IN RE RICHTER MINORS

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS In the Matter of DANIEL WAYNE RICHTER, ANDREW RICHTER, CANDY RICHTER, and AARON RICHTER, minors. FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, UNPUBLISHED September 24, 1999 Petitioner-Appellee, v No. 214636 Kalamazoo Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 96-000035 NA JERRY RICHTER and TAMME RICHTER, Respondents-Appellants. Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Jansen and Whitbeck, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondents appeal by delayed leave granted from a family court order terminating their parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g). We affirm. Although the trial court concluded that termination of parental rights was not appropriate under § 19b(3)(c)(i), only one statutory ground for termination is required in order to terminate parental rights, In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). In addition, respondents failed to show that termination of their parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondents’ parental rights to the children. Id. We reject respondents’ claim that the trial court failed to provide them with a fair opportunity to demonstrate their parenting skills when it ended the in-home visits. The trial court ended these visits after it was determined that a petition to terminate parental rights was going to be filed, and because the -1­ trial court had received reports that the children feared the home visits. However, the trial court continued to permit visitations, albeit at the agency’s office in a supervised setting. The supervised visits still afforded respondents an opportunity to demonstrate their parenting skills. Finally, we find no support in the record for respondents’ claims that the trial court improperly considered the foster family’s interest in the children for purposes of adoption or that the trial court improperly compared the children’s foster home to respondents’ home when deciding whether to terminate respondents’ parental rights. The foster family, while vocal about the children’s rights, reported problems that the children experienced in their home and any negative impact that respondents may have had on them. Respondents do not dispute the accuracy of the information provided by the foster family, but appear to argue that the foster family should not have had a role in these proceedings. However, the foster family’s input in these proceedings was helpful to the trial court because the foster family was aware of relevant information that no one else may have known. The foster family communicated information relevant to the children’s best interests only, not their own interest in adopting the children. Furthermore, the trial court did not improperly compare the two homes in its decision to terminate rights. Indeed, the trial court specifically noted in its findings that it was not considering the children’s foster home in its decision to terminate parental rights. See In re Hamlet (After Remand), 225 Mich App 505, 520; 571 NW2d 750 (1997). Accordingly, we find no error requiring reversal. Affirmed. /s/ Richard A. Bandstra /s/ Kathleen Jansen /s/ William C. Whitbeck -2­

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