SCHMIDT BAGEL CREATIONS INC V MICHAEL ALAN SCHWARTZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SCHMIDT BAGEL CREATIONS, INC., and
ELIOT CHARLIP,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellants,
v
No. 206602
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-544829 NM
MICHAEL ALAN SCHWARTZ and FIEGER,
FIEGER & SCHWARTZ, P.C.,
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Markman and J.B. Sullivan*, JJ.
SULLIVAN, J. (Concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
While I agree with footnote 2, in which the majority determines that Schmidt Bagel was not a
party to the underlying arbitration proceeding, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff
Charlip failed to state a claim for legal malpractice.
Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action
“between the same parties” when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the
issue was actually and necessarily determined in the prior proceeding. Cole v West Side Auto Credit
Union, 229 Mich App 639, 647; 583 NW2d 226 (1998), quoting from Porter v Royal Oak, 214
Mich App 478, 485; 542 NW2d 905 (1995) (emphasis in Cole, supra). The “factual findings made
by an arbitrator after a proper arbitration proceeding are conclusive in a later-filed civil suit between the
same parties . . .” Cole, supra (emphasis added).
A legal malpractice action and the litigation from which it arose are distinct. Coleman v
Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 66; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). In the instant suit for legal malpractice, Charlip is
suing Schwartz and his law firm. In the underlying suit, Charlip was being sued by then-plaintiff
Ehrmann in a suit involving a business transaction. Since the parties are not the same, collateral estoppel
does not apply.
The issue in the instant malpractice case is whether plaintiff would have fared better had he had
the opportunity to have a jury trial rather than the arbitration, i.e., whether he can “establish that, absent
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the . . . omission complained of [here, the failure of counsel to advise him that the common law
arbitration agreement could have been revoked by either party at any time prior to the issuance of the
arbitration award], the . . . judgment suffered [would have been] avoided.” Coleman, supra, at 64
(citations omitted). I disagree with the majority’s finding that plaintiff cannot show whether he would
have fared better, and whether therefore the defendants’ negligence was the proximate cause of his
injury.
In his “suit within a suit,” id., plaintiff can present evidence to the jury, including Ehrmann’s
testimony, and the jury will be instructed to determine what damages they would have awarded and to
whom in the underlying lawsuit. That amount will then be compared to the result of the arbitration,
which was an award of $165,000 against plaintiff. If the jury determines that they would have awarded
less against plaintiff than the result of the arbitration, the difference is the amount of plaintiff’s damages in
the instant malpractice case. If, on the other hand, the jury determines that they would have awarded
more against plaintiff than the amount of the arbitration, then plaintiff has no damages, and cannot prove
either element three, proximate cause, or element four, the fact and extent of the injury. Coleman,
supra, at 63.
Alterman v Provizer, Eisenberg, Lichtenstein & Pearlman, PC, 195 Mich App 422; 491
NW2d 868 (1992), and the cases cited therein, cited by the majority, are factually distinguishable from
the instant case, and do not compel a different result.
I would reverse.
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
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