MICHAEL P HOULIHAN V JEFF ELLIS & ASSOC INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL P. HOULIHAN, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of DANIEL RYAN
HOULIHAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 24, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 206093
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-507816 NO
JEFF ELLIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JOSH WELCH, DARCY FITCHKO and
ROBERT PHELPS.
Defendants.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Murphy and O'Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff appeals as of right from the order granting defendant’s
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). We affirm.
I
Plaintiff claims that defendant Ellis & Associates was negligent in performing its contract,
resulting in the tragic drowning death of four-year-old Daniel Houlihan at Addison Oaks Park, part of
the Oakland County Parks system. Plaintiff alleges that as part of its contract with Oakland County
Parks, Ellis should have reviewed a specific defective procedure of Oakland County’s park safety
procedures. The procedure in question did not require lifeguards and other safety personnel to
immediately search the water for a missing child. Plaintiff contends that if park employees had promptly
conducted a water search when Daniel’s mother reported him missing, Daniel would have been
successfully rescued. Plaintiff claims that defendant Jeff Ellis & Associates, Inc, a private entity
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contracted to provide Oakland County with an aquatic training program, was negligent performing its
contract with Oakland County by failing to recommend revision to this specific procedure. The trial
court granted defendant’s summary disposition motion on the ground that defendant had no duty under
the contract to review the disputed procedures or to recommend improvements.
II
This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Motions under MCR 2.116(C)(8) test
the legal sufficiency of the claim on the pleadings alone to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a
claim on which relief may be granted. Id. The court must grant the motion if no factual development
could justify the plaintiff’s claim for relief. Id. Motions under MCR 2.116(C)(10) test the factual
support of the plaintiff’s claim. Id. The court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and other evidence submitted to determine whether a genuine issue of any material fact
exists to warrant a trial. Id. Both this Court and the trial court must resolve all reasonable inferences in
the nonmoving party’s favor. Bertrand v Allan Ford, 449 Mich 606, 618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).
A plaintiff must prove four elements in order to establish a prima facie case of negligence: (1)
duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445,
449; 506 NW2d 175 (1993). The question—is there a duty—is ordinarily a question of law for the
court. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 655; 532 NW2d 842 (1995). Whether a duty has been
breached is a question of fact for the jury. Perry v Hazel Park Harness Raceway, 123 Mich App
542, 549; 332 NW2d 601 (1983). Cause in fact is a question of fact for the jury, while legal cause,
also known as proximate cause, is generally a question of law to be decided by the court. Gillam v
Lloyd, 172 Mich App 563, 580; 432 NW2d 356 (1988).
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition on the basis that defendant had no duty to review the County’s procedures. The
defendant’s duty can be established by a contractual relationship. Antoon v Community Emergency
Medical Service, Inc, 190 Mich App 592, 595; 476 NW2d 479 (1991). A professional who
undertakes a service in a contract owes a duty to act with due care toward third parties who
foreseeably will be affected as well as toward the other party to the contract. Com’l Union Ins v
Medical Protective Co, 426 Mich 109, 124 n 5; 393 NW2d 479 (1986).
When contract language is not ambiguous, the issue of whether a party has a contractual duty to
the other party is a question of law and the court is to construe the contract. Century Surety v
Charron, 230 Mich App 79, 82-83; 583 NW2d 486 (1998). The contract at issue in this case states
in Paragraph 1 that defendant had a general duty to provide a nationally recognized aquatic training
program endorsed by the NRPA. Paragraph 2 lists five specific points that the program should cover.
These are: lifeguard training, instructor training, aquatic facility inventory, three unannounced audits of
two water parks, and the capability of providing liability insurance. Defendant contends that because
the contract does not specify review of the County’s procedures, as a matter of law they had no duty to
do so, or that failure to do so did not constitute a breach of contract. We agree.
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The ordinary meaning of this language is that, in fulfilling its primary duty of providing a nationally
recognized aquatic training program endorsed by the NRPA, defendant was to include those five things.
It is generally accepted that “one who undertakes to accomplish a certain result impliedly agrees to do
everything necessary to accomplish such result . . .” 17A Am Jur 2d Contracts, §407, p 432.
Accordingly, defendant was obligated t do whatever necessary to fulfill its five specific obligations
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under the contract, as well as anything else necessary to satisfy its general obligation. Plaintiff has not,
however, adduced any evidence to show that NRPA endorsement required defendant to review or
recommend emergency procedures with immediate water searches for missing children. Although
plaintiff introduced evidence that some aquatic safety experts and organizations advocate such a
procedure, there is no indication that such procedures were a condition of NRPA endorsements or a
customary part of this type of contractual undertaking. Accordingly, the contract did not require
defendants to review existing procedures and recommend this modification. Furthermore, plaintiff’s
evidence that defendant did, in fact, review certain procedures and recommend certain changes does
not establish a contractual duty to review the procedure in question. Summary disposition on the
duty/breach issue was thus proper.
After oral argument, plaintiff moved to supplement oral argument by brief, and we granted this
motion. The dissent would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition on the basis of
evidence that defendant endorsed national standards calling for a “three-minute” rule. However, the
“three-minute” rule as described in plaintiff’s supplemental materials would not have made a difference
here. In order to withstand summary disposition, plaintiff had to demonstrate that defendant had a
contractual duty to at least advise Oakland County to implement an immediate-search procedure for
missing children last seen near the water. The “three-minute” rule adduced by plaintiff does not satisfy
this requirement. The rule merely requires life saving personnel to be able to search the area and find a
submerged guest within three minutes. This rule does not require immediate water searches for all
missing persons, but only for those who are believed to be submerged. It does not, as plaintiff suggests,
require lifeguards to search immediately the water for missing patrons who were last seen on land.
Indeed, the supplemental materials say nothing with regard to the appropriate response when a child is
reported lost, nor do they require lifeguards to assume that any missing child may be submerged.
II
Alternatively, we would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition on the ground that
plaintiff failed to prove causation. Plaintiff argues that he provided sufficient evidence of causation to
establish a prima facie case of negligence and thus, was entitled to proceed to trial. In order to establish
causation in a negligence case, a plaintiff must prove (1) cause in fact, and (2) leal cause, also known as
proximate causation. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163; 560 NW2d 475 (1994).
The factual causation element is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that “but for” the defendant’s negligence,
there would not have been injury. Id. at 163. Proximate cause does not become an issue unless cause
in fact is first shown to exist. Id. Cause in fact can be established by circumstantial evidence, but the
plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate causation is not lessened by the fact that an injury was unwitnessed.
Id. at 163-164. Rather, a plaintiff must submit evidence substantial enough for a jury to conclude that it
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is more likely than not that injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s negligence. Id. at
164-165.
We do not believe a reasonable person could conclude that plaintiff’s evidence makes it more
probable that Daniel Houlihan would not have drowned if the water had been searched immediately
after his mother reported him missing. Plaintiff’s expert testified that Daniel Houlihan would have had to
have been found within five to nine minutes from the time he left his family in order to make a full
recovery, and within twelve minutes to avoid death. No one knows exactly when Daniel Houlihan left
his family because no one saw him leave. Based on his mother’s testimony, between three and seven
minutes passed before she notified the lifeguards that Daniel Houlihan was missing. Because the
window of opportunity was five to twelve minutes, Daniel Houlihan could already have been dead for
two minutes when the lifeguards were informed that he was missing. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence
that makes his theory of when Daniel Houlihan drowned more probable than the alternatives.
Accordingly, under Michigan law governing the cause in fact question, Skinner, we are obliged to affirm
the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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