GRAND TRAVERSE AFC INC V RESIDENTIAL CARE ALTERNATIVE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GRAND TRAVERSE AFC, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
September 14, 1999
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellant,
v
No. 207054
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-618235 CK
RESIDENTIAL CARE ALTERNATIVES,
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Saad and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this contract action, plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in
favor of defendant and denying plaintiff's motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
Underlying this dispute is a multi-tiered system of contracts used to deliver community mental
health services to individuals with state funds. The Detroit-Wayne County Community Mental Health
Board (“Board”) contracted with defendant to provide specialized residential services pursuant to MCL
330.1228; MSA 14.800(228). The Board was acting under the purview of its master contract with the
State Department of Mental Health ("DMH").1 Defendant, in turn, contracted with licensed home
providers, such as plaintiff, to provide specialized residential services for mentally ill recipients. The
contract that is the subject matter of this appeal covered fiscal year 1990/1991 (October 1, 1990, to
September 30, 1991). Section IX contained an integration clause providing that the contract "shall be
read and interpreted as an integrated whole; and that this contract constitutes the full and complete
agreement of the parties unless subsequently amended in writing." The general provisions in § I of the
contract incorporated a number of governmental requirements as listed in DMH Schedule 3819:
H. The HOME PROVIDER shall abide by the Public Acts, Department of
Mental Health Rules, Policies, Procedures and relevant Guidelines which deal directly
with the subject matter of this contract as listed in DMH Schedule 3819 and are hereby
made part of this contract by reference and all other statutes, ordinances, regulations
and policies governing its operations.
***
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I. The SERVICE PROVIDER shall provide the HOME PROVIDER with
copies of all applicable laws, rules, policies and procedures referred to in the preceding
paragraph and attached to this contract as DMH Schedule 3819. With respect to the
rules and policies detailing financial provisions, i.e., cost settlement procedures, other
financial provisions of Department of Mental Health Administrative Rules, Regulations
and Policies which materially affect HOME PROVIDER cost reimbursement, etc., if the
HOME PROVIDER is not furnished with copies of same by the SERVICE
PROVIDER, the HOME PROVIDER shall not be bound thereby.
Finally, an administrative provision in § III of the contract required a cost settlement at the end
of the contract period:
J. The HOME PROVIDER shall cost settle in accordance with "Expenditure
Reports/Cost Settlement" provisions of DMH Guidelines for services provided under
this contract based upon the approved home budget, DMH-3835 upon expiration of
the contract term or termination of the contract. The SERVICE PROVIDER shall
complete a preliminary cost settlement within 60 days of receipt of the final quarterly
statement of revenue and expenditures, DMH-3836. A final cost settlement may be
performed by the SERVICE PROVIDER's auditors and establish a repayment
schedule as the need requires in accordance with DMH Guidelines.
The DMH guideline on cost settlements itself, which was incorporated into the contract as item
6 of DMH Schedule 3819, specified in § III [policy], ¶ D:
COST SETTLEMENT FOR A DMH-3800B CONTRACT IS INITIALLY
PERFORMED THROUGH A REVIEW BY CONTRACT MANAGEMENT. IN
ADDITION, THE DEPARTMENT HAS THE RIGHT TO PERFORM A
FINANCIAL AUDIT WITHIN SEVEN YEARS.
DMH audited the Board for fiscal year 1990/1991 and issued an audit report dated December
9, 1994, which concluded that defendant overpaid plaintiff by $29,636. During the Board’s
opportunity for an audit review within DMH, the amount overpaid was reduced to $28,036. Plaintiff
thereafter filed the instant action to enjoin defendant from recouping this sum by reducing payments due
it under their contract for fiscal year 1995/1996. Defendant filed a countercomplaint for a declaratory
judgment. Both parties later filed motions for summary disposition. The trial court granted defendant's
motion and denied plaintiff's motion based on its determination that the parties' contract had, by
reference, adopted the relevant DMH guideline that permitted the DMH audit and reimbursement. The
trial court also denied plaintiff's motion for rehearing or reconsideration.
Having considered plaintiff's arguments on appeal, we conclude that plaintiff has not
demonstrated a basis for disturbing the trial court's decision. Plaintiff's reliance on MCR 2.517 is
misplaced because findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary for decisions on motions,
unless required by a particular rule. MCR 2.517(A)(4). The summary disposition rule, MCR 2.116,
does not require findings. On the contrary, when deciding a motion for summary disposition, a court
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must be careful to avoid making findings of fact under the guise of determining that no issue of material
fact exists. Mahaffey v Attorney General, 222 Mich App 325, 343; 564 NW2d 104 (1997). Under
MCR 2.116(I)(1), the trial court shall render judgment without delay if a party is entitled to judgment as
matter of law, or the proofs show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. MCR 2.116(I)(1).
Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition is de novo. Spiek v
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Here, the trial court did not
specify whether it was applying MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10), but it is apparent that the motion was
granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because materials apart from the pleadings were considered. See
Atkinson v Detroit, 222 Mich App 7, 9; 564 NW2d 473 (1997).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Spiek, supra at 337.
In reviewing a trial court’s decision on the motion, we consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
admissions and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties, MCR
2.116(G)(5), in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich
358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996), and grant the benefit of all reasonable doubt to that party, Bourne v
Farmers Ins Exchange, 449 Mich 193, 197; 534 NW2d 491 (1995). A genuine issue of material
fact must be established by admissible evidence. SSC Associates Ltd Partnership v General
Retirement System, 192 Mich App 360, 364; 480 NW2d 275 (1991).
In reviewing plaintiff's arguments, we note, as a threshold matter, that plaintiff's reliance on
principles governing contract formation is misplaced. Although a valid contract requires mutual assent,
Kamalnath v Mercy Memorial Hosp Corp, 194 Mich App 543, 548-549; 487 NW2d 499 (1992),
one who signs a contract cannot claim, when enforcement is sought, that "he did not read it, or that he
supposed it was different in its terms." Stark v Kent Products, Inc, 62 Mich App 546, 548; 233
NW2d 643 (1975). Because plaintiff's arguments, in substance, do not attack the validity of the
contract, but only its meaning, we apply principles of contract interpretation in determining whether
summary disposition was properly granted to defendant.
In the context of a motion for summary disposition, a trial court may determine the meaning of a
contract only when the terms are unambiguous. D'Avanzo v Wise & Marsac, PC, 223 Mich App
314, 319; 565 NW2d 915 (1997); SSC Associates Ltd Partnership, supra at 363. A contract is
ambiguous if the language is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations or is inconsistent on its
face. Petovello v Murray, 139 Mich App 639, 642; 362 NW2d 857 (1984). If a contract, though
inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, fairly admits of but one interpretation, it may not be said to be
ambiguous or fatally unclear. Allstate Ins Co v Goldwater, 163 Mich App 646, 648; 415 NW2d 2
(1987).
In the case at bar, plaintiff has not shown any contractual ambiguity that precluded summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The fact that the parties did not execute a DMH-3800B
contract is neither disputed nor material. The material fact is that the parties' contract unambiguously
required the parties to cost settle in accordance with the DMH guideline. "Cost settlement" was defined
in the DMH guideline as "a final reconciliation and adjustment of revenue and expenditures under a
DMH-3800B or DMH-3800F contract." Although the parties did not execute a DMH-3800B or
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DMH-3800F contract, their contract, § I(H), made it clear that applicable guidelines are determined
based on whether they "deal directly with the subject matter of this contract." The only reasonable
construction that can be given to these provisions is that the cost settlement i the DMH guideline
n
devised for a DMH-3800B contract applied when it dealt directly with the same subject matter as the
parties' contract, namely, reconciling revenue and expenditures of a home provider's contract funded by
state money.
We also reject plaintiff's claim that applying the cost settlement procedures called for in the
DMH guideline conflicts with the parties' contract and renders the provision allowing for an audit by
defendant's auditors a nullity. Where possible, all contract language should be harmonized and
construed so as to make it all meaningful. Purlo Corp v 3925 Woodward Avenue, Inc, 341 Mich
483, 487-488; 67 NW2d 684 (1954). A reference by contracting parties to an extraneous writing for
a particular purpose makes it a part of their agreement only for the purpose so specified. Berkel & Co
Contractors v Christman Co, 210 Mich App 416, 419; 533 NW2d 838 (1995).
Examined with these principles of contract interpretation in mind, the contract language, although
inartfully arranged, is subject to only one reasonable interpretation. Two audits are possible, but neither
is mandatory. By using the phrase "final cost settlement may be performed by the SERVICE
PROVIDER's auditors" in the last sentence of § III(J) of their contract, the parties plainly intended that
an audit by defendant's auditors is a permissible part of the parties' process of arriving at their "final cost
settlement" at the end of the contract term, but is not required. See Mollett v Taylor, 197 Mich App
328, 339; 494 NW2d 832 (1992) (the word "may" generally designates discretion). Furthermore,
although the word "final" does suggest that something has come to an end,2 when examined in context,
its use cannot be reasonably construed as evidencing an intent to preclude a DMH audit or to otherwise
conclusively establish allowable expenditures.
Again, if possible, all contract language should be harmonized and construed so as to make it all
meaningful. Purlo Corp, supra at 487-488. On the one hand, the word "final," preceding "cost
settlement" in the last sentence of § (III)(J), appears redundant on its face because a cost settlement is
defined in the DMH guideline, § IV, as a "final reconciliation and adjustment of revenue and
expenditures . . . ." On the other hand, when examined within the context of the parties' contract,
§ III(J), it becomes clear that the word "final" is intended to distinguish a cost settlement prepared by
defendant's auditors from the "preliminary cost settlement within 60 days of receipt of the final quarterly
statement of revenue and expenditures" recognized in the preceding sentence. Thus, "final," within the
context of the last sentence of § III(J), can reasonably be interpreted as meaning only that an audit may
be used to complete the cost settlement mandated when the contract ends. At this point, the parties,
through defendant's auditors, would have reached a decisive position on whether the cost settlement
comports with the DMH guideline. Logically, because the DMH has seven years to audit pursuant to
the DMH guideline incorporated into the parties' contract, the DMH is not part of the parties'
contemplated process for closing out the contract by virtue of the cost settlement. The only reasonable
conclusion that can be reached by giving effect to all of the contract language is that the DMH, although
not required to do so, may conduct its own audit of a cost settlement within seven years. Hence, while
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the parties’ contract permits defendants' auditors to prepare a "final cost settlement," we reject plaintiff's
claim that this must be the final audit.
We have also considered plaintiff's arguments concerning the affidavits and other proofs
extrinsic to the contract that were submitted by the parties in support of their respective motions for
summary disposition in the trial court, but are not persuaded that plaintiff presented any extrinsic
evidence that demonstrated the existence of an ambiguity requiring factual development. See Meagher
v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 722; 565 NW2d 401 (1997) (extrinsic evidence may be
admissible to prove the existence of an ambiguity). With regard to Bonita Lauer's deposition, we reject
plaintiff's claim that the trial court used the deposition to construe the contract. The deposition was used
to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact was shown as to whether § I(I) of the parties'
contract was satisfied. This was a material issue because § I(I) required that plaintiff be given copies of
policies materially affecting cost reimbursements in order for plaintiff to be bound by them. Compliance
with § I(I) did not present an issue of contract interpretation, but rather one of contract performance.
Examined in the proper context, we conclude that plaintiff has not demonstrated a basis with regard to
§ I(I) for disturbing the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant.
With regard to plaintiff's claim that "appeal" rights were created by its contract with defendant,
we note that plaintiff relies on extrinsic evidence for an appeal process; in particular, plaintiff relies on a
statement in an October 23, 1992, letter to plaintiff from defendant's auditing firm, which provided that
a draft copy of plaintiff's financial statement would be adjusted within ten days if plaintiff provided
support for certain expenditures that the auditors concluded lacked sufficient documentation. We find
that plaintiff uses the term "appeal" too loosely. The opportunity afforded to plaintiff to supply missing
documentation is not an "appeal," as that term is understood in a technical and appropriate sense,
because it does not involve action on the audit adjustments by a superior decisionmaker. Cf. In re
Manufacturer's Freight Forwarding Co, 294 Mich 57, 70; 292 NW 678 (1940) ("appeal," in
technical and appropriate sense, means taking suit or cause and its final determination from one court or
jurisdiction after final judgment to another); Babcock v City of Grand Rapids, 308 Mich 412; 415; 14
NW2d 48 (1944) (distinguishing "appeals" that result in de novo proceeding from a "review" involving a
reexamination of a prior proceeding). We conclude that the extrinsic evidence relied upon by plaintiff
did not show an ambiguity or otherwise create a genuine issue of material fact. Meagher, supra at 722.
Next, turning to plaintiff's statutory arguments, we find that plaintiff has not demonstrated a
statutory basis for construing the contract so as to preclude a DMH audit. Plaintiff's claim that the trial
court's interpretation of the contract violates MCL 330.1244; MSA 14.800(244) is not properly before
us because it is insufficiently briefed, Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 655 n 1; 358 NW2d 856
(1984), and plaintiff has not demonstrated that this question was presented to the trial court. As a
general rule, absent unusual circumstances, an issue that was not raised below may not be raised on
appeal. Peterman v Dep't of Resources, 446 Mich 177, 183; 521 NW2d 499 (1994). In any event,
plaintiff did not present evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that the DMH caused the
audit undertaken by defendant's auditors. More importantly, the statute cannot reasonably be construed
as limiting the number of audits that can be performed. It only creates an affirmative duty to audit, or
cause to be audited, the expenditures of state funds. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction,
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considering the purpose of the statute and the object sought to be accomplished by the Legislature.
VandenBerg v VandenBerg, 231 Mich App 497, 499; 586 NW2d 570 (1998). Further, we hold that
plaintiff has not established any basis under MCL 600.631; MSA 27A.631 for precluding defendant
from recouping $28,036 as a result of the DMH audit and review process. Although plaintiff may
believe that its contract terms are unfair, we conclude that plaintiff has not established any basis for
disturbing the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10).
Affirmed. Defendant, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
1
The Department of Mental Health was renamed the Department of Community Health in 1996
pursuant to an executive reorganization order. MCL 330.3101; MSA 14.800(2101).
2
In this regard, we note that contract language is to be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. UAWGM Human Resource Center v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486, 491; 579 NW2d 411
(1998). A dictionary definition may be used to establish the meaning of a word having a common
usage. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins Co v Bronson Plating Co, 445 Mich 558, 568; 519 NW2d 864
(1994). The word "final" is defined in the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997), p
487, as:
1. pertaining to or coming to an end; last in place, order, or time. 2. Ultimate:
the final goal. 3. Conclusive or decisive: a final decision. 4. Constituting the end or
purpose: a final result. 5. Law. Precluding further controversy on the questions
passed upon: a final decree. -- n. 6. Something that is last or terminal. . . . .
[Emphasis in original.]
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