MARLENE PIASECKI V MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSN-NEA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARLENE PIASECKI, Personal Representative of
the Estate of JOSEPH K. PIASECKI, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
October 15, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION-NEA,
WASHTENAW-LIVINGSTON EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION-MEA/NEA, and CHELSEA
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
No. 208757
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-2378 NO
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Doctoroff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals of right the circuit court’s orders granting summary disposition to defendants
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), clarifying its ruling on defendants’ motion, and denying
plaintiff’s cross-motion for reconsideration, in this wrongful death action alleging negligence, vicarious
liability, and breach of a third-party beneficiary contract. We affirm the dismissal of the vicarious liability
and third-party beneficiary contract claims, and reverse the dismissal of the negligence claim.
I
This case arises from the shooting death of Joseph Piasecki (Piasecki), the Superintendent of
the Chelsea School District, by Stephen Leith, a teacher at Chelsea High School, on December 16,
1993. Leith was a member of defendant Michigan Education Association (MEA), which was a party to
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Chelsea School District Board of Education. The
shooting occurred during the course of a grievance proceeding against the school administration,
instituted by the MEA on Leith’s behalf.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that sometime before January 1992, Leith began to experience
depression and a tendency toward anti-social behavior, for which he sought psychiatric treatment. The
complaint alleged that as a result of Leith’s behavior on the job, the school administration pursued
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various disciplinary proceedings against him, at which various MEA agents represented him, including
Mark Jenkins, an employee of the MEA and MEA’s representative for the Chelsea School District,
Phillip Jones and Joseph Beard. The complaint alleged that at all pertinent times, Jenkins was the
MEA’s agent and acting within the scope of his employment with the MEA. The complaint further
alleged that in early November 1993, the administration summoned Leith to a disciplinary proceeding
based on inappropriate conduct toward students. On November 23, 1993, Leith, Jenkins, Jones, and
Beard traveled to Lansing to meet with an attorney to consider Leith’s legal rights with regard to these
disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the MEA agents at the Lansing meeting either
knew or should reasonably have known that Leith was armed with a gun at the meeting, that the MEA
had notice that Leith was considering a dangerous and perhaps lethal criminal attack in connection with
his grievance, and that he had the means to carry out such an attack.
The complaint alleged that on the afternoon of December 16, 1993, after school, a proceeding
on Leith’s grievance against the administration was held in Piasecki’s office, and attended by Piasecki,
Leith and Jones. The complaint alleged that the grievance proceeding was a protected concerted union
activity and that during the course of the proceeding, Leith became upset and left the meeting. The
complaint alleged that while the proceeding continued, Leith drove home with his wife, Alice Leith. It
further alleged that while at home, Leith reviewed documents relating to the grievance; became enraged,
grabbed a loaded gun from the second story of his home, and charged down the stairs past his wife and
into his car, heading back to Chelsea High School. The complaint alleged that during or after Leith’s
review of the grievance documents, Mrs. Leith called Jenkins at his MEA office. The complaint alleged
that because Jenkins was unavailable, Mrs. L spoke with Caroll Sypniewski, an MEA agent with
eith
duties similar to Jenkins’, telling her that her husband was headed back to the grievance proceeding,
armed with a gun, and with the intention of doing serious if not fatal harm to Piasecki, and perhaps other
grievance participants. The complaint further alleged that Sypniewski asked a secretary to contact
Jenkins, and after Jenkins was located in Hartland, Sypniewski informed Jenkins that Leith was headed
to Piasecki’s office with a gun, with the apparent intention of shooting him. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged
that neither Jenkins nor Sypniewski made any attempt to contact law enforcement, and that Sypniewski
did not contact anyone in the Chelsea School District Administration (administration) to warn of Leith’s
apparent intentions and approach. It further alleged that after concluding his telephone conversation
with Sypniewski, Jenkins made an unsuccessful attempt to contact the administration, had to again call
Sypniewski to verify the proper phone number, and then called Piasecki’s office. The complaint alleged
that
33. When Jenkins finally reached [Piasecki], he informed him that Leith had become
angry and threatened Piasecki.
34. During their telephone conversation, Jenkins did not give Mr. Piasecki any specific
details regarding the nature of Leith’s threat, did not mention the fact that Leith was
armed with a gun, and did not mention Leith’s apparent intent to shoot Mr. Piasecki,
instead suggesting, after initially “beating around the bush” for a while, that if it were left
up to Jenkins, ”Maybe I’d leave the office and see what happened.”
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Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that, prior to the shooting, the MEA had knowledge that Leith was
dangerous and could foresee that Leith would injure the grievance procedure participants, that Jenkins
was in a unique position to prevent the harm to Piasecki by communicating the urgency and the severity
of the impending danger from Leith, and was in the position to contact law enforcement officials who
could intervene and protect the participants in the grievance proceeding.
Plaintiff’s complaint also alleged that defendant was vicariously liable for the battery perpetrated
by Leith on Piasecki. The third-party beneficiary claim alleged that the MEA owed a number of the
duties stated above to the administration, as a participant in the grievance proceeding, and breached
them, and that Piasecki was an intended and anticipated third-party beneficiary of the duties defendant
owed the Administration.
A
In lieu of f
iling an answer to plaintiff’s complaint, defendants moved for summary disposition,
seeking dismissal of the negligence and vicarious liability claims pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), and the
breach of third-party beneficiary contract claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff’s response to
defendants’ motion requested leave to amend should the circuit court conclude the claims were
inadequately pleaded.
The circuit court granted summary disposition of the negligence and vicarious liability claims
under (C)(8) and the third-party beneficiary contract claim under (C)(10):
When all of this is boiled down, it seems to me that plaintiff must first establish that there
is this duty on the part of the union to warn or intervene between Mr. Leith and Mr.
Piasecki. And in order to do so they must establish either that there is a special
relationship, special circumstances or assumption of this duty.
The circuit court noted:
. . . . Murdock [v Higgins, 454 Mich 46; 559 NW2d 639 (1997),] talks about the
rationale behind imposing a duty to protect in special relationships again is based on
control.
In those situations it is always where one person entrusts himself to the control and
protection of another with a consequent loss of the control to protect themselves.
Under these, [sic] facts, even in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, it
cannot be said that the decedent lost control to protect himself. He was given a
warning, and chose not to heed that warning and went back into the situation he was
told was dangerous. And, clearly, by his own actions it was not a situation where he
had lost the control of himself.
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The Court is not persuaded with the argument that because he had agreed to a
collective bargaining discussion or a disciplinary hearing that he could not, under a
situation of warning, go back into a situation or lost control to protect himself.
Secondarily, I’m not persuaded that the union had a duty to protect the – Mr. Piasecki,
that that relationship existed where there had been that degree of entrustment between
the two.
As to the assumption of risk [sic duty], there is no question that there may be situations
when a person voluntarily attempts to aid the victim and takes control of the situation
that there can be an assumption of risk.
Again, there was no – no indication here that, in fact, the control had transferred over
and that they had, in fact, by doing that somehow increased the risk. If anything,
regardless of what we say about the degree of the warning, the risk was decreased.
There are, of course, all these issues of proximate cause. Even if there was a duty, even
if the – we can all surmise what might have happened had Mr. Piasecki attempted to
leave, etcetera. But the focus of the motion today is what duty, if any, existed.
Under both C-8 and C-10 this Court finds that under the facts in this case in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party that the union owed no duty to Mr. Piasecki,
had not exerted sufficient control such that this court can impose liability on the union.
B
Defendants filed a motion for clarification requesting the basis of the circuit court’s ruling on the
claims other than the negligence claim. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
circuit court invaded the jury’s province by making the factual determination that Piasecki had not lost
control to protect himself and the determination that “regardless of what we say about the degree of
warning, the risk was decreased.” Plaintiff argued that this was error for two reasons: because the
plaintiff was not legally required to demonstrate increased risk and, second, because even if plaintiff
were required to prove increased risk, that would be a question for the jury:
The question before this Court is whether a union which has knowledge that a specific
union member is headed to a specific administrator’s office at a specific time and date,
with a gun, is required to communicate that information to the intended victim. Marlene
Piasecki is confident that the public policy of this State does require a union to
affirmatively reveal its specific knowledge that an employee is immediately headed into
his employer’s office with a gun. She is also confident that even if no such affirmative
duty were to exist, once the union begins to talk to the intended victim about what might
happen, it must reveal that which it knows to be imminent, and specifically, the crucial
fact that the impending attack involves a firearm. “Under these circumstances, to say
that” the MEA “had no duty . . . would be ‘shocking to humanitarian considerations’
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and fly-in-the-face of ‘the commonly accepted code of social conduct”.” Farwell v
Keaton, supra, 396 Mich at 291, 292, citing Hutchinson v Dickie, 162 F2d 103, 106
(6th Cir 1947); Prosser, supra, § 53, p. 327. This Court should have found, and is now
asked to find that the MEA could owe a duty to Joseph Piasecki, because “reasonable
men would recognize and agree that it exists.” Id. It should be for the jury to determine
whether the necessary elements for a duty to be imposed are present, whether the duty
was breached, and whether Joseph Piasecki’s death was the proximate result of that
breach.
Plaintiff argued that even in the absence of a special relationship which would give rise to a legal duty,
plaintiff’s negligence claim sufficiently rested on duties which arise from special circumstances or
defendants’ own assumption of duty.
Regarding the contract claim, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration argued that the pertinent
allegations were based on the CBA, which, it argued, was made for the benefit of teachers, through the
MEA, on one side, and administrators, through the District, on the other side. Plaintiff argued that the
express purpose of the CBA was “promoting harmonious relations” between the parties, furthering
“their mutual aim(s),” and asserted:
The Union failed to warn Joseph Piasecki that its own grievant was headed into the
grievance with a loaded gun, failed to promote harmonious relations, failed to further the
mutual aims of the parties, and acted inconsistently with the terms of the Agreement. . .
it breached the Agreement, the main purpose of which was to provide peaceful relations
between the Union and the Administration. Joseph Piasecki was an intended
beneficiary of that Agreement, and suffered as a result of the breach.
The circuit court’s order of clarification dismissed the negligence and vicarious liability claims
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), and the breach of third-party beneficiary contract claim pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10). This appeal ensued.
II
Plaintiff argues that the circuit court improperly dismissed her negligence claim under MCR
2.116(C)(8). Plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent by virtue of the existence of special
circumstances, which include a special relationship between defendants and Piasecki and defendants
and Leith, and defendants’ assumption of a duty by undertaking performance, i.e., making a call to
Piasecki to warn him of danger, and performing the duty negligently.
We review the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition de novo. Beaty v Hertzberg &
Golden, PC, 456 Mich 247, 253; 571 NW2d 716 (1997). A motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The factual allegations in the complaint
must be accepted as true, as well as any inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom. Blackwell
v Citizens Ins Co, 457 Mich 662; 579 NW2d 889 (1998). Summary disposition is proper only if the
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claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify
recovery. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 654; 532 NW2d 842 (1995).
In order to state an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of adequately alleging that
the defendant owed a legal duty to plaintiff, a breach of that duty, that plaintiff suffered damages, and
that the breach was a proximate cause of the damages suffered. Schneider v Nectarine Ballroom Inc,
(On Remand), 204 Mich App 1, 4; 514 NW2d 486 (1994). “In negligence cases, the duty is always
the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk.”
Sponkowski v Ingham Road Comm, 152 Mich App 123, 127-128; 393 NW2d 579 (1986), citing
Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 37, p 206.
As a general rule, a private person has no duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a
third person absent some special relationship or circumstance. Murdock v Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 54;
559 NW2d 639 (1997); Roberts v Pinkins, 171 Mich App 648, 652; 430 NW2d 808 (1988); see
also Anno: Comment note—Private Person’s Duty and Liability for Failure to Protect Another
Against Criminal Attack by Third Person, 10 ALR3d 619, § 2, p 623, (noting that “[i]n the absence
of special circumstances, such as a special relationship between the parties or knowledge by the
defendant of an extraordinary danger, there is no duty to protect another from criminal attack.”).
“‘Duty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.” Buczkowski v McKay, 441
Mich 96, 100-101; 490 NW2d 330 (1992). In determining whether a special circumstance or
relationship exists it is necessary to:
. . . balance the societal interests involved, the severity of the risk, the burden upon the
defendant, the likelihood of occurrence, and the relationship between the parties. Other
factors which may give rise to a duty include the foreseeability of the criminal activity,
the defendant’s ability to comply with the proposed duty, the victim’s inability to protect
himself from the criminal activity, the costs of providing protection, and whether the
plaintiff had bestowed some economic benefit on the defendant. [Roberts v Pinkins,
171 Mich App 648, 652-653; 430 NW2d 808 (1988).]
A special relationship can be either between the defendant and the victim or the defendant and the third
party who caused the injury. Murdock, 454 Mich at 54.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged:
35. Although he undertook a duty to warn Mr. Piasecki that Leith posed a threat to the
grievance participants, Jenkins’ warning was inadequate, incomplete, and left out the
crucial detail that Leith was returning to the grievance with a lethal weapon.
36. The incomplete and untruthful character of the warning was motivated in part by a
desire to protect the MEA’s own member, Stephen Leith, from possible professional
and/or criminal culpability.
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37. After getting off the phone with Jenkins, Mr. Piasecki reported that Jenkins had
“suggested that Steve was going to do some harm to me,” and had “basically made a
threat to me,” although nothing in Mr. Piasecki’s demeanor suggested a threat of
immediate harm or knowledge of a gun being involved.
38. Approximately five minutes after the telephone call between Jenkins and [Piasecki],
Leith returned to the grievance with a fully-loaded weapon and opened fire on
[Piasecki], hitting him with four bullets, one of which was fatal.
39. After shooting Mr. Piasecki, Leith then opened fire on Ronald Mead and Phillip
Jones, wounding both of them.
40. The first telephone call that day to the Chelsea Police Department . . . was received
by the Chelsea dispatcher from employees of the Chelsea High School sometime
immediately after the shooting had occurred.
41. Neither the MEA nor its agents took any action whatsoever, except the limited and
inadequate actions described above, to intervene in the impending attack by Leith upon
the grievance participants.
***
44. Prior to the above-described shooting, the MEA had knowledge that Leith was
dangerous and could foresee that Leith would injure some or all of the remaining
participants in the grievance proceeding.
45. The MEA was in a unique position to prevent the harm done to [Piasecki] by
communicating the urgency and the severity of the impending danger from Leith,
including the fact that Leith was returning to the grievance proceeding armed and with
an apparent intent to shoot the participants, and further was in the position of taking
steps to contact law enforcement officials who could intervene and protect the
participants in the grievance proceeding.
46. Based upon the special relationship which exists between a labor union and
an employer, in this case the District Administration, and based upon the special
circumstances which exist during the course of protected concerted activities such
as grievance proceedings, and based upon the assumption of duties already
undertaken through partial action by its agents, the MEA owed the following
duties to [Piasecki]:
a. A duty to warn of the impending danger with immediacy and without delay;
b. A duty to refrain from unnecessary discussion and conferencing within the
ranks of the union prior to taking protective action;
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c. A duty to provide an adequate, complete, and detailed warning, relaying to
the intended victims all crucial and pertinent facts regarding Leith’s threat, including the
fact that he was seen carrying a gun, the fact that he was known to be headed to Joseph
K. Piasecki’s office, the fact that he appeared intent upon shooting participants in the
grievance proceeding, and including but not limited to the fact that Leith’s threat and the
danger which he posed was an urgent matter which appeared immediate and imminent;
***
f. A duty to avoid unnecessary delay in placing the telephone call to Joseph K.
Piasecki;
g. A duty to avoid unnecessary delay in communicating the fact and explicit
details of the threat to [Piasecki] after telephone contact had finally been established,
rather than down-playing the immediacy and lethal nature of the impending harm;
h. A duty to contact law enforcement officials and to seek intervention upon
receiving knowledge of the threat. [Emphasis added.]
The pleadings alleged that Jenkins was aware before the shooting of Leith’s mental problems
and alleged misconduct toward students, and had knowledge that the administration had initiated
disciplinary proceedings against Leith for the alleged inappropriate conduct. Defendants were Leith’s
bargaining representative, and Jenkins, the MEA’s representative for the Chelsea District, had a
relationship with Leith as to the specific grievance which was the subject of the grievance proceeding on
the day of the shooting. Jenkins had driven with Leith to Lansing several weeks before the shooting to
determine Leith’s legal rights regarding a grievance the MEA instituted on his behalf against the
administration, of which Piasecki was the head. The grievance at issue in the Lansing meeting arose out
of the disciplinary proceedings resulting from Leith’s misconduct toward students, incidents which were
the subject of the December 16th grievance proceeding. Plaintiff’s complaint further alleged that
Jenkins had actual knowledge of Leith’s imminent arrival at Piasecki’s office with a gun and
Leith’s intent to harm Piasecki. When Mrs. Leith called Jenkins on the afternoon of December 16,
1993, Piasecki, Mead, the principal of Chelsea High School, and Jones, an MEA representative were
continuing Leith’s grievance proceeding in Piasecki’s office. Under the CBA, there was an ongoing
relationship between defendants and Piasecki in that the union and administration had to comply with the
provisions of the CBA regarding grievance proceedings; Piasecki, as the Superintendent, or his
designee, was obligated to be present at the second level of grievance proceedings and meet with the
grievant and a union representative;1 and no grievance could be adjusted absent prior notice and
opportunity given for a union representative to be present.
Under these circumstances, the severity of the risk, the likelihood of occurrence, and the
foreseeability of the harm were high, while the burden on defendant was minimal, as was Piasecki’s
ability to protect himself without adequate warning. Roberts, supra at 652-653. Jenkins had actual
knowledge of an identified imminent threat of catastrophic harm to a particular individual at a particular
location from a particular person. He also knew that there was no reason to believe that Piasecki knew
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of the danger. He had the ability to promptly and adequately warn Piasecki of Leith’s imminent attack
and the ability to promptly contact law enforcement. Thus he had the ability to discharge the proposed
duty at little or no cost. Piasecki was unable to protect himself from the harm posed by Leith given that
he was unaware that Leith was armed with a gun. Further, while Piasecki was conferring no direct
economic benefit on defendant, Piasecki and Jenkins, as designated representatives of the union and the
administration, were involved in a joint undertaking for the mutual economic and other benefit of their
principals. This joint undertaking involved the face-to-face resolution of grievances outside of a
courtroom setting, and the attendant possibility that some grievants might lose control of their emotions
and become violent. Where such an event occurred and defendant had actual knowledge that the
subject of an ongoing grievance procedure was about to attack the participants in this joint undertaking
with a gun, there is a special relationship or circumstance so as to lead the law to say that Piasecki was
entitled to the protection of being informed by defendant that Leith was returning to the meeting with a
gun and with an apparent intent to do physical harm. A balancing of the societal interests involved
weighs in Piasecki’s favor. He was an administrator required by the CBA to attend the instant
grievance proceeding. Persons required under CBA’s to participate in such proceedings as part of a
joint undertaking must be able to do so with a sense that actual, specific, imminent threats to their lives
by other participants in the process will not be inadequately communicated to them.
We conclude that plaintiff’s negligence claim was improperly dismissed pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8). Plaintiff’s complaint alleged the requisite elements of negligence and adequately stated a
claim that a special relationship existed between Piasecki and defendants, and that defendants’ agents
assumed the duty to warn Piasecki of the danger Leith posed, and performed the duty negligently by
cloaking the gravity of the impending danger by being indirect and by failing to inform Piasecki that Leith
was armed with a gun.
We therefore conclude that the circuit court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s negligence claim on
the basis of failure to state a claim.
III
Plaintiff also argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her claim that defendants were
vicariously liable for Leith’s battery.
The parties agree that in order to survive summary disposition, plaintiff must have adequately
alleged that the MEA participated in, authorized, or ratified Leith’s criminal conduct. Sowels v
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N America, 112 Mich App 616, 622; 317 NW2d 195 (1981). Plaintiff
alleged that Jenkins’ and Sypniewski’s willfully shielding the grievance participants from knowledge of
Leith’s impending attack and willfully choosing not to intervene or seek help from law enforcement
established that defendants effectively participated, ratified, or authorized the shooting.
Under Sowels, unions and their officers and members participating or interested in a labor
dispute cannot be held liable for unlawful acts of union officers, members, or agents, except on clear
proof of actual participation in or authorization of the acts, or ratification of the acts after actual
knowledge thereof. “Participation” means to take part in, to receive or have a part or share of, or to be
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engaged in an activity. See Burrell v Ford Motor Co, 386 Mich 486, 494; 192 NW2d 207 (1971).
“Ratification” is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind him, but which was done or
professed to be done on his account. Restatement Agency, 2d, § 82, p 210; Cudahy Bros Co v West
Michigan Dock & Market Corp, 285 Mich 18, 25; 280 NW 93 (1938).
We conclude that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege facts from which it could be inferred that
defendants actually participated, authorized, or ratified Leith’s actions. We find no error in the circuit
court’s dismissal of the vicarious liability claim.
IV
Plaintiff’s final argument is that the circuit court erred in dismissing her breach of third-party
beneficiary contract claim. We review the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition de novo. Baker
v Arbor Drugs, 215 Mich App 198, 202; 544 NW2d 727 (1996). A motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis of a plaintiff’s allegations. Id. The circuit court must
consider and view the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any documentary evidence in
favor of the nonmoving party. The moving party has the initial burden of supporting its position by
affidavits, depositions, admissions or other documentary evidence. Smith v Globe Life Ins, 460 Mich
446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1994), citing Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362-363; 547
NW2d 314 (1996). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish that a genuine i sue of
s
material fact exists. Id.
The rights of third-party beneficiaries are addressed in MCL 600.1405; MSA 27A.1405,
which provides:
Any person for whose benefit a promise is made by way of contract, as hereinafter
defined, has the same right to enforce said promise that he would have had if the said
promise had been made directly to him as the promisee.
(1) A promise shall be construed to have been made for the benefit of a person
whenever the promisor of said promise has undertaken to give or to do or refrain from
doing something directly to or for said person.
The law presumes that a contract has been executed for the benefit of the parties, and plaintiff
has the burden of proving that Piasecki was an intended beneficiary of the contract between defendant
and the Chelsea School District Board of Education. Oja v Kin, 229 Mich App 184, 193; 581 NW2d
739 (1998). When determining whether the parties to the contract intended to make a third person a
third-party beneficiary, a court should examine the contract using an objective standard. Dynamic
Construction Co v Barton Malow Co, 214 Mich App 425, 427; 543 NW2d 31 (1995). A person
who may be incidentally benefited by the contract does not have rights as a third-party beneficiary.
Alcona Schools v Michigan, 216 Mich App 202, 205; 549 NW2d 356 (1996). Calamari & Perillo,
Contracts (3d ed), Third Party Beneficiaries, ch 17, p 701, states that in order to qualify as an intended
beneficiary, the third party must meet two requirements, otherwise he is an incidental beneficiary:
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. . . . (1) The third party must show that recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary “is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties.” (2)(a) “[T]he
performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to
the beneficiary” or (b) “the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.”
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged in pertinent part:
61. Upon information and belief, the MEA was party to a collective bargaining
agreement between it and the Chelsea District Administration which gave rise to certain
express and implied contractual duties, upon information and belief including but not
limited to the following:
a. A duty to take steps to insure the safe and efficient handling of protected
concerted union activities, including grievance proceedings;
b.
members;
A duty to warn the Administration of violent threats made by union
c. A duty to maintain a policy placing the personal safety of Administrators
over the labor-related interests of any other individual;
d. A duty to contact law enforcement officials and/or take such other action to
intervene in situations which would foreseeably jeopardize the safety of participants to
grievance proceedings;
e. A duty to take whatever steps were necessary to insure and protect
participants in a grievance proceeding once it learned of a specific threat posed by a
particular union member; and
f. Such other duties as may appearing during the course of discovery and trial
of this matter.
Plaintiff asserts that the CBA was made for his benefit since the Board of Education employs
the administration of which he was a part, and the union members on one side and the administration on
the other side were the respective intended beneficiaries of the CBA, which had the express purpose of
“promoting harmonious relations” between them and furthering “their mutual aim(s).2
Plaintiff failed to establish that he was more than an incidental beneficiary of the promise to
promote harmonious relations. Further, the express provision in the CBA upon which plaintiff relies –
the preamble’s recitation of an interest in promoting harmonious relations between the teaching staff and
administration - - is not tantamount to a contractual commitment to undertake the duties set forth in
paragraph 61 of plaintiff’s complaint. While the CBA and Piasecki’s status as administrator are facts
relevant to the determination whether there was a special relationship sufficient to support a duty under
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the facts of this case, as discussed in section II, supra, Piasecki’s status does not establish him a a third
party beneficiary of the CBA.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Helene N. White
1
Article XIX of the CBA, entitled “Grievance Procedure,” provided in pertinent part:
Paragraph A: A grievance shall be an alleged violation of the terms of this contract or
written Board policy which concerns teachers’ wages, hours, and working conditions.
***
No grievance shall be adjusted without prior notification to the Association and
opportunity for an Association representative to be present, nor shall any adjustment
of a grievance be inconsistent with the terms of this agreement. . .
***
LEVEL TWO: If the Grievant and/or the Association is not satisfied with the
disposition at Level One . . . the Grievant and/or the Association may appeal the
grievance within five (5) additional school days by filing it with the Superintendent.
Within three (3) school days from the receipt of the written grievance, the
Superintendent or his designee shall meet with the grievant and a representative of
the Association to attempt to resolve the grievance. The Superintendent or his
designee shall render his/her decision within three (3) days after such meeting.
***
If an individual teacher has a personal complaint which h desires to discuss with a
e
supervisor, he/she is free to do so without recourse in the grievance procedure.
However, no grievance shall be adjusted without prior notification to the Association
and opportunity for an Association representative to be present, nor shall any
adjustment of a grievance by inconsistent with the terms of this agreement. In the
administration of the grievance procedure, the interests of the teachers shall be the sole
responsibility of the Association. [Emphasis added.]
2
The preamble of the collective bargaining agreement provided in pertinent part:
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WHEREAS, The Board and the Association recognize and declare that providing a
quality education for the children of the Chelsea School District is their mutual aim, and
that the character of such education is influenced by the quality and morale of the
teaching service, and
WHEREAS, The parties hereto are interested in promoting harmonious relations
among the teaching staff, administration, Association and the Board, and
WHEREAS, Pursuant to the Provisions of Act 336 of the Michigan Public Acts of
1947, as amended by Act 379 of the Michigan Public Acts of 1965, the Association
and the Board desire to contract in respect to wages, hours, or other conditions of
employment.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the respective agreement of
the Board and the Association herein contained, the Board and the Association agree as
follows . . . [Emphasis added.]
-13
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