PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES CARPENTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 16, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204051
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-011473 FC
JAMES CARPENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
AMENDED
Before: Neff, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his bench trial conviction of first-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a(2); MSA 28.305(a)(2), two counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6), possession of a firearm
in the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and resisting and obstructing a police
officer, MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747. The trial court sentenced defendant to twenty-eight months to
twenty years’ imprisonment for the home invasion conviction, twenty-eight months to four years’
imprisonment for each of the two counts of felonious assault, twenty-eight months to five years’
imprisonment for the felon in possession conviction, the mandatory consecutive two years’ imprisonment
for the felony-firearm conviction, and one to two years’ imprisonment for the resisting and obstructing
conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by requiring him to prove his claim of
diminished capacity by a preponderance of the evidence. According to defendant, by assigning the
burden of establishing diminished capacity to defendant, the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden
of proof with respect to an essential element of the applicable offenses in this case, namely, specific
intent, and thus violated the constitutional principle that requires the prosecution to carry the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all essential elements of an offense. See In re Winship, 397 US
358, 364; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970).
In 1994, the Legislature amended the insanity statute to provide that the insanity defense is an
affirmative defense and that “[t]he defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence.” MCL 768.21a(3); MSA 28.1044(1)(3). The Legislature clearly
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intended to place the burden of proof of this defense on defendants. Beginning with this Court’s
determination in People v Mangiapane, 85 Mich App 379, 395; 271 NW2d 240 (1978), and
consistently thereafter,1 this Court has construed the defense of diminished capacity to come within the
codified definition of legal insanity and therefore has held that it is subject to the same procedural
requirements that are statutorily imposed on the insanity defense. Plaintiff correctly maintains that when
the Legislature amends existing statutes, it is presumed to act with knowledge of appellate court
statutory interpretations. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 230 Mich App 166, 169; 583 NW2d 247
(1998). According to plaintiff, therefore, it follows that because the Legislature had not specifically
included the diminished capacity defense by name in the insanity statute prior to Mangiapane, and
because the 1994 amendment did not otherwise change the definition of insanity or the procedural
requirements imposed by the statute, it must be presumed that the Legislature, aware of this Court’s
inclusion of the diminished capacity defense within the codification of the insanity defense, intended that
this Court’s construction of the insanity statute remain in force. The trial court agreed with the
prosecution and assigned the burden of proof to defendant with respect to the defense of diminished
capacity.
We conclude that the trial court’s decision to require defendant to establish the defense of
diminished capacity by a preponderance of the evidence does not require reversal. This requirement did
not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to defendant on the specific intent elements of the crime.
The trial court did not relieve the prosecution of its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt all the essential elements of the offense in this case, which included the specific intent to commit
the acts proscribed by the applicable statutes. In this bench trial, the trial court articulated in a written
opinion that the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of each
offense for which the court returned a conviction, and only then did the trial court turn to the question
whether defendant had established by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a
diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication. The trial court concluded that he had not. Therefore,
because the trial court expressly determined that the prosecution had carried its burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt with respect to the relevant offenses in this case, there was no improper shifting of
the burden.
Defendant next contends that, even if he was required to establish the defense of diminished
capacity, the evidence he presented at trial sufficiently established that defense and thereby negated the
specific intent necessary for the home invasion charge and the two assault charges. We review the
sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial de novo in a light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether the trial court could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 268-270; 380 NW2d 11 (1985).
There was evidence that defendant had been drinking prior to the incident, and several of his
friends testified that they believed he was intoxicated. However, none of them reported that he engaged
in any bizarre behavior or made any delusional statements, and two of them believed defendant was
sober enough to drive his vehicle. Defendant’s behavior in demanding entry to his former girlfriend’s
home, his forcible entry into the home, his confrontation with and assault on his former girlfriend and her
male companion, and his subsequent telephone call to her warning her not to contact the police was–as
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the trial court concluded–goal oriented and understandable, even if it is not the sort of behavior that
organized society condones. It was not until the police arrived at defendant’s home that he began
ranting and talking about demons and the F.B.I., and about someone stealing money from his company.
This case does not present a situation where there is insufficient evidence for the trial court’s conclusion.
Each side presented both expert and lay testimony concerning defendant’s state of mind. Where there
is adequate evidence on both sides of this issue, it is a matter for the trier of fact to determine where the
truth lies. We find that the trial court’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence.
Defendant next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
conclusion that he intentionally broke and entered the complainant’s home and that he should therefore
have been acquitted of the charge of first-degree home invasion. To establish the charge of first-degree
home invasion, the prosecutor had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among other elements, that
defendant broke into a dwelling. MCL 750.110a; MSA 28.305(1). Under Michigan law, any amount
of force used to open a door or a window to enter the building, no matter how slight, is sufficient to
constitute the breaking. People v Toole, 227 Mich App 656, 659; 576 NW2d 441 (1998). The
uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses established that defendant demanded entry into his former
girlfriend’s home, that he insisted that he was coming in, and that when he was refused entry, he jumped
through a glass window and proceeded to assault his former girlfriend and her companion. In response,
defendant offered only his speculation that he accidentally fell through the window. Because the
evidence of the breaking was consistent with defendant’s stated intention to enter the home, the trial
court was justified in finding that defendant intentionally broke into and entered the complainant’s home.
Next, defendant contends that if this Court sets aside his convictions for first-degree home
invasion and felonious assault, it must also set aside his conviction for felony-firearm. However,
because we affirm defendant’s convictions for the predicate felonies, we likewise affirm defendant’s
felony-firearm conviction.
Defendant next contends that there was insufficient evidence that he resisted and obstructed a
police officer. Defendant argues that the police officer was not justified in reaching through a window to
grab him and that he did not resist being arrested, but rather merely properly tried to avoid being
dragged through a window and a torn screen. The purpose of the resisting and obstructing statute “is to
protect officers from physical harm.” People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 759; 456 NW2d 237 (1990).
In this Court’s recent decision in People v Philabaun, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket
No. 201759, issued 3/19/99), the majority held that in order for the prosecution to meet the statutory
requirements for a charge of resisting or obstructing a police officer, there must be an active
interference, either verbal or physical, or a threatened interference with the ability to carry the threat out.
Id., slip op, p 5. In this case, the police officer testified that he attempted to reach inside the side
window to grab defendant and take him into custody, but defendant pulled back and then closed the
window on the officer’s hand. The trial court properly found that defendant resisted the officer in the
performance of his lawful duties. There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of
resisting and obstructing.
Finally, defendant contends that his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm
violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, US Const, art 1, § 10; Const 1963, art
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1, § 10, because imposing punishment for a felon in possession conviction amounts to improper
additional punishment for a prior conviction. In People v Tice, 220 Mich App 47, 51-52; 558 NW2d
245 (1996), this Court held that the felon in possession of a firearm statute did not seek to impose
further punishment for a prior conviction, but rather imposed punishment for the “recent act of
possessing a firearm” in order to “protect the public by precluding certain convicted felons from
possessing firearms.” Defendant’s ex post facto argument is therefore meritless.
Defendant also claims the felon in possession statute violates his constitutional right to keep and
bear arms. Const 1963, art 1; § 6. In both People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 364-365; 572
NW2d 666 (1997), and People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 692; 580 NW2d 444 (1998), this
Court held that the felon in possession statute did not violate the state’s constitutional provision
guaranteeing the right to keep and bear arms. Defendant argues that this Court’s decisions have not
addressed the decision of our Supreme Court in People v Zerillo, 219 Mich 635; 189 NW 927
(1922), which held that a statute forbidding unnaturalized, foreign-born residents from possessing
firearms was unconstitutional. We find Zerillo to be distinguishable. The Supreme Court recognized
that the right to keep and bear arms was subject to reasonable regulation, but held that a statute that
made that right subject to the will of the local sheriff, and that prohibited foreign-born residents from
using firearms to legitimately defend their persons and property, was an unconstitutional regulation. The
felon in possession statute does not suffer from the infirmities identified in Zerillo, but instead represents
a reasonable legislative regulation aimed at protecting the public safety by forbidding convicted felons
from possessing firearms.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
1
See, e.g, People v Anderson, 166 Mich App 455, 464; 421 NW2d 200 (1988); People v
Belanger, 158 Mich App 522, 530; 405 NW2d 405 (1987), vacated on other grounds 432 Mich 880;
436 NW2d 667 (1989); People v Hollis, 140 Mich App 589, 592; 366 NW2d 29 (1985); People v
Denton, 138 Mich App 568, 571; 360 NW2d 245 (1984).
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