PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER MATTHEW CORNELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 15, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 207160
Roscommon Circuit Court
LC No. 96-003123 FH
CHRISTOPHER MATTHEW CORNELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Gage and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from a post-judgment order of restitution holding him liable
for restitution in the amount of $413,000. Defendant and two accomplices broke into a house in search
of valuables. Somehow, during commission of the offense, the house burned to the ground. Defendant
pleaded guilty to breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305,
and was sentenced to four to ten years' imprisonment with the amount of restitution to be determined at
a later time. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court’s use of replacement cost as the measure of value of
the burned house was incorrect. We note that by not suggesting a different measure of value and citing
no authority for his contention that replacement cost is an improper measure, defendant has failed to
properly present this issue on appeal. A party may not merely announce a position and leave it to this
Court to discover and rationalize the basis for that position. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640
641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). Nonetheless, we conclude that replacement cost was an appropriate
measure of value in this case.
Seven months after defendant was sentenced the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing to
determine restitution. In determining the amount of restitution to order, the trial court must consider the
amount of the loss sustained by the victim. MCL 780.767(1); MSA 28.1287(767)(1). The prosecutor
bears the burden of demonstrating the loss by a preponderance of the evidence. MCL 780.767(4);
MSA 28.1287(767)(4). Where loss or destruction of property is the result of the crime, the statute
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directs that the court may order a defendant to pay an amount equal to the greater of the value of the
property on the date of the loss or the value of the
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property on the date of sentencing. MCL 780.766(3)(b); MSA 28.1287(766)(3)(b).1 The statute,
however, is silent regarding how to measure value.
This Court has held that amount of the loss sustained by the victim should be based upon the
evidence. People v Guajardo, 213 Mich App 198, 200; 539 NW2d 570 (1995). At the evidentiary
hearing the prosecutor presented evidence that the replacement cost of the house was $413,140. The
prosecutor also presented evidence that the house was of historical value and had been built with high
quality materials. Additionally, the owner of the house was planning on restoring the house to its original
condition for the purpose of opening a bed and breakfast. Though defendant objected to this valuation,
he failed to offer any evidence supporting a different measure of value. The trial court thus ordered
restitution in the amount of $413,000. Under the facts presented, and given that an evaluation of the
replacement cost was the only evidence proffered, we find the determination of the loss sustained by the
victim to be reasonable and based on the evidence.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by not considering his ability to pay the
restitution ordered, as required by MCL 780.766(13); MSA 28.1287(766)(13) and MCL 780.767(1);
MSA 28.1287(767)(1).2 When defendant raised the question of his ability to pay the trial court
expressly refused to consider the issue, holding that its consideration of this factor was not relevant until
such time as defendant was no longer incarcerated and stating that it would defer any ruling until such
time. Under the version of the statute in effect at the time of this December 1996 hearing, the court's
refusal to consider defendant's finances was arguably error. People v Law, 223 Mich App 585, 590
592; 568 NW2d 90 (1997). However, the court's acknowledgment that it would hold an additional
hearing at the time of defendant's release, when his obligation to begin payment took effect, renders any
error harmless.
Entering into the plea agreement to secure withdrawal of his pending arson charge defendant
was aware that restitution would be ordered. MCL 780.766(2); MSA 28.1287(2); People v
Ronowski, 222 Mich App 58, 61; 564 NW2d 466 (1997). Defendant's agreement to pay restitution
constitutes a "special circumstance" having a strong bearing on his ability to pay. MCL 780.766(13);
MSA 28.1287(766)(13); People v Hart, 211 Mich App 703, 708; 536 NW2d 605 (1995).
Moreover, the court reasonably can consider the restitution agreement as establishing a rebuttable
presumption that a defendant has considered his own financial situation and has determined that he has
or will have the ability to pay the amount ordered by the court. Id.
That the court postponed the time for considering any evidence defendant could produce that
might overcome this presumption was perhaps not intended by the statute, but it will likely be more
problematic for the court than it will cause harm to defendant. While the need to hold another hearing
will entail the investment of additional time and expense on the part of the court, defendant will be able
to present a more relevant and accurate picture of his financial circumstances at the time pertinent to his
initiation of payments. We find no error prejudicial to defendant. Furthermore, we note that pursuant to
additional provisions of the act,3 other procedural safeguards exist that ensure that defendant will be
afforded due process in the eventual
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enforcement of the restitution order. People v Gahan, 456 Mich 264, 277; 571 NW2d 503 (1997);
see also People v Grant, 455 Mich 221, 241, n 26; 565 NW2d 389 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
1996 PA 562, effective June 1, 1997, amended the Crime Victim's Rights Act. At the time of the
evidentiary hearing this provision was found at MCL 780.766(4)(b); MSA 28.1287(766)(4)(b).
2
We note that pursuant to the 1996 amendment a defendant's ability to pay restitution is no longer a
factor in the court's analysis. For the purpose of resolving this claim of appeal, however, we will analyze
this issue under the procedural standards in effect at the time of defendant's hearing.
3
MCL 780.766(11); MSA 28.1287(766)(11), previously subsection 14; MCL 780.766(12); MSA
28.1287(766)(12), previously subsection 15; MCL 780.766(14); MSA 28.1287(766)(14), previously
subsection 17. We opine that the trial court likely focused on these provisions when conducting the
evidentiary hearing, resulting in its mistaken view that defendant's ability to pay was irrelevant at the time
restitution was ordered.
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