MARY E ARNOLD V EUGENE J STROIA
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARY E. ARNOLD, Successor Personal
Representative of the Estate of JOSEPH F.
CERVENKA, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
July 23, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
EUGENE J. STROIA, Individually and as Former
Personal Representative of the Estate of JOSEPH F.
CERVENKA,
No. 203153
Macomb Probate Court
LC No. 96-146616 CZ
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Kelly and Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Before this Court is an action brought by plaintiff as the personal representative of the estate of
Joseph F. Cervenka, alleging that defendant exerted undue influence over the decedent with regard to a
mortgage transaction and that $11,000 given by the decedent to defendant was a loan, not a gift.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order entering judgment in favor of plaintiff for
$11,000, following a jury trial, in addition to setting aside defendant’s mortgagee’s interest in a parcel of
land. We reverse.
I
Defendant challenges several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. On appeal, this Court
reviews challenges to evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. Lopez v General
Motors Corp, 224 Mich App 618, 634; 569 NW2d 861 (1997). However, “[o]bjections to the
admission of evidence may not be raised for the first time on appeal absent manifest injustice.” Phinney
v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 558; 564 NW2d 532 (1997).
First, defendant argues that the probate court erred by admitting Robert White’s hearsay
testimony into evidence because the statements were not admissible under an exception specifically
enunciated in MRE 804(B). We agree. “A hearsay statement is an unsworn, out-of-court statement
-1
that is offered to establish the truth of its contents.” People v Jensen, 222 Mich App 575, 580; 564
NW2d 192 (1997); MRE 801(c). Unless the rules of evidence provide otherwise, hearsay statements
are inadmissible as substantive evidence. MRE 802.
In the instant case, White’s testimony clearly constituted inadmissible hearsay if it was offered
for nothing more than to establish that defendant did in fact owe decedent money. White’s testimony
indicated that decedent told him defendant owed him money and that he kept track of the amount in his
ledger book, also that the decedent told White if anything were to happen to him that he wanted White
to remove the ledger book from his house. Further, says White, when decedent was admitted to the
hospital shortly before his death, he instructed White to remove the ledger from his home.
In her response brief, plaintiff states that White’s statements were properly admitted under
MRE 804(a)(4).1 We disagree with plaintiff’s assertion. While death of a declarant is proof positive of
an unavailable status, it is only the first step in admitting a declarant’s statements. Once the declarant is
determined to be unavailable, the declarant’s statements must fall within specific exceptions to the
general rule precluding hearsay evidence. Accordingly, under MRE 804(b) the following types of
hearsay evidence are admissible when a declarant is deemed unavailable: (1) the former testimony of
the declarant, (2) a statement made under belief of impending death, (3) a statement made against the
interest of the declarant, (4) a statement of personal or family history, and (5) a general “catch all”
exception. We find that none of these exceptions apply to the statements in question.
In deeming the statements made by decedent to White as admissible, the trial court found the
statements to fall under “an exception to the Hearsay Rule relative to probate proceedings and would
allow the testimony to proceed.” After review of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, we find no such
exception to the hearsay rule. It should be noted that the trial court could have been relying on MRE
803(3) which states:
(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the
declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant’s will.
[Emphasis added.]
MRE 803(3) clearly relates to a declarant’s will. However, at issue in the present lawsuit is an accounts
receivable ledger. While it could be argued that White’s testimony related to the decedent’s beliefs
concerning the nature and importance of the ledger book, we decline to extend the exception outlined in
MRE 803(3) to the present case. In viewing all of the testimony and exhibits admitted at trial, except
for White’s testimony, it is unclear whether the money given by decedent to defendant was in fact a loan
or a gift. The facts of this case indicate decedent to have destroyed the promissory note drafted by
defendant, thus indicating that the money given by decedent might, in fact, have been intended as a gift.
On the other hand, defendant’s name was present in decedent’s ledger book with the amount of money
he received noted next to his name.
The ledger did not contain evidence of a loan payment date or applicable interest rate. Of all of the
-2
proffered evidence, decedent’s statements to White best support plaintiff’s claim that the money given
by decedent was a loan. Therefore, we find decedent’s out of court statements to White to have had
the effect of factually supporting plaintiff’s claim that the transfer of money was intended to be a loan.
Thus, the statements were offered for the truth of the matter asserted and their admission should have
been precluded by MRE 802. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of White
concerning the statements made by decedent about the contents of the ledger book.
Second, defendant asserts that the trial court improperly admitted the Michigan Rules of
Professional Conduct as an exhibit during trial. By admitting the MRPC into evidence, defendant argues
that the jury was allowed to measure his conduct against a higher standard of care than would be
required of any other fiduciary. We disagree
In the instant case, defendant is an attorney. As an attorney, defendant is subject to the
Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, whether or not he actively counsels any clients. The MRPC
dictates a code of conduct for all members of the bar. In addition to regulating the lawyer/client
relationship, the MRPC also requires that an attorney conduct his or her daily affairs avoiding conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or violation of criminal law. MRPC 8.4. It
appears that defendant acted as decedent’s lawyer on numerous occasions. While money may not have
exchanged hands for defendant’s legal services, defendant drafted a will for decedent, drafted two
mortgage transactions, and handled decedent’s estate upon his death. Therefore, defendant was
subjected to the MRPC based upon his lawyer/client relationship with decedent.
Based upon defendant’s professional relationship with decedent, MRPC 1.8 would apply. The
rule prohibits a lawyer from entering into business transactions with a client unless certain precautions
are met. MRPC 1.8(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a
manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
The rule was designed to ensure that all transactions between a lawyer and his or her client would be
fair and reasonable to the client. See comments to MRPC 1.8.
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. MRE 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any
tendency to make the existence of a fact which is of consequence to the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401. However, relevant evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403.
-3
Unfair prejudice exists when there is a tendency that the evidence will be given undue or preemptive
weight by the jury, or when it would be inequitable to allow the use of the evidence. In re Flury
Estate, 218 Mich App 211, 217; 554 NW2d 39 (1996). See also People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75
76; 537 NW2d 909, modified, remanded 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
In the instant case, the MRPC were relevant. The rules enabled the jury to evaluate whether
defendant breached his fiduciary duty to decedent, as an attorney, by placing his name as an additional
mortgagee on the mortgage documents and by accepting $11,000 as a gift from decedent.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the probative value of the MRPC was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. There was no indication that the evidence would be given undue or
preemptive weight by the jury, or that it would be inequitable to allow the use of the MRPC.
Moreover, the trial court cautioned the attorneys that any discussions of malpractice should not be
utilized during arguments, voir dire, or cross-examination. Therefore, we believe that the MRPC were
properly admitted as an exhibit into evidence.
Third, defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of plaintiff’s
expert witness into evidence. Since the instant case did not involve legal malpractice, defendant argues
that the jury did not require any technical or specialized knowledge to assist them in understanding the
evidence. We disagree.
If the trial court determines that recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert may testify to the knowledge by opinion or otherwise. MRE 702; McDougall v Eliuk,
218 Mich App 501, 506-507; 554 NW2d 56 (1996). Expert knowledge can assist the trier when
there are facts which require interpretation or analysis and the witness’ knowledge is of particular value.
MRE 702.
The three requirements for the admission of expert testimony are: “(1) the witness must be an
expert; (2) there must be facts which require an expert’s interpretation or analysis; and (3) the witness’
knowledge must be peculiar to experts rather than to lay persons.” Green v Jerome-Duncan Ford,
Inc, 195 Mich App 493, 498; 491 NW2d 243 (1992) (citations omitted). When determining whether
an expert’s testimony would assist the trier of fact, it is helpful to apply a common sense inquiry whether
an untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the
particular issue without enlightenment from experts. People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 105-106; 387
NW2d 814 (1996); King v Taylor Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 184 Mich App 204, 215; 457 NW2d
42 (1990).
In the instant case, we believe that the trial court properly concluded that an expert’s testimony
was necessary to assist the jury in their understanding of the topic of fiduciary duty. Without a legal
background, the jurors would probably be unclear as to the fiduciary duties which a lawyer owes his or
her client and the fiduciary duties a personal representative has to the estate of the deceased. The
expert’s testimony assisted the trier of fact in understanding the evidence and in determining whether
defendant breached his fiduciary duties to decedent.
-4
With regard to defendant’s argument that the court should have prohibited plaintiff’s expert from
testifying pursuant to MCR 2.313(B)(2)(b) and (c), because plaintiff failed to file timely answers to
interrogatories, which were directed at the expert, we disagree. Plaintiff was provided with the
substance of the expert’s proposed testimony at the motion to exclude the expert witness on January 6,
1997, which was three days prior to trial. Even defendant admits in his brief on appeal that plaintiff did
file answers to his interrogatories within one week of trial, although he maintains that plaintiff’s answers
to the interrogatories were unresponsive and evasive. The expert’s testimony was straightforward and
did not relate to a subject that defense counsel, as an attorney, would have had a difficult time
comprehending. As a result, we do not believe that defendant was prejudiced by plaintiff’s alleged
discovery violations. Therefore, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
plaintiff’s expert witness to testify.
Finally, defendant argues that the probate court erred by allowing plaintiff to testify that her
daughter is disabled. According to defendant, the testimony served no purpose other than to generate
sympathy from the jurors. We note that defendant failed to object below and, therefore, we review the
issue for manifest injustice. Phinney, supra. Plaintiff testified that she was a widow and that she was
the mother of two children, one of whom is disabled. There were no specific questions regarding the
nature of plaintiff’s daughter’s handicap. Because there is no indication that t he testimony was offered
merely to solicit sympathy from the jury, we do not believe that manifest justice will result if we decline
to review this issue.
II
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary disposition
based upon the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal, this Court reviews de novo a court's grant or denial
of a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) to determine whether the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Limbach v Oakland Co Bd of Co Road Comm'rs,
226 Mich App 389, 395; 573 NW2d 336 (1997); Energy Reserves, Inc v Consumers Power Co,
221 Mich App 210, 215-216; 561 NW2d 854 (1997).
The doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent suit between the same parties when the evidence
or essential facts remain the same. Energy Reserves, Inc, supra at 215; Eaton Co Bd of Co Rd
Comm’rs v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371, 375; 521 NW2d 847 (1994). In order for the doctrine to
apply (1) the former suit must have been decided on the merits, (2) the issues in the second action were
or could have been resolved in the former one, and (3) both actions must involve the same parties or
their privies. Energy Reserves, supra at 215-216. Res judicata bars a subsequent action between the
same parties when the facts or evidence essential to the action are identical to those essential to a prior
action. Dart v Dart, 224 Mich App 146; 568 NW2d 353 (1997).
Defendant argues that because plaintiff accepted the mediation award in the probate
proceedings, the mediation judgment in the case precludes plaintiff from raising the issues in the instant
case. We disagree.
-5
In the instant case, plaintiff sought to set aside a mortgage transaction, which she believed was
obtained through defendant’s undue influence over decedent. In addition, plaintiff sought to collect
$11,000, which she believed was owed to decedent’s estate by defendant. However, the previous
mediation judgment dealt only with defendant’s petition for attorney and fiduciary fees relating to his
handling of decedent’s estate while defendant served as personal representative from December 1994
to May 1995. Because the mediation judgment did not address the mortgage issue and/or the issue
whether the $11,000 given to defendant by decedent was a loan or a gift, the former mediation action
never addressed the merits of the instant lawsuit. The issues in the instant case were not and could not
have been resolved during the mediation proceeding since only defendant’s petition for attorney and
fiduciary fees was addressed by the panel. Therefore, we do not believe that the doctrine of res
judicata bars the instant action.
III
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based
upon ex parte communications between the court, plaintiff’s counsel and plaintiff’s expert witness.
“Generally, this Court will not interfere with a trial court's disposition of a motion for mistrial unless there
was an abuse of discretion which results in a miscarriage of justice so that the party has not had a fair
and impartial trial.” Vaughan v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 153 Mich App 575, 579; 396 NW2d
440 (1986).
“Ex parte communications from a judge’s chambers to one side in a contested lawsuit are
‘clearly at odds with our adversary system of justice.’” Knop v Johnson, 977 F2d 996, 1011 (CA 6,
1992). According to Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should not permit or initiate ex
parte communications under most circumstances. The rule provides:
A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider
other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning
a pending or impending proceeding, except as follows:
(a) A judge may allow ex-parte communications for scheduling, administrative
purposes, or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters or issues on the
merits, provided
(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party or counsel for a party will gain a
procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and
(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties and counsel for parties
of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond.
[Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(4).]
In the instant case, the trial judge admitted that he engaged in a brief conversation with plaintiff’s
counsel and with plaintiff’s expert witness. However, the judge stated that the comments were made in
passing and concerned proper impeachment techniques, which was basically the same information that
-6
he and the parties had discussed in court during the first side bar. Based on the record, it appears that
any conversation between the court and plaintiff’s counsel and/or plaintiff’s expert witness evolved from
a chance meeting and did not deal with substantive matters or issues on the merits. Furthermore, we
believe that plaintiff did not gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte
communications. While the judge acknowledged that his brief conversation with plaintiff’s counsel
and/or plaintiff’s expert witness may have given an appearance of impropriety,2 there is no reason on the
record not to believe his contention that nothing improper occurred.
Reversed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
1
MRE 804(a)(4) provides:
(a) Definition of Unavailability. “Unavailability as a witness” includes situations in
which the declarant
*
*
*
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing
physical or mental illness or infirmity.
2
We note that while the record indicates that the ex parte communication between the trial judge and
plaintiff’s counsel most likely did not unfairly prejudice defendant nor cause plaintiff to have a tactical
advantage over defendant, this Court is gravely concerned with any appearance of impropriety on the
part of jurists of this state. “Not only is it a gross breach of the appearance of justice when the
defendant’s principal adversary is given private access to the ear of the court, it is a dangerous
procedure.” United States v Minsky, 963 F 2d 870, 874 (CA 6, 1992), citing Haller v Robbins,
409 F 2d 857, 859 (CA 1, 1989). While we find no reversible error on the part of the trial judge, it is
clear that better judgment should have been exercised on the part of the court and plaintiff’s counsel in
determining the propriety of such an ex parte meeting. This practice must be discouraged since it
undermines the public’s confidence in the impartiality of the court. Carroll v Princess Anne, 393 US
175, 183; 89 S Ct 347; 21 L Ed 2d 325 (1968).
-7
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.