PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY FRANCIS SCHOHL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 8, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 194717
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 95-002712 FH
ANTHONY FRANCIS SCHOHL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Hood and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520e(1)(c); MSA 28.788(5)(1)(c), and furnishing alcohol to a minor, MCL 436.33(1); MSA
18.1004. He was sentenced to two years’ probation with the first six months to be served in the
Macomb County Jail, and appeals as of right. We affirm.1
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for fourth
degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e(1)(c); MSA 28.788(5)(1)(c). We disagree. “In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial in a criminal case, we view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational factfinder could conclude that
the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Terry, 224
Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
In order to establish fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, the prosecutor had to prove that
defendant i tentionally engaged in sexual contact with the victim for sexual purposes while defendant
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knew that the victim was physically helpless. CJI2d 20.13; CJI2d 20.16; MCL 750.520e(1)(c); MSA
28.788(5)(1)(c). In the present case, defendant does not contest the victim’s allegations of sexual
contact by the touching of her buttocks, but rather, challenges the victim’s ability to identify defendant as
her assailant. The victim testified that she woke up when she felt “him touching” her buttocks.
However, the victim admitted that when she woke up, she could not see anything. The next thing she
felt was an object, believed to be a penis, on her mouth. She also admitted that, at that time, she
could not see defendant because it was dark. The victim turned her head away. She could feel her arm
being manipulated when the dog began to bark. At this time, defendant jumped and ran away. The
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victim testified that, at that time, she could see defendant. Additionally, on re-direct examination, the
victim testified that defendant was the only person in the home who could have physically committed the
crime due to his size.
Defendant also contends that the victim’s testimony failed to establish that the object which
touched her mouth was defendant’s penis. During direct examination, the victim testified that she
thought she “felt” a penis which touched her mouth, although she admitted that it was dark. She also
described the penis as feeling “soft and wet.” During cross-examination, the victim admitted that she
told a police officer that she was not sure what the object was which touched her mouth. However, the
victim also testified that when she returned from vacation, she had determined that it was defendant’s
penis. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could
conclude that it was defendant who touched the victim’s buttocks with his hand and touched her mouth
with his penis. There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct conviction. Terry, supra.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to provide a specific unanimity instruction
to the jury. We disagree. In People v Yarger, 193 Mich App 532, 533; 485 NW2d 119 (1992), the
defendant was charged with a single count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520d(1)(a); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(a). The victim testified that in the fall of 1985, she was fifteen
years of age when she consensually performed fellatio on the defendant. The defendant then penetrated
her vagina with his penis. The trial testimony differed from the victim’s preliminary examination
testimony at which she stated that the defendant’s penis never entered her vagina. The victim was
impeached by her contradictions in testimony as well as prior false accusations of rape. The defendant
denied that any act of sexual penetration occurred. Id.
The trial court in Yarger instructed the jury that either one of the two sexual acts, fellatio or
vaginal intercourse, would satisfy the first element of the statute. The trial court went on to instruct the
jury that their verdict must be unanimous as all twelve jurors had to agree on the verdict. The jury
returned a guilty verdict. Although polled, the jurors were not asked to indicate which sexual act was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the jury instructions,
although not objected to, were insufficient to satisfy the requirement that his conviction was the result of
a unanimous verdict. This Court agreed and reversed the conviction, stating:
The complainant’s trial testimony, if accepted as true, would have supported
two separate convictions of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, each based on a
separate sexual penetration. The jury instructions allowed the jury to convict defendant
on the single sexual penetration charge if it believed that the evidence proved either
penetration, or both, beyond a reasonable doubt. While we find nothing objectionable
in the instruction itself, because only a single count of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct was submitted to the jury, error occurred when the jury was not instructed that
it must unanimously agree on which act(s) was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In
other words, a possibility exists, that for example, six jurors were convinced that fellatio
had occurred, but not intercourse, while the other six jurors held the opposite view.
Unless waived by a defendant, the right to a jury trial includes the right to a unanimous
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verdict. In this case, we find it impossible to discern of which act of penetration
defendant was found guilty. . . . We now conclude that the error requires that
defendant’s conviction be reversed. If this case is retried, defendant should either be
charged with two separate counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct or else an
appropriate instruction should be given to the jury. [Yarger, supra at 536-537 (citations
omitted; emphasis in original).]
However, the Supreme Court examined the Yarger decision in People v Cooks, 446 Mich 503; 521
NW2d 275 (1994), and distinguished the facts to reach the opposite conclusion. In Cooks, the ten
year-old victim testified that the defendant engaged in three acts of nonconsensual anal intercourse with
her during a one-week period. At trial, the defendant requested a special instruction to the jury
requiring them to unanimously agree on the specific act of penetration which occurred. The trial court
declined to do so, giving only the general unanimity instruction. Cooks, supra at 506-509.
The Cooks Court examined the law from state and federal jurisdictions before holding:
. . . if alternative acts allegedly committed by defendant are presented by the state as
evidence of the actus reus element of the charged offense, a general instruction to the
jury that its decision must be unanimous will be adequate unless 1) the alternative acts
are materially distinct (where the acts themselves are conceptually distinct or where
either party has offered materially distinct proofs regarding one of the alternatives), or 2)
there is reason to believe the jurors might be confused or disagree about the factual
basis of defendant’s guilt. [Cooks, supra at 524.]
In Yarger, the victim testified that she consensually performed fellatio on the defendant. She then
testified that the fellatio was followed by vaginal intercourse. However, the defendant went on to
impeach the victim’s testimony as she had previously made false accusations of rape. The victim was
also impeached with her prior testimony at the preliminary examination at which she denied that the
defendant’s penis entered her vagina. As the convictions focused on the credibility of the victim and the
defendant, the jury could have reached a verdict without concluding unanimously which sexual act,
fellatio or vaginal intercourse, occurred. Yarger, supra at 537.
However, the Cooks Court concluded that:
. . . the evidence offered in this case to support each of the alleged acts of penetration
was materially identical, i.e., the complainant’s equivocal testimony of an anal
penetration, occurring in the same house over an unspecified three-day period in
January 1989, while only she and defendant were in the room. Thus, the multiple acts
alleged by the prosecutor were tantamount to a continuous course of conduct. . . .
[D]efendant here did not present a separate defense or offer materially distinct evidence
of impeachment regarding any particular act. He merely denied the existence of any
inappropriate behavior. Thus, the sole task of the jury was to determine the credibility
of the victim with respect to the pattern of alleged conduct. Because neither party
presented materially distinct proofs regarding any of the alleged acts, the factual basis
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for the specific unanimity instruction mandated in Yarger . . . was nonexistent. [Cooks,
supra at 528-529.]
In the present case, the victim testified that she was asleep when she felt defendant touching her
buttocks. The next act which occurred was the placement of defendant’s penis on her mouth. The trial
court did not provide a specific unanimity instruction, but gave the general instruction. The evidence
offered in support of the fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct charge was materially identical, namely
both acts were testified to by the victim as occurring within the same location, the living room area of
defendant’s residence, within a short span of time. Therefore, the multiple acts could be deemed to be
a continuous course of conduct. Defendant did not offer separate defenses to each individual sexual
act, but rather, categorically denied the allegations of inappropriate touching of the buttocks and mouth.
Accordingly, the jury assessed the credibility of Nicole and defendant where the proofs and defenses
were the same. Pursuant to Cooks, supra at 536-537, reversal is not required as the general
instruction to the jury did not deprive defendant of his right to a unanimous verdict.
Defendant next argues that various statements made in the prosecutor’s closing argument
deprived him of a fair trial. “Failure to object during trial precludes appellate review of alleged
prejudicial remarks by the prosecutor unless the prejudicial effect would not have been cured by a
cautionary instruction and failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.” People
v Whitfield, 214 Mich App 348, 352; 543 NW2d 347 (1995). We find that the prosecutor’s
comments were not prejudicial. In any event, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s
comments could not have been cured by an appropriate instruction. Id.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony regarding defendant’s
exercise of his right to remain silent. We disagree. The prosecutor questioned a police officer regarding
contact with defendant. Although the question posed required a “yes” or “no” response, the officer
testified that defendant did not return any additional telephone calls. There was no evidence that the
prosecutor elicited the answer in a studied attempt to place the issue before the jury. The prosecutor
did not reference defendant’s failure to return telephone calls in closing argument. Accordingly,
defendant was not denied a fair trial. People v Truong, 218 Mich App 325, 335-336; 553 NW2d
692 (1996).
Defendant also asserts that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of a prior consistent
statement by the victim. We disagree. The testimony was not objected to and was cumulative to the
victim’s testimony. Accordingly, any error was harmless. People v Rodriquez (On Remand), 216
Mich App 329, 332; 549 NW2d 359 (1996).
Lastly, defendant asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. There is a
presumption in favor of effective assistance, and a defendant bears a heavy burden of proving
otherwise. People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). “To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Id.
The alleged deficiency must be prejudicial to the defendant, and the defendant must overcome the
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presumption that the challenged action was sound trial strategy. People v Daniel, 207 Mich
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App 47, 53; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). In the present case, defendant failed to meet his burden in
demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
1
The trial court imposed the sentence of two years’ probation with the first six months to be served in
the Macomb County Jail, but was interrupted before it could specify the conviction to which this
sentence applied. The sentencing document provides that this sentence was imposed for the fourth
degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. The document also provides that defendant was sentenced
to ninety days in jail for the furnishing alcohol to a minor conviction, to be served concurrently to the
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction.
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