IN RE THEOTIS LAWSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of THEOTIS LAWSON, Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 24, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206869
Wayne Juvenile Court
LC No. 96-340518
THEOTIS LAWSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Kelly and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a juvenile court order adjudicating him responsible for
carjacking, MCL 750.529a(1); MSA 28.797(a)(1), and committing him to the custody of the Family
Independence Agency. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting his confession into evidence
because it was not freely and voluntarily made. In reviewing a trial court’s determination of
voluntariness, this Court must examine the entire record and make an independent determination.
People v Gould, 225 Mich App 79, 88; 570 NW2d 140 (1997). The trial court’s findings of fact will
not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich
496, 500; 556 NW2d 498 (1996). The trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous if, after
review of the record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 119; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).
The admissibility of a juvenile’s statement depends upon whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the statement was voluntarily made. The test of voluntariness is the same as that for an
adult: whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the statement was the product of an
essentially free and constrained choice or whether the defendant’s will was overborne and his capacity
for self-determination was critically impaired. Givans, supra at 120-121. Relevant factors include
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whether the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and, if so, whether he clearly understood
and waived those rights; the degree of police compliance with MCL 764.27; MSA 28.866 and the
juvenile court rules; the presence of an adult parent, custodian or guardian; the defendant’s personal
background; the defendant’s age, educational and intelligence level, and the extent of his prior
experience with the police; the length of detention before the statement was made; the repeated and
prolonged nature of the questioning; and whether the defendant was injured, intoxicated, in ill health,
physically abused or threatened with abuse, or deprived of food, sleep or medical attention. Givans,
supra at 121; People v Good, 186 Mich App 180, 189; 463 NW2d 213 (1990).
There is no doubt that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights. They were read to
him, the officer discussed them with him, and he indicated that he understood his rights and wished to
waive them and make a statement. Because defendant was only thirteen and not subject to the
automatic waiver statute, MCL 600.606(1); MSA 27A.606(1), he had to “be taken immediately
before the juvenile division of the probate court of the county where the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the officer making the arrest shall immediately make and file, or cause to be made and
filed, a petition against the child . . . .” MCL 764.27; MSA 28.866. The date and time of defendant’s
arrest is not apparent from the record. He waived his rights and gave a statement late on the night of
March 31 and early in the morning of April 1, 1997. Even if the statute was violated, however, that is
only one factor to be considered and suppression is not required if the totality of the circumstances
indicates that defendant’s statement was voluntarily made. People v Rode, 196 Mich App 58, 69-70;
492 NW2d 483 (1992), rev’d on other grounds sub nom People v Hana, 447 Mich 325; 524 NW2d
682 (1994). There is no indication that any delay in complying with the statute was used as a tool to
extract a confession. See Good, supra at 189. Defendant’s custodial parent was not present, but
defendant advised the officer that she was unavailable and there is no evidence that he requested her
presence. See Givans, supra at 121. At the time of the interview, defendant was thirteen years and
seven months old. He had an eighth grade education and could apparently read and write. He was
questioned only once and the entire process took only one hour. The specific time period between
defendant’s arrest and his statement is unknown, but defendant does not claim that he was subject to a
lengthy detention. There is no indication that defendant was other than in good health. He was not
under the influence of illegal drugs, alcohol or medication, was not denied food, access to counsel or
bathroom privileges, and was not threatened or promised anything in exchange for his statement. Under
the totality of the circumstances, we find that the juvenile court did not clearly err in concluding that
defendant’s confession was voluntarily made.
Defendant next contends that the juvenile court erroneously admitted his confession in violation
of the corpus delicti rule because the prosecutor failed to independently establish that he harbored the
specific intent to commit a carjacking. Apart from the fact that defendant failed to preserve this issue by
raising it below, People v Carrick, 220 Mich App 17, 19; 558 NW2d 242 (1996), it is without merit.
The corpus delicti of a crime other than murder requires proof of the occurrence of the specific injury
and some criminal agency as the source of the injury. People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 270; 536
NW2d 517 (1995). “Once this showing is made, a defendant’s confession may be used to establish
identity, intent, or aggravating circumstances.” People v Cotton, 191 Mich App 377, 394; 478
NW2d 681 (1991). The victim’s testimony showed that she was in lawful possession of a motor
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vehicle and that someone took it from her in her presence by putting her in fear through the open display
of a shotgun. Such evidence was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the offense. See People v
Davenport, 230 Mich App 577, 579; 583 NW2d 919 (1998). Because defendant’s identity and
intent are not part of the corpus delicti, Cotton, supra, and carjacking is not a specific intent crime,
Davenport, supra at 581, the prosecution was not required to prove that defendant specifically
intended to commit a carjacking prior to the admission of his confession.
Defendant lastly contends that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, this Court
must review the record de novo and, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997);
People v Hammons, 210 Mich App 554, 556; 534 NW2d 183 (1995). Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime. Gould,
supra at 86.
The elements of carjacking are: (1) that the defendant took a motor vehicle from another
person; (2) that the defendant did so in the presence of that person, a passenger, or another person in
lawful possession of the vehicle; and (3) that the defendant accomplished the taking by force or
violence, by threat of force or violence, or by putting the other person in fear. Davenport, supra at
579. Defendant did not commit this crime himself, but was charged as an aider and abettor and thus
could be convicted and punished as a principal. People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 568; 540
NW2d 728 (1995).
“The term ‘aiding and abetting’ includes all forms of assistance. The term comprehends ‘all
words or deeds which may support, encourage, or incite the commission of the crime.’ The amount of
aid or advice is immaterial so long as it had the effect of inducing the crime.” People v Usher, 121
Mich App 345, 350; 328 NW2d 628 (1982) (citations omitted).
To support a finding that a defendant aided and abetted a crime, the prosecutor
must show that (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other
person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the
commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or
had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid and
encouragement. An aider and abettor’s state of mind may be inferred from all the facts
and circumstances. Factors that may be considered include a close association
between the defendant and the principal, the defendant’s participation in the planning or
execution of the crime, and evidence of flight after the crime. [Turner, supra at 568
569 (citations omitted).]
The defendant must have the same intent necessary to be convicted as a principal. When the
case involves a general intent crime, the requisite intent is the intent to do the prohibited physical act.
People v Motor City Hosp & Surgical Supply, Inc, 227 Mich App 209, 215; 575 NW2d 95 (1997).
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In this case, that would entail the use of force or violence or fear to take another person’s vehicle from
that person’s presence. Davenport, supra at 581.
The evidence showed that two of defendant’s confederates committed a carjacking by taking
the victim’s car from her in her presence by putting her in fear through the open display of a shotgun.
Defendant aided in the commission of the offense by watching out for the police while his two friends
committed the crime. In his statement, defendant said he knew that his friends were going to steal a car.
He watched them go over to a gas station to find a vehicle while he kept a lookout for the police. Once
at the gas station, defendant’s friends took a car from a woman who ran away from them. As the trial
court noted, planning to steal a car from a place where the vehicle is attended by its owner is an
indication that a use of force, violence or intimidation will be necessary to induce the owner to part with
his or her vehicle. Thus, it was reasonable to infer that defendant intended to commit a carjacking or
knew that his friends intended to commit that crime. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to enable a
rational trier of fact to find that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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