PEOPLE OF MI V DARRYL GENE ORR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 13, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 205173
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 97-071383 FC
DARRYL GENE ORR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Doctoroff, and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by jury of intentionally discharging a firearm at a dwelling or occupied
structure, MCL 750.234b; MSA 28.431(2), and possessing a firearm at the time of an attempted or
completed felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant first claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in her closing argument by
disparaging the defense and its exculpatory theory of self-defense. Defendant did not object to this
instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial and this Court will not address the issue on appeal
"unless failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.” People v Dalessandro,
165 Mich App 569, 579; 419 NW2d 609 (1988). Defendant made self-defense a material issue
through his testimony and the prosecutor was entitled to argue that defendant’s defense was inconsistent
with the evidence. People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 116; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). To the extent the
prosecutor’s particular comments were improper, a timely objection and request for a limiting instruction
would have cured any resulting prejudice. People v Mitchell, 223 Mich App 395, 400; 566 NW2d
312 (1997). We do not believe defendant was prejudiced by the comments and find no miscarriage of
justice.
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor's "message" argument was an improper civic duty
argument. Defendant preserved this issue by making a timely objection. Dalessandro, supra at 579.
We review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct by examining the relevant portion of the record to
determine if the remarks denied defendant a fair and impartial trial. People v Legrone, 205 Mich App
77, 82; 517 NW2d 270. A prosecutor commits misconduct, and thereby deprives a defendant of a fair
trial, when he or she appeals to the jury to return a guilty verdict as part of its civic duty. See People v
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Crawford, 187 Mich App 344, 354; 467 NW2d 818 (1991). “Such arguments are generally
condemned because they inject issues into the trial that are broader than a defendant's guilt or innocence
of the charges and because they encourage the jurors to suspend their own powers of judgment.” Id.
Further, civic duty arguments “appeal to the fears and prejudices of jurors . . . .” People v Schmitz,
231 Mich App 521, 533; 586 NW2d 766 (1998).
In the instant case, the prosecutor argued that defendant had traveled to Lansing to give a
message to the intended victim with his gun. However, she contended that when he "delivered" the
message it was to the entire apartment building with reckless disregard for the occupants' safety. In her
rebuttal argument, the prosecutor asserted that the evidence supported conviction and the jury
should give a message back, a message in return that should be loud and clear. We will
not tolerate this. We will not look for ways to excuse your behavior by calling what you
did self-defense. Because you cannot endanger an entire apartment building full of
people when you have ways to avoid it.
We will not look the other way and ignore the evidence that you shot into this
building before anyone shot at you. We will not put on blinders and refuse to ask
ourselves why anyone needs to come calling on people with guns in the first place. And
we will not look for a way out of holding you responsible for this by personally attacking
and needlessly criticizing the person that you chose as a victim.
We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument was not premised on emotion without facts, nor
did it ask the jury to abandon its logic. See Schmitz, supra at 533; Crawford, supra at 354. While a
different phrasing would have been preferred, the prosecutor was summarizing and interpreting the
evidence presented at trial by using the image of delivering a message. And, given that the prosecutor
was obliged to establish that the building was a dwelling or occupied structure, MCL 750.234b;
MSA 28.431(2), defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor’s references to the
building residents.
Next, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of discharging a firearm.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, this Court looks at the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecutor. People v Head, 211 Mich App 205, 210; 535 NW2d 563
(1995). The evidence is sufficient when a rational factfinder could determine that the prosecutor proved
every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Daniels, 192 Mich App
658, 665; 482 NW2d 176 (1991).
The crux of defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is that the eyewitness
account by the prosecutor's key witness was not credible. This Court has long held that “the credibility
of witnesses is a matter of weight, not sufficiency. Determinations of credibility are made by the jury
which heard the testimony and observed the witnesses, and this Court will not substitute its judgment on
this issue.” People v Scotts, 80 Mich App 1, 9; 263 NW2d 272 (1977). Even though this witness did
not provide perfectly consistent accounts of the events, “the question is not whether there was
conflicting evidence, but rather whether there was evidence that the jury, sitting as the trier of fact, could
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choose to believe and, if it did so believe that evidence, that the evidence would justify convicting
defendant.” People v Smith, 205 Mich App 69, 71; 517 NW2d 255 (1994). Nor does it matter that
the prosecutor's case lacked physical evidence of the offense, such as a gun or a gun powder residue
test that indicated defendant shot a weapon that day. “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences arising therefrom can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v
Reddick, 187 Mich App 547, 551; 468 NW2d 278 (1991). Therefore, we conclude that the evidence
was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to convict defendant of discharging a firearm at a dwelling or
occupied structure when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecutor.
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor failed to prove a connection between him and a felony
and, therefore, the jury could not properly convict him of felony-firearm. MCL 750.227b(1); MSA
28.424(2)(1). Discharging a weapon at a dwelling or structure is a felony. MCL 750.234b(1); MSA
28.431(2)(1). Although the felony-firearm statute provides exceptions for certain statutory offenses,
discharging a firearm is not among them. Indeed, we have held that the felony-firearm statute applies to
individuals who commit this same offense. People v Guiles, 199 Mich App 54, 59-60; 500 NW2d
757 (1993). By proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had discharged a firearm at a
dwelling or occupied structure, the prosecutor implicitly proved that defendant had possessed a firearm
while committing a felony. Therefore, defendant’s felony-firearm conviction does not require reversal.
Defendant's final argument is that the trial court did not cure the prejudice that stemmed from the
clearly misstated instruction on self-defense. To the contrary, by telling the jury that it had misspoken
and by re-reading the jury instruction in the correct form, the trial court provided a timely cure for its
inadvertent error. See People v Gray, 57 Mich App 289, 297; 225 NW2d 733 (1975).
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Helene N. White
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