PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT C THOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 30, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210382
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-150452 FC
ROBERT C. THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530; MSA
28.798, and assault with intent to rob while unarmed, MCL 750.88; MSA 28.283. He was sentenced
to one to fifteen years’ imprisonment for each conviction. Defendant appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a new trial because the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence and that
his dual convictions of unarmed robbery and assault with intent to rob while unarmed violate the
prohibition against double jeopardy. We disagree on both accounts and affirm.
A new trial may be granted if the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. A motion
for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence should be granted only if the evidence preponderates
heavily against the verdict so that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.
People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 637; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). In the present case, defendant
claims that there was no evidence that he actually assaulted Larry Ludlow and argues, therefore, that his
conviction for unarmed robbery was against the great weight of the evidence.
On the evening of December 29, 1996, defendant and four friends went to the home of Heather
Martin. Ludlow and Martin were present at the home when defendant arrived. Martin became
concerned because the group was acting rowdy. Ludlow believed that defendant and his friends were
under the influence of alcohol. In order to encourage them to leave Martin’s home, Ludlow offered to
take defendant and the others to the city of Detroit so that they could purchase marijuana from a person
with whom Ludlow was acquainted. Defendant and his friends agreed to follow Ludlow to Detroit in
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their own cars. After leaving Martin’s home, Ludlow picked up his friend, Todd Polczynski, because
Polczynski knew the exact location of the person from whom the group planned t purchase the
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marijuana and because Ludlow “didn’t feel comfortable having this many people follow me.” Ludlow
then stopped at a gas station and the cars following him also stopped. While at the gas station,
defendant and his friend, Cardell Smith, asked Ludlow if they could ride in his car. Ludlow agreed and
the two got into the back seat of his car while he went inside to pay for gas.
When Ludlow returned to the car, Polczynski was being choked from behind by defendant.
According to Ludlow and Polczynski, defendant threatened to shoot Polczynski and Polczynski gave
defendant approximately $100 to $150 that he had in his pocket. Also, according to Ludlow and
Polczynski, defendant then took Ludlow’s radar detector from his car and demanded that Ludlow give
defendant his pager and unlock the trunk so that defendant and his friends could gain access to the car’s
stereo speakers. As Ludlow struggled to open the trunk, defendant struck Polczynski in the face.
Defendant then took Ludlow’s amplifier while his friends tore Ludlow’s speakers from his trunk and fled
the scene.
Ludlow testified that he observed defendant choking Polczynski and heard defendant threaten
to “blow [Polczynski’s] head off” if he did not surrender his money to defendant. He stated that he saw
a “blackish, gray object” in defendant’s hand that he believed was metal and could have been a gun.
Ludlow also testified that he gave defendant his pager after defendant demanded it because, “I was
under the impression the man had a gun. I w
asn’t going to say no.” Thereafter, Ludlow observed
defendant hit Polczynski in the face, and Ludlow did not protest defendant’s taking of his radar detector
and amplifier.
Based on that evidence, we conclude that defendant’s conduct put Ludlow reasonably in fear of
injury which enabled defendant to take Ludlow’s property. People v Johnson, 206 Mich App 122,
125-126; 520 NW2d 672 (1994). Thus, defendant’s conviction for unarmed robbery was not against
the great weight of the evidence and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s
motion for a new trial with respect to that conviction.
Defendant also claims that testimony indicating he had a claim of right to the money in
Polczynski’s possession establishes that his conviction for assault with intent to rob while unarmed was
against the great weight of the evidence. An assault with intent to rob while unarmed occurs when a
perpetrator commits an assault, either by committing a forceful act that causes immediate injury to
another or by committing a forceful act that makes another reasonably afraid of being injured, with the
intent to permanently deprive the other of his property. People v Reeves, 458 Mich 236, 239; 580
NW2d 433 (1998).
Here, all of the witnesses that observed the incidents at the gas station, including defendant,
testified that defendant held Polczynski in a headlock and demanded that he give defendant money.
Defendant, Smith, and Matthew Hancock testified that they had given Polczynski approximately $130
to purchase marijuana earlier in the evening. According to those witnesses, the argument between
defendant and Polczynski ensued when Polczynski refused to return that money after defendant, Smith,
and Hancock decided they did not want the marijuana Ludlow and Polczynski planned to purchase.
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Ludlow and Polczynski, however, testified that no one gave them money that evening and that the
money Polczynski surrendered to defendant rightfully belonged to Polczynski. Questions of credibility
and intent should be left to the trier of fact to resolve. MCR 2.613(C); People v Cartwright, 454
Mich 550, 555; 563 NW2d 208 (1997).
Giving due regard to the special opportunity and ability of the trial court to determine the
credibility of witnesses, we conclude that defendant’s conviction for assault with intent to rob while
unarmed was not against the great weight of the evidence. See id. at 555. Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial with respect to the verdict finding
defendant guilty of assault with intent to rob while unarmed.
Defendant next argues that his convictions were violative of double jeopardy protections
because the two convictions involved the same offense. The guarantee against double jeopardy
protects against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense. People v Denio,
454 Mich 691, 706; 564 NW2d 13 (1997). A trial court’s determination of a double jeopardy issue is
a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 705; 542
NW2d 921 (1995).
In the present case, defendant choked Polczynski and demanded that he surrender his money.
Compelling testimony indicates that defendant then took money that belonged to Polczynski.
Thereafter, defendant demanded that Ludlow surrender his property. Ample evidence indicated that
Ludlow was put in fear when defendant hit Polczynski in the face. Defendant then took property from
Ludlow’s car. We conclude that the evidence establishes that defendant had an intent and goal with
respect to Ludlow and his possessions that was wholly separate from his prior intent to assault and rob
Polczynski and that defendant’s assault upon Polczynski was complete before defendant’s commission
of the unarmed robbery. There is no double jeopardy violation if one crime is complete before the other
takes place, even if the offenses share common elements or one constitutes a lesser offense of the other.
Id. at 708, citing People v Swinford, 150 Mich App 507, 515; 389 NW2d 462 (1986); see also
People v Shively, 230 Mich App 626, 629; 584 NW2d 740 (1998) (there is no double jeopardy
violation where the defendant’s convictions arise out of wholly separate transactions).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Helene N. White
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