GREGORY DWAYNE ALLEN SR V CLEARING NIAGARA INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GREGORY DWAYNE ALLEN, SR.,
UNPUBLISHED
October 5, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CLEARING-NIAGARA, INC., d/b/a NIAGARA
MACHINE & TOOL WORKS,
No. 207976
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 95-002343 NP
Defendant,
and
GUELPH TOOL SALES, INC., d/b/a ODF
INDUSTRIES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Whitbeck and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order dismissing defendant, Clearing-Niagara, Inc., d/b/a Niagara
Machine & Tool Works. However, the issue on appeal relates to a prior order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendant, Guelph Tool Sales, Inc., d/b/a ODF Industries.1 We affirm.
The sole issue on appeal is whether sufficient facts were alleged by plaintiff to establish an
intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation
Act (WDCA), MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1). Plaintiff contends that he has alleged
sufficient facts. We disagree. Whether the facts alleged by plaintiff are sufficient to constitute an
intentional tort is a question of law for the trial court. Gray v Morley, 460 Mich 738, 742-743; 596
NW2d 922 (1999); Palazzola v Karmazin Products, 223 Mich App 141, 146-147; 565 NW2d 868
(1997).
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Our Supreme Court, in Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich 149; 551 NW2d 132
(1996), construed the intentional tort exception to the WDCA and described the facts and proofs
necessary to establish such a claim.2 The Travis Court held that, “to state a claim against an employer
for an intentional tort, the employer must deliberately act or fail to act with the purpose of inflicting an
injury upon the employee.” Id. at 172. The Travis Court further noted that, when there was no direct
evidence of an intent to injure, i.e., a true, classic intentional tort, the plaintiff may prove such intent with
circumstantial evidence. Id. at 172-173. A plaintiff may, therefore, properly set forth an intentional tort
claim if the plaintiff establishes that “the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to
occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.” MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1); see, also,
Travis, supra 173, 180. It is this provision that is at issue in the present case, i.e., whether plaintiff has
alleged sufficient facts to illustrate that defendant had actual knowledge that plaintiff was certain to be
injured while he operated the press and willfully disregarded that knowledge.
Plaintiff primarily argues that defendant’s intent to injure him can be inferred from the fact that
the presses were routinely operated on a continuous cycle with safety guards improperly positioned and,
consequently, another employee previously sustained severe injuries. Plaintiff also alleged that
defendant engaged in violations of MIOSHA, failed to train its employees in safety, and failed to
perform and ensure proper safety inspections.
We agree with the trial court that the facts alleged by plaintiff, even if accepted as true, are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. MCR 2.116(C)(8); Radke v Everett,
442 Mich 368, 373-374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). None of the facts alleged by plaintiff in his amended
complaint were sufficient to establish actual knowledge or certainty of occurrence. Plaintiff’s argument
that the press ran in a continuous cycling phase does not necessarily cause the press to be considered a
“continuously operative dangerous condition” within the contemplation of Travis, supra at 178. The
risk associated with running the press without the proper placement of protective guards was obvious to
the press operator, including plaintiff, and could have been mitigated by simply moving the protective
guards into proper position. Although plaintiff was “allowed” to work without the safety guards being
properly placed, plaintiff did not allege that he was required to work without properly placed guards.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the fact that a similar injury occurred to a press operator months prior to
the incident involving plaintiff, even though under allegedly similar circumstances, does not establish the
requisite certainty that an injury would occur. Id. at 174. Similarly, defendant’s alleged failure to
provide safety training and perform safety inspections of the presses does not lead to an inference that
defendant specifically intended to injure its employees. Defendant’s knowledge that the presses were
being operated without use of safety guards may be considered negligent because it was foreseeable
that, eventually, someone would place their hand in the path of the ram and severe injuries would result.
However, mere negligence is insufficient to establish an intentional tort. Gray, supra at slip op p 7;
Travis, supra at 178-179. Therefore, plaintiff has
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failed to state an intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA, and
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) was proper.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
Guelph Tool Sales, Inc. will be referred to as “defendant” because plaintiff’s claim on appeal relates
only to his claims against Guelph.
2
A majority of the Court concurred in the test established in the lead opinion. See Travis, supra at
191-192.
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