BARBARA COFFEY V UNIVERSITY FAMILY PHYSICIANS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA COFFEY,
UNPUBLISHED
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
UNIVERSITY FAMILY PHYSICIANS, f/k/a
UNIVERSITY FAMILY PHYSICIANS, P.C., d/b/a
GRACE FAMILY PRACTICE CENTER, DR.
FERRANS, SANFORD LAX, M.D., and DR.
QUEK,
No. 210739
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-544155 NH
Defendants-Appellees
and
DR. BENITEX-GONZALEZ, a/k/a ORLANDO
BENEDICT, M.D.
Defendant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Saad and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Barbara Coffey appeals as of right from the trial court's order granting defendants'
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), which provides for summary disposition
where the statute of limitations has run on a claim. Plaintiff argues that her claim is not barred by MCL
600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4), which mandates a two-year statute of limitations on actions to
recover damages based on medical malpractice. Plaintiff argues that because defendants continued to
treat her after they failed to properly diagnose her cancer, the alleged negligence continued until her
condition was properly diagnosed by another doctor in early 1995. Because she filed her notice of
intent in 1996, plaintiff argues that she is within the statute of limitations. However, we agree with the
trial court that the so-called "continuing violations" doctrine does not apply to these sorts of medical
malpractice claims. For purposes of determining whether the statute of limitations has run on plaintiff's
claim, we look to the date of the actual commission or omission that forms the basis of her claim, which
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in this case happens to be sometime in June of 1994. Consequently, plaintiff's claim is barred by MCL
600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4), and we affirm the trial court's order granting defendants' motion for
summary disposition.
The parties do not dispute the essential facts. According to plaintiff, she began seeking
treatment from defendants in 1993 when she was experiencing abdominal pain and rectal bleeding. On
June 13, 1994, at defendants' request, plaintiff underwent a procedure known as a barium enema.
Although the test did not reveal any significant abnormalities, the doctor who summarized the test results
recommended a colonoscopy if plaintiff's clinical symptoms suggested polyp or polypoid lesion.
Defendants did not order or perform any further tests, but they continued to treat plaintiff for various
medical problems through the beginning of 1995. On March 16, 1995, plaintiff complained to
defendants of pain in her lower abdomen. Further tests, including a CT scan and a colonoscopy,
revealed that plaintiff had colon cancer that had metastasized to her ovaries. On April 12, 1995,
plaintiff underwent surgery to remove the mass.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to order appropriate and timely
diagnostic testing to determine the source of her rectal bleeding and, consequently, failed to diagnose
her colon cancer. She notified defendants of her intent to file this lawsuit on November 8, 1996 and
filed her complaint on May 14, 1997. Defendants moved for summary disposition, claiming that the
statute of limitations had run on plaintiff's claim. The trial court agreed with defendants that the alleged
malpractice occurred in June 1994. Consequently, the trial court found that the claim was barred by the
statute of limitations on malpractice tort claims. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations
does not bar her claim because defendant's malpractice was part of a continuing act of omission that
only ended when plaintiff's condition was properly diagnosed.
When reviewing a motion for summary disposition granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), we
accept as true the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations and construe them in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Stabley v Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Park Authority, 228 Mich App 363, 365; 579
NW2d 374 (1998). The motion should not be granted unless no factual development could provide a
basis for recovery. Id. "The affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties, must be considered by the
court when the motion is based on subrule (C)(1)-(7) or (10)." MCR 2.116(G)(5).
Generally, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must bring a claim within two years of the
claim's accrual or within six months of the discovery of the claim. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA
27A.5805(4). Medical malpractice claims accrue "at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for
the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has
knowledge of the claim." MCL 600.5838a(1); MSA 27A.5838(1)(1). See also Solowy v Oakwood
Hospital Corp, 454 Mich 214, 220; 561 NW2d 843 (1997). In this case, plaintiff alleges that
defendants failed to follow up with necessary tests after her first barium enema. Therefore, the alleged
omission occurred in June 1994, when the findings of the barium enema were prepared. Plaintiff had
two years from the claim accrual date to bring her malpractice claim. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA
27A.5805(4). However, plaintiff filed her notice of intent November 1996, well after the statute of
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limitations had lapsed. Because the statute of limitations had lapsed, the trial court did not err in granting
defendants' motion for summary disposition. Solowy, supra, at 220.
In opposition to defendants' motion for summary disposition, plaintiff argued that she could still
bring her complaint under the continuing violations doctrine. However, in Traver Lakes Community
Maintenance Ass'n v Douglas Co, 224 Mich App 335, 341; 568 NW2d 847 (1997), this Court
declined to extend the continuing violations doctrine, or continuing wrongful acts doctrine, to negligence
claims. Furthermore, the Traver Court noted that the continuing violations doctrine was established by
"continual tortious acts, not by continual harmful effects from an original, completed act." Id. at 340
341. Here, even if the continuing violations or continuing wrongful acts doctrine did apply to medical
malpractice claims, plaintiff has failed to present documentary evidence of continual tortious acts.
Rather, her documentary evidence reveals no further incidences of possible misdiagnosis; rather, the
majority of plaintiff's contacts with defendants were for prescription refills. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in granting defendants' motion for summary disposition because the continuing violations
doctrine has not been extended to medical malpractice or negligence actions, and even if the doctrine
did apply, plaintiff's documentary evidence fails to establish a continuing violation or continuing wrongful
acts. MCR 2.116(G)(4).
Lastly, in opposition to defendants' motion for summary disposition, plaintiff asserted that her
claim was timely because the statute of limitations should commence when defendants last treated her or
when she obtained relief from defendants' alleged malpractice by having her corrective surgery in April
1995. Plaintiff, however, failed to cite authority for this position. A statement of position without
citation to authority is insufficient to bring an issue before the Court. Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App
526, 536-537; 476 NW2d 439 (1991). Furthermore, plaintiff's position was rejected by the
Legislature. The last treatment rule provided that a claim of malpractice accrued at the time the
defendant discontinued treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff. Chase v Sabin 445 Mich 190, 198 n
14; 516 NW2d 60 (1994). In Morgan v Taylor, 434 Mich 180, 194; 451 NW2d 852 (1990), the
Supreme Court noted that the Legislature had repealed the last treatment rule. Accordingly, plaintiff's
argument that her claim accrued either with defendants' last treatment or the correction of the alleged
malpractice is without merit.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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