PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID HARDY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 205411
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-012015
DAVID HARDY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Kelly and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
On October 26, 1995, the court convicted defendant of arson - real property (an abandoned
home), MCL 750.73; MSA 28.268, and sentenced him to five years' probation. A condition of
defendant's probation was that he avail himself to a halfway house. Defendant appeals as of right from
his guilty plea to a violation of this probation entered with the trial court at a hearing on the petition and
bench warrant. Defendant was sentenced to five to ten years in prison. We reverse.
I
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to comply with the mandates of MCR 6.445(F)(4),
and consequently, that there was insufficient factual support for the court's acceptance of defendant's
guilty plea. We agree.
In Michigan, probation revocation proceedings are governed by MCR 6.445 and primarily
consist of two phases. First, a factual determination of guilt is made. Next, if defendant is guilty, a
discretionary determination is made as to whether probation should be revoked. People v Laurent,
171 Mich App 503; 431 NW2d 202 (1988). MCR 6.445(F)(4) provides, in pertinent part:
. . . Before accepting a guilty plea, the court, speaking directly to the probationer and
receiving the probationer's response, must
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(4) establish factual support for a finding that the probationer is guilty of the alleged
violation.
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to establish factual support for the probation violation. We
agree.
This Court has not directly addressed the quantum or nature of support necessary for a finding
of guilt, pursuant to a guilty plea in a probation violation context. People v Hall, 138 Mich App 86, 90;
359 NW2d 259 (1984). However, the facts on the record here clearly fall short of the level required to
establish a violation. On the critical issue of whether defendant went to the halfway house, the trial court
was satisfied with defendant’s isolated statement, “I went there, but I left” and asked no further
questions about defendant’s contact with the halfway house. This record is devoid of a factual basis
establishing defendant’s commitment to and criminally responsible departure from the halfway house.
The background of this case evinces a defendant of marginal competence and distressing
circumstances. Defendant is a homeless individual who was convicted of arson after he set fire to an
abandoned building, apparently to keep warm on a frigid day. The trial court sentenced him to five
years’ probation, including a sloppy requirement to “avail” himself to a halfway house. After showing
up at and leaving the unspecified halfway house, defendant was arrested on other charges related or not
to the circumstances of this record. Defendant pleaded guilty to probation violation.
Given the manner in which this case has been handled, we cannot conclude that the trial court
adequately complied with MCR 6.445(F)(4). The April 12, 1996 order of probation indicates a five
year sentence of probation for defendant. However, it also indicates an unspecified term of community
service in lieu of court costs. Additionally, the order remanded defendant to the Wayne County Jail until
the probation department could find a halfway house for him. No time period is fixed for the jail term or
the halfway house term. The record is devoid of any indication as to when and where defendant was to
report after his release from jail, or how long he was required to stay. 1
Because of the uncertainty of the original sentence, defendant’s isolated statement “I went there,
but I left” does not provide adequate factual support for a finding of probation violation. Due to the
incomplete nature of the order of probation and lack of certainty of the probation violation charge, we
find that defendant has been denied due process. All that we can discern from the probation order is
that defendant was to avail himself to a halfway house. On this record it appears defendant did present
himself at the facility. What transpired between his arrival and departure is a mystery to this Court.
Given these limited facts, the record does not supply or support any factual basis for the plea.
Reversed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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1
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the trial court properly imposed the halfway house condition.
Defendant’s probation officer unsuccessfully petitioned for deletion of the halfway house requirement on
the ground that convicted arsonists are ineligible for halfway house placement. The trial court denied
this petition.
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