previously had express
legislative authority to control aeronautical activities. It also follows that there is no violation of the title
object clause of the state constitution, Const 1963, art 4, § 24, given that no zoning laws were
effectively repealed by the amendments to the Aeronautics Code.
To the extent that plaintiff township was asserting a right to control the activity on defendant
Handleman's property, it was attempting to regulate aeronautical activity. Intervening plaintiffs are
similarly seeking to enforce a restriction that limits the type of flights that may be made to and from
Handleman's property. Intervening plaintiffs' intent to limit the flight activities exceeds the scope of the
township's authority to regulate Handleman's property in light of the MAC's exclusive jurisdiction. After
defendant Woodworth was granted the right to maintain a private airport on his property, a right now
possessed by Handleman, the local authority's control over this mater with respect to aeronautical
activities ended and that authority is now vested exclusively with the MAC.
1996 PA 370 also added §24a to the Aeronautics Code, MCL 259.24a; MSA 10.124a,
which, as initially enacted, provided:
"Private landing area" means any location, either on land or water, that is used
for the take-off or landing of aircraft, and is to be used by the owner or persons
authorized by the owner. Commercial operations shall not be conducted on private
landing areas.
This section was recently amended by 1998 PA 268, effective July 17, 1998, and now provides:
"Private landing area" means any location, either on land or water, that is used
for the takeoff or landing of aircraft, and is to be used by the owner or persons
authorized by the owner. Notwithstanding any existing limitation or regulation to
the contrary, the owner and any person authorized by the owner shall have the
right to use such private landing area. Commercial operations shall not be
conducted on private landing areas. [Emphasis added.]
This more recent change reflects that the owner of a private landing field has the right to authorize others
to use the landing field, notwithstanding any limitation or regulation to the contrary. Thus, the Legislature
has made it clear that the owner of a private landing field has the right to allow guests to use the landing
field. Although the latest version of §24a had not yet been adopted when Judge Mester issued his
decision, it provides further support for that decision.
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Reading §§ 24a and 51(1) together, we are satisfied that Judge Mester properly granted
defendant Handleman's request for relief from the 1981 injunctive order, because it was no longer
equitable to continue the injunction in light of the statutory changes.
Intervening plaintiffs further argue that the effect of Judge Mester’s ruling and the legislative
changes is to effectuate a taking of their property without just compensation. However, intervening
plaintiffs do not explain what property of theirs has been taken. To the extent they claim a vested
property right in the injunction, that argument is meritless for the reasons previously discussed.
Intervening plaintiffs next argue that the newly adopted amendments to the Aeronautics Code
violate their rights to due process. Legislation comports with due process where the legislation bears a
reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. Fort Gratiot Charter Twp v Kettlewell,
150 Mich App 648, 653; 389 NW2d 468 (1986). The changes made to the Aeronautics Code were
intended to clarify the MAC's authority over aeronautical matters, as well as promote uniformity and
safety in air travel. Because the amendments had the effect of clarifying the MAC's jurisdiction and
matters within its exclusive control, these changes are reasonably related to a permissible legislative
objective. Thus, intervening plaintiffs have not shown that the statutory amendments violate their due
process protections, even if the changes adversely affect their rights.
Intervening plaintiffs also argue that the legislative changes to the Aeronautics Code had the
effect of violating the separation of powers clause of the state constitution, Const 1963, art 3, §2.
Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature overstepped its bounds and invaded the judicial branch's authority
because the effect of the statutory amendments was to invalidate Judge Roberts' 1981 injunctive order.
Under the separation of powers doctrine, the Legislature may not reverse a judicial decision or set aside
a final judgment through a legislative enactment. Wylie v Grand Rapids City Comm, 293 Mich 571,
582-583; 292 NW 668 (1940).
Intervening plaintiffs' argument is flawed. Judge Roberts' made his ruling in the absence of any
controlling state law on point. Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that should only issue when
justice requires it and there is no adequate remedy at law. Kernan v Homestead Development Co,
232 Mich App 503, 509; 591 NW2d 369 (1998). Here, Judge Roberts’ ruling was one in equity only
because there was no controlling legal authority at the time.
It is the Legislature's function to make laws and the judicial branch is vested with the authority to
interpret and apply laws, not make them. Randall v Meridian Twp Bd, 342 Mich 605, 608; 70
NW2d 728 (1955). It was certainly within the Legislature's authority to enact a law clarifying the
jurisdiction of the MAC and defining private landing rights. It is not inappropriate for the Legislature to
adopt new legislation in response to court rulings without violating the separation of powers doctrine if
those statutes apply prospectively to future actions. The Legislature is only precluded from adopting
retroactive legislation that either reopens or sets aside a final judgment of a court already entered. See
Quinton v General Motors Corp, 453 Mich 63, 82-84; 551 NW2d 677 (1996) (Opinion of Levin,
J.). The effect of the changes made by the Legislature was not to invalidate the trial court's equity
powers, even though the proposed changes had an effect on the subject matter of the 1981 injunctive
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order. We conclude that it was not a violation of the separation of powers clause for Judge Mester to
modify the 1981 injunction in light of the recent legislative changes.
Finally, we find no merit to intervening plaintiffs' claim that res judicata applies. Res judicata
does not apply if the relevant facts change or new facts develop. Labor Council, Michigan Fraternal
Order Police v Detroit, 207 Mich App 606, 608; 525 NW2d 509 (1994). Since 1981, the basis for
the injunctive order has changed as a result of the statutory amendments made by the Legislature.
Intervening plaintiffs also argue that defendant Handleman's right to land planes on his property
should be abolished altogether because the effect of Judge Mester's decision was to expand the rights
originally granted by Judge Roberts in 1981. We find no merit to this argument. Defendant
Handleman's right to operate a private landing strip was established by the 1981 judgment and this
Court affirmed that decision. This Court is bound to follow its prior decision on that issue as the law of
the case. Freeman v DEC Int'l, Inc, 212 Mich App 34, 37-38; 536 NW2d 815 (1995). However,
due to an intervening change in the law that applies to Judge Roberts' injunctive order, the law of the
case doctrine does not apply to the portion of the court's order prohibiting guest flights and that portion
may therefore be set aside. Moreover, because Judge Roberts' original intent was to allow defendant
Woodworth to operate a private landing field, as opposed to a public airport, we do not believe the
effect of Judge Mester's ruling was to improperly expand defendant Handleman's rights.
Intervening plaintiffs also adopt and incorporate by reference the issues raised by Oxford
Township in Docket No. 205688. However, because Oxford Township’s appeal has since been
disconsolidated and dismissed by stipulation of the parties, this issue is no longer properly before this
Court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
1
The Experimental Aircraft Association has been granted the right to participate in this case as amicus
curiae.
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