PEOPLE OF MI V DERRICK D CAIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 13, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 205970
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-008833
DERRICK D. CAIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL
750.520d(1)(b); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(b), and was sentenced to concurrent terms
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC), MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(b), and was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight
to fifteen years in prison. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.
We first address defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he
accomplished the sexual acts by force or coercion as required by MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA
28.788(4)(1)(b). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we are required to view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact
could find that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of the
crime. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993).
A person is guilty of third-degree CSC if he engages in sexual penetration with another person
and force or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual penetration. MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA
28.788(4)(1)(b). Force or coercion includes, but is not limited to, the following circumstances: (1)
When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical
violence; (2) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on the
victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats; or (3) When
the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim, or any
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other person, and the victim believes that the actor has the ability to execute this threat. MCL
750.520b(1)(f)(i)-(iii); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(f)(i)-(iii); MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(b).
“The existence of force or coercion is to be determined in light of all the circumstances and is not
limited to acts of physical violence.” People v Malkowski, 198 Mich App 610, 613; 499 NW2d
450 (1993) (emphasis added). The term "force" includes the exertion of strength or power on another
person, People v Premo, 213 Mich App 406, 409; 540 NW2d 715 (1995), and the term "coercion"
includes circumstances that create a reasonable fear of dangerous consequences. People v McGill,
131 Mich App 465, 470-472; 346 NW2d 572 (1984).
The victim, seventeen years old at the time of the assaults, testified that she planned to spend the
night at the home of a woman for whom she regularly baby-sat. The woman and her children were
home when the victim arrived. Defendant and his cousin, codefendant Ramone Jones, came to the
home later in the same evening. At one point during the evening, defendant checked that the side door
was locked and Jones said "ain't nobody going nowhere". Sometime later, the victim observed
defendant handling a knife in a strange manner. When defendant observed the victim trying to spurn
Jones' advances, he told her to “give that man a play,” which the victim understood to mean that she
should respond to Jones' kisses. The victim again rejected Jones, telling him, in defendant’s presence,
to stop. The victim left the room and Jones followed. Later, after the victim went into the bedroom to
sleep, Jones followed her and sexually assaulted her. Defendant observed his cousin having
nonconsensual intercourse with the victim and apparently urged him on in his efforts. After Jones
finished his assault, defendant remarked, in Jones' presence, that he “wasn’t as nice” as Jones,
whereupon he commanded the victim to undress and get down on her knees. He told her that she
“better” perform fellatio on him. The victim testified that she complied because she felt intimidated by
the two older men and was scared. There was also testimony that, at some point when the victim,
defendant and codefendant were in the bedroom, defendant whispered to codefendant and made a
motion across his neck with a finger, which the victim interpreted as a “slitting throat” gesture. We find
that this evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to enable a
rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim submitted to defendant out of
a reasonable fear of dangerous consequences and thus, that defendant used coercion to accomplish the
first act of fellatio.
The victim also testified that defendant sexually assaulted her a second time, after the woman for
whom she baby-sat had left the house and she was alone with defendant and Jones. Defendant told her
that she would have to engage in oral sex with him again if she wanted to be allowed to leave. He then
pulled her down to her knees and put his penis into her mouth. The victim's testimony evidences that
defendant exerted physical strength or power on the victim. Such evidence, if believed, was sufficient to
enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used force or coercion to
accomplish the second act of fellatio.
We next address defendant’s arguments with regard to the defense of consent. Defendant
argues that his only theory of defense was that the sexual activity between the victim and himself was
consensual. He claims that a new trial is warranted because his consent theory was not presented to the
jury and no jury instruction on consent was given. Defendant cites to People v Hearn, 100 Mich App
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749; 300 NW2d 396, 397-398 (1980) for the proposition that, even where no jury instruction was
requested, a consent theory and instruction must be presented to the jury. We disagree.
In People v Paquette, 114 Mich App 773; 319 NW2d 390 (1982), aff’d 421 Mich 338
(1984), the defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of
consent. As in this case, no request for such an instruction was made. The defendant relied on Hearn,
supra to support his argument that the consent instruction was necessary and failure to give such an
instruction was error requiring reversal. This Court disagreed because Hearn, supra did not involve the
element of force or coercion:
Hearn was charged with having committed first-degree criminal sexual conduct by
engaging in sexual penetration with another person while armed with a weapon
....
Hearn had testified that he had engaged in sexual penetration with the complainant with
her consent and that he had been armed with a pocket knife which, however, he did not
display. Without instruction on the defense of consent, the jury might have believed
Hearn’s story but nevertheless convicted him.
In contrast, here defendant was charged with having committed first-degree
criminal sexual conduct by engaging in sexual penetration with another person while
aided and abetted by another person and while using force or coercion to accomplish
the penetration, MCL 750.520b(1)(d)(ii); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(d)(ii). The trial judge
instructed the jury:
“A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, if he engages in
sexual penetration with another person, and the actor is aided or abetted by one or
more other persons, and the following circumstances exist. The actor uses force or
coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration.
“Force or coercion includes when the actor overcomes the victim through the
actual application of physical force, or physical violence, and when the actor coerces
the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on the victim, and the victim
believes that the actor as the present ability to execute these threats.
***
“The term force or coercion means . . . .
***
A jury following such instructions could not have convicted defendant if it
believed that the complainant consented to the sexual penetration. [Id. at 780-781.]
Thus, this Court has concluded that an instruction on consent is not necessary where the element of
force or coercion must be found in order to convict defendant. Similarly, in People v Jansson, 116
Mich App 674, 682-683; 323 NW2d 508 (1982), this Court stated:
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Although consent . . . precludes conviction of criminal sexual conduct in the
third degree by force or coercion, the prosecution is not required to prove nonconsent
as an independent element of the offense. If the prosecution offers evidence to establish
that an act of sexual penetration was accomplished by force or coercion, that evidence
necessarily tends to establish that the act was nonconsensual. . . .
***
[I]f the actor coerces the victim to submit by threats of present or future harm, it
necessarily follows that the victim engaged in the act nonconsensually. In short, to
prove force or coercion as those terms are defined in the statute is to establish that the
victim did not consent. [Emphasis in original.]
See also People v Johnson, 128 Mich App 618, 623; 341 NW2d 160 (1983) (“The court’s
instruction requiring the jury to f that penetration was accomplished by force or coercion implicitly
ind
required the jury to find that the complainant did not consent to sexual intercourse before it could find
defendant guilty.”); and People v Hale, 142 Mich App 451, 453-454; 370 NW2d 382 (1985) (A trial
court’s instructions taken directly from the standard jury instructions on the necessary elements of third
degree criminal sexual conduct, implicitly require the jury to find that the victim did not consent to sexual
intercourse before the jury may convict.)
We find that there was no error requiring reversal in this case, which involved force or coercion,
because the trial court did not need to instruct the jury on the defense of consent 1. Similarly, we hold
that it was not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury that the prosecutor needed to disprove
consent. Jansson, supra.
Defendant next argues that the jury should have been required to find that he knew the sexual
act was nonconsensual in order to convict. In other words, defendant contends that there was no
evidence to support that he knew or should have known that the victim was not a willing participant and
thus, his conviction cannot be sustained. This argument is disingenuous.
In Jansson, supra at 681, the defendant, like defendant herein, argued that he “did not know
that the sexual relations were nonconsensual and, therefore, could not have intended to engage in those
relations by force or coercion.” The defendant also argued that without a manifestation of the victim’s
unwillingness to engage in sexual relations, he could not have known that she was not consenting. This
Court rejected that argument:
Defense counsel . . . would require that there be proved a specific intent to
overcome the will of the victim and, as a necessary precondition, knowledge on the part
of the actor that the victim was not engaging in the act consensually. In short, defense
counsel would have us require some manifestation of nonconsent by the victim. In our
judgment, this is simply a suggestion that we require proof that the victim resisted the
actor or at least expressed an intent to resist. The express language of the statute
precludes any such requirement, MCL 750,520(i); MSA 28.788(9). [Id. at 683.]
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See also People v Brown, 197 Mich App 448, 449-450; 495 NW2d 812 (1992) (The crime is one of
general intent and no knowledge is required for the element of force or coercion2); and Hale, supra at
453 (“No Michigan case law requires the trial court to define consent in terms of a defendant’s
reasonable and honest belief” that the victim consented.) Similarly, in this case, we reject defendant’s
argument that the jury should have been required to determine that defendant knew the sexual act was
nonconsensual3.
Defendant next argues that two jury instructions constitute error requiring reversal. We
disagree. We review jury instructions in their entirety to determine if there was error that requires
reversal. People v Whitney, 228 Mich App 230, 252; 578 NW2d 329 (1998). Because harmless
error analysis applies, a new trial will not be granted based on error in jury instructions unless an
examination of the entire record indicates that the error caused a miscarriage of justice. People v
Graves, 458 Mich 476, 484; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). There is no error as long as the jury instructions
“fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected a defendant’s rights.” Whitney, supra
at 252-253.
The complained of instructions were as follows:
It is not necessary to prove any of these charges that there be evidence other
than the testimony of the complainant. That is, if that testimony proves guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Also to prove these charges the prosecutor does not have to show
that the complainant resisted the defendants.
Defendant did not object to the jury instructions at trial and thus, this error is waived absent manifest
injustice. People v Torres, 222 Mich App 411, 423; 564 NW2d 149 (1997). In this case, we find no
manifest injustice.
The aforementioned instructions were given pursuant to standard jury instructions CJI2d 20.25
and CJI2d 20.26, which mimic statutory language. CJI2d 20.25 is based on MCL 750.520h; MSA
28.788(8), which states that “[t]he testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions
under sections 520b to 520g.” CJI2d 20.26 follows MCL 750.520i; MSA 28.788(9), which states
that “[a] victim need not resist the actor in prosecution under sections 520b to 520g.” Defendant here
was prosecuted under § 520d. The instructions were in accordance with the statutes and were proper.
Thus, there was no error.
Defendant next argues that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence and the trial
court, sitting as the thirteenth juror, should have granted a new trial because of the weight of the
evidence in favor of defendant. We disagree. We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion. People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 27; 592 NW2d 75 (1998).
The thirteenth juror standard set out in People v Hebert, 444 Mich 466; 511 NW2d 654
(1993), the case cited to by defendant, has been rejected. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627;
576 NW2d 129 (1998). Recently, in Gadomski, supra at 28, this Court looked at the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Lemmon and stated:
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The Michigan Supreme Court has subsequently rejected the “thirteenth juror” standard
and explained that a trial court may grant a motion for a new trial based on the great
weight of the evidence only if the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict so
that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand. However, neither
the former nor the current understanding of the law with respect to such motions [new
trial motions based on the great weight of the evidence] provides that this Court may
make a credibility determination on appeal. To the contrary, it is well settled that this
Court may not attempt to resolve credibility questions anew. [Citations omitted.]
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure to grant a new trial based on the great weight of
the evidence in this case. Defendant’s argument on appeal rests on his claim that the victim’s testimony
was not credible, which argument we may not decide, and on his claim that there was insufficient
evidence, an argument we explicitly reject.
Defendant also makes a strained argument that testimony about codefendant’s willingness to
take a polygraph examination tainted the case because there was no similar evidence that he too was
willing to take a polygraph examination. Defendant argues that the jury was left with an inference that he
was “not willing to test his credibility through this procedure” and that this inference was so prejudicial,
reversal is required. We disagree.
Defendant failed to object to the testimony regarding codefendant’s willingness to take a
polygraph examination. Our review is therefore “precluded unless a curative instruction could not have
eliminated the prejudicial effect or the failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of
justice.” People v Mayfield, 221 Mich App 656, 661; 562 NW2d 272 (1997). We find no
miscarriage of justice.
It is well established that evidence that a polygraph examination was conducted
and the results of such examination is inadmissible at trial. The reason for exclusion is
the lack of trustworthiness of the accuracy of a polygraph examination. [People v
Triplett, 163 Mich App 339, 343; 413 NW2d 791 (1987), remanded on other
grounds 432 Mich 568 (1989).]
In this case, there was no testimony that defendant, or codefendant, took and failed a polygraph
examination. Thus, the reason for excluding evidence of a polygraph, lack of accuracy of the result, is
not applicable to the situation. Moreover, the references to a polygraph were fleeting and only directed
to codefendant. The testimony was admitted by codefendant’s counsel in an apparent attempt to
bolster codefendant’s credibility with the suggestion that he would’ve taken a polygraph but was never
given one.
On appeal, defendant also argues that defendant and codefendant were inextricably linked with
regard to their involvement in the case and thus, reference to codefendant as “Psycho” caused
reversible prejudice to defendant. Defendant’s argument rests on the fact that if the jury perceived
codefendant to be a psycho, they would necessarily consider defendant in the same vein and this
amounts to reversible prejudice. We disagree that there was any error requiring reversal.
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At the beginning of trial, codefendant’s counsel expressed concern that he did not wish
codefendant to be referred to by his alleged nickname of “Psycho”. The judge cautioned the
prosecution to instruct its witnesses to refer to codefendant as “Mr. Jones”, but also indicated that if the
term “Psycho” came out in the development of the story, it would be appropriate for the victim to use it.
During trial, the victim testified that she was introduced to codefendant Jones as “Psycho”. She
thereafter did not refer to codefendant as “Psycho” with the exception of one instance where she
referred to him by the nickname but then immediately corrected herself and said, “I mean Ramone”.
Defendant did not object and did not request a curative instruction. Thus, we review only for a
miscarriage of justice, Mayfield, supra, and find none. Defendant’s argument that these two fleeting
references caused reversible prejudice because they could have led the jury to surmise that defendant
also possessed psychotic characteristics is speculative at best.
Defendant next argues that the trial court should have granted defendant and codefendant
separate trials and that failure to do so interfered with his right to a fair trial. He argues that codefendant
portrayed defendant as being “the violent one” during the events and that the defendants were divided in
theory. We review for an abuse of discretion. People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 331; 524 NW2d 682,
amended 447 Mich 1203 (1994).
Severance is mandated only when a defendant demonstrates that his substantial
rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary means of rectifying the
potential prejudice. Severance is required where the defenses are mutually exclusive or
irreconcilable, not simply where they are inconsistent. [People v McCray, 210 Mich
App 9, 12; 533 NW2d 359 (1995), citing Hana, supra at 345.]
In this case, prior to trial, codefendant’s counsel indicated that his defense may be antagonistic to
defendant. Codefendant was going to argue that the victim’s sexual activity with codefendant was
entirely consensual and that only when codefendant did not protest defendant’s requests for fellatio from
the victim, did she became upset and go to the police. Neither defendant or codefendant offered a
supporting affidavit or made an offer of proof that “clearly, affirmatively, and fully demonstrate[d] that”
their substantial rights would be prejudiced if severance was not granted. Hana, supra at 346.
On appeal, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant defendant
and codefendant separate trials. The defenses, as actually presented, were barely antagonistic and, in
fact, meshed quite well. Codefendant’s defense did not negate or interfere with defendant’s defense of
lack of force or coercion in any manner. The defenses were certainly not mutually exclusive or
irreconcilable, and thus, the requisite prejudice did not occur at trial and reversal is not warranted.
Hana, supra. See also People v Cadle (On Remand), 209 Mich App 467; 531 NW2d 761 (1995)
(“[D]efenses must be not only inconsistent, but also mutually exclusive or irreconcilable.)
Defendant next argues that the trial court demonstrated excessive impartiality toward the victim
and should have excluded her from the courtroom during trial. We disagree. A party who challenges
“on the basis of bias or prejudice must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Cain v
MI Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 497; 548 NW2d 210 (1996). In this case, defendant has
failed to overcome the presumption. The incidents, which defendant claims demonstrate the trial court’s
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impartiality, evidence nothing more than the trial court’s respectful posture to both the victim and the
parties. Codefendant’s counsel complained to the court, at one point during trial, that the victim was
making gestures to communicate with a witness on the witness stand. The trial court indicated that it
had not noticed the victim engaging in that conduct, but stated that it would take an objection to that
conduct under advisement. Later, codefendant’s counsel again indicated that he believed the victim was
inappropriately by shaking her head in response to testimony. The trial court acknowledged that the
attorney had brought it to his attention. He then asked defendant’s attorney to continue his cross
examination, which was in progress. When codefendant’s attorney protested the lack of warning to the
victim, the trial court instructed the victim to not make any signals. While he tempered this comment4,
apparently because he had not witnessed the conduct, there is no indication that he tempered the
comment because he was partial to the victim or was attempting to bolster the victim’s credibility. Thus,
we find no error requiring reversal. We also note that defendant’s speculation that by allowing the
victim to remain in the courtroom, she “was potentially able to influence testimony and to non-verbally
communicate with the jury” does not support reversal. There is no indication whatsoever that the victim
influenced testimony or improperly communicated with the jury.
Defendant next argues that hearsay testimony was elicited from a witness and that the testimony
improperly reiterated and reinforced the victim’s credibility. The testimony at issue was admitted
without a contemporaneous objection from either defendant. However, after the testimony was given
and a lunch break taken, both defendant’s counsel and codefendant’s counsel indicated to the court that
they were concerned that the prosecutor was eliciting hearsay. Defendant’s counsel stated that he did
not have any trouble with the prosecution asking questions that fell within hearsay exceptions, i.e. state
of mind, but was concerned that other testimony was “rank hearsay”. He then specifically indicated that
he did not want a curative instruction at that point. The trial court reminded counsel that they needed to
object contemporaneously and he would rule appropriately.
Defendant now claims that the testimony, given without objection, requires reversal because not
all of it qualified under an exception to the hearsay rule. This issue is not preserved. People v Jones,
203 Mich App 384, 390; 513 NW2d 175 (1994). Moreover, we note that even if the issue could be
deemed preserved by the late objection, we find no error requiring reversal. The erroneous admission
of hearsay evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139, 158
159; 585 NW2d 341 (1998). Reversal based on preserved, nonconstitutional error is warranted only if
‘“after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear’ that it is more probable than not
that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, ___Mich___; ___NW2d___(1999).
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the alleged error was more probably than not outcome
determinative.
Defendant next argues that his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his
theory of consent was not presented to the jury; because his counsel did not object to the hearsay
testimony complained about above; because the only request for separate trials came on the day of trial;
and because improper character evidence was admitted. Defendant failed to move for a new trial or
evidentiary hearing on this issue and therefore, our review is limited to errors that are apparent from the
trial court record. People v Nantelle, 215 Mich App 77, 87; 544 NW2d 667 (1996).
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In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for defense
counsel's errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 157-158; 560 NW2d 600 (1997); People v Stanaway,
446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). A defendant "must affirmatively demonstrate that
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial."
Mitchell, supra. In this case, defendant’s brief argument completely fails to make the requisite
demonstration that without the complained of errors, there was a reasonable probability that he would
not have been convicted. Further, we find insufficient evidence on the record to support defendant’s
allegations that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant next argues that the closing arguments given by the prosecution and the codefendant
were prejudicial to him and that the prosecutor’s arguments were unsupported. “[P]rosecutors are
accorded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct.” People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261,
282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995), quoting People v Rohn, 98 Mich App 593 596; 296 NW2d 315
(1980). “They are ‘free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it
relates to [their] theory of the case.” Bahoda, supra, quoting People v Gonzalez, 178 Mich App 526,
535; 444 NW2d 228 (1989). Our review of the record does not reveal that the prosecutor’s argument
was improper or unsupported. The prosecutor properly argued the evidence and reasonable inferences
from that evidence.
Defendant also argues that codefendant, during his closing argument, created three arguments
adverse to defendant and that because codefendant’s argument followed defendant’s closing argument,
he could not defend against the accusations. First, defendant fails to elaborate on what these “three (3)
adverse arguments” are and does not cite to the record to demonstrate their existence. Second, this
argument is unsupported by any legal authority and thus, no relief is required. Magee v Magee, 218
Mich App 158, 161; 553 NW2d 363 (1996). Third, and more importantly, our thorough review of the
record fails to reveal any arguments made by codefendant’s counsel that were prejudicial to the extent
that defendant was denied a fair trial.
Defendant next argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by testimony that revealed
that he failed to turn himself over to police after he was informed of the warrant for his arrest. We
disagree5. Because defendant did not object to the testimony at trial, the issue is not preserved. People
v Miller, 211 Mich App 30, 42; 535 NW2d 518 (1995). However, we may review it because it
raises a constitutional issue, which if valid could be outcome determinative. Id.
In this case, defendant made a voluntary statement to the police and was released. Later, he
learned that there was a warrant for his arrest. He talked to an officer about the warrant, but failed to
turn himself in to the police department. Testimony about his failure to turn himself in to the police
department did not violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The Fifth Amendment and Const 2963, art 1, § 17 provide that no person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal trial. The Fifth Amendment
privilege has been extended beyond criminal trial proceedings “to protect persons in all
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settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves.” [People v Schollaert, 194 Mich App 158, 64;
486 NW2d 312 (1992) (citation omitted).]
In determining whether the Fifth Amendment is implicated, the “relevant inquiry is whether [the
defendant] was subjected to police interrogation while in custody or deprived of his freedom of action in
a significant way.” Id. at 165 (citations omitted). Under the facts of this case, defendant was not
arrested at the time he learned of the warrant and he was not under any compulsion to be a witness
against himself. His conduct in failing to submit to the warrant for his arrest does not implicate any Fifth
Amendment rights and thus, there is no error requiring reversal.
Defendant next argues that he should be resentenced because his juvenile conviction was given
too much weight by the trial court. Defendant has waived any review related to his sentence because he
has failed to submit a copy of the presentence investigation report as required by MCR 7.212(C)(7).
MCR 7.212(C)(7) states that “[i]f an argument is presented concerning the sentence imposed in a
criminal case, the appellant’s attorney must send a copy of the presentence report to the court at the
time the brief is filed.” We also note, however, that the trial court properly considered defendant’s
juvenile convictions when imposing his sentence, People v Smith, 437 Mich 293; 470 NW2d 70
(1991); People v Jones, 173 Mich App 341, 343; 433 NW2d 829 (1988), and our review of the
record does not reveal that the trial court placed too much emphasis on defendant’s juvenile record.
Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors in this case mandates reversal.
Only actual errors are aggregated to determine their cumulative effect. Bahoda, supra at 292 n 64.
Where no errors are found, there can be no cumulative error. See People v Maleski, 220 Mich App
518, 525; 560 NW2d 71 (1996).
We also note that defendant attempts to advance several other arguments on appeal. We find
that these arguments are, however, abandoned.
First, defendant complains about the admission of testimony that codefendant apologized to the
victim. In his argument, defendant cites to the testimony from the trial wherein the victim claimed that
codefendant apologized to her, stating that he was wrong for “doing what he did”. Other than citing to
this testimony, defendant simply states:
This testimony was totally unimpeached and uncontradicted as the CoDefendant, Ramone Jones, exercised his constitutional right to not testify.Not only was
this testimony admitted without objection, there was no limiting instruction prohibiting
use of this confession/apology against the Defendant, Derrick Cain.
Defendant provides no other argument to the court on this issue. Because defendant did not object to
the testimony below and because he has failed to provide any argument or legal authority to support his
position that the testimony was improperly admitted, we deem this issue abandoned. People v Rollins,
207 Mich App 465, 468; 525 NW2d 484 (1994)6.
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Second, defendant also claims that impermissible character evidence was admitted through the
victim’s testimony. He does not provide any argument or legal authority to support that the complained
of testimony, to which there was no objection7, constitutes error. Thus, this issue is also deemed
abandoned. Rollins, supra.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred because it did not instruct the jury on any
lesser included offenses. Defendant failed to request any lesser included instructions at trial and, more
importantly, on appeal he completely fails to set forth what instructions he believes should have been
given. We will not speculate as to what lesser included instructions may have been appropriate in this
case, if any. Moreover, we will not search for authority to support that there were lesser included
instructions that could have been given and should have been given. People v Lynn, 223 Mich App
364, 368-369; 566 NW2d 45 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
1
In making our ruling, we note that defendant also cites to People v Thompson, 117 Mich App 522;
324 NW2d 22 (1983) to support that a consent instruction should have been given. Thompson, like
Hearn, supra, did not require a finding of force or coercion to convict the defendant. The theory
against the defendant in Thompson was that the criminal sexual penetration occurred under
circumstances involving the commission of a felony. Id. at 526-527.
2
Defendant’s citation to Brown for the proposition that our Court has stressed that a defendant needs
to have knowledge that the sexual act was nonconsensual is a misrepresentation of the ruling and
language in that case.
3
We note that, although not pertinent to a resolution of the issue, defendant’s argument that he had no
knowledge that the victim was not consenting is completely unsupported by the record. There was
testimony that the victim told codefendant Jones that she did not want to engage in sexual activity with
him and was crying while he assaulted her. Defendant testified that he watched codefendant Jones
engaging in sexual activity with the victim. The victim testified that defendant entered the room while
Jones was assaulting her. Thus, there was ample evidence from which to infer that defendant was
aware that the victim was not a willing participant when defendant required the victim to submit to
perform fellatio on him immediately after Jones’ forced assault.
4
The trial court stated:
[Victim], and I’m not saying that you’re doing anything wrong, but don’t try to make
any signals, and I’m not suggesting that you are, but don’t do anything like that. I don’t
think that you would, all right. Continue.
-11
5
Initially, we note that the only authority cited by defendant in support of his argument is People v
Hurd, 102 Mich App 424; 301 NW2d 881 (1980), which was vacated by the United States Supreme
Court, 454 US 807; 102 S Ct 81; 70 L Ed 2d 77 (1981). It has no precedential value.
6
Defendant also claims that his sixth amendment right of confrontation was violated. He cites to Bruton
v United States, 391 US 123; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968) for the proposition that “where
the confession of one defendant contains references to a second codefendant, and the confessor refuses
to take the stand, the use of that confession in a joint trial violates the second codefendant’s Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation.” Bruton has no bearing on the case at hand. Codefendant’s
apology to the victim never referenced or implicated defendant in any manner. The victim testified that
codefendant apologized for the wrong he did. This is not a case where codefendant confessed in a
manner that implicated the defendant in any wrongdoing.
7
The prosecution asked the victim, “Why didn’t you care for him [defendant] too much? Is it
something that you had seen?” The victim answered, “Yes.” The prosecution followed up by asking
“What’s that?”, at which point defendant’s counsel objected on the grounds that the prosecution was
asking leading questions. The court instructed the prosecution not to lead the witnesses and the
examination continued with the prosecutor eliciting information about a prior incident between defendant
and the victim. Defendant’s counsel did not object to this testimony at all.
-12
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