PEOPLE OF MI V CORNELIUS TERREL SHANNON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 18, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209255
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 93-020297 FC
CORNELIUS TERREL SHANNON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(e); MSA
28.788(2)(1)(e) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2) case, defendant appeals by right from the twenty-seven- to forty-five-year prison term the
lower court imposed while resentencing defendant, a second habitual offender, under MCL 769.10;
MSA 28.10821. This Court remanded for the resentencing because the original sentencing court
improperly considered the possible effect of disciplinary credits in sentencing defendant to thirty to fifty
years in prison. People v Shannon, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals issued
11/22/96 (Docket No. 174662). Because at the time of resentencing, defendant had already served
the mandatory two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction, at issue is only the CSC I sentence. We
affirm defendant's convictions but remand for the correction of the judgment of sentence.
The jury found defendant guilty of forcing the complainant, at gunpoint, to perform oral sex.
Defendant appeals only his resulting sentence, arguing that the twenty-seven- to forty-five-year prison
term imposed is disproportionate. This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a
sentence. People v Albert, 207 Mich App 73, 74; 523 NW2d 825 (1994). “[A] given sentence can
be said to constitute an abuse of discretion if that sentence violates the principle of proportionality,
which requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636;
461 NW2d 1 (1990).
The Legislature has established that individuals who have been convicted of a subsequent felony
or attempted felony may be sentenced for the subsequent felony to life imprisonment or for a lesser term
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when the subsequent felony is punishable upon a first conviction by life imprisonment. MCL 769.10;
MSA 28.1082. The lower court resentenced defendant to twenty-seven to forty-five years in prison on
the CSC I conviction, which is within the life term the habitual offender statute permits. MCL
750.520b(2); MSA 28.788(2)(2).
Defendant contends that his resentence is disproportionate based on the circumstances
surrounding the offense and the offender. Defendant’s prior record includes convictions for breaking
and entering, attempted felonious assault with a dangerous weapon, and delivery of less than fifty grams
of cocaine. Both the sentencing court and the presentence investigator involved with defendant’s
cocaine conviction noted the seriousness of defendant’s previous crimes. See People v Smith, 437
Mich 293, 304; 470 NW2d 70 (1991) (considering the defendant’s criminal history). Further,
defendant committed both the instant offenses and the cocaine delivery offense while he was on
probation, prompting the presentence investigator to comment that “[t]hree new felony offenses
committed while on probation demonstrates a total disregard for the purpose and privilege of a
community based sentence.” See People v Ross, 145 Mich App 483, 495; 378 NW2d 517 (1985)
(considering the defendant’s attitude toward his criminal behavior). Moreover, while incarcerated and
awaiting resentencing, defendant has been convicted of thirteen major misconducts, including possession
of alcohol, fighting, assault and battery, possession of dangerous contraband, insolence, disobeying
direct orders, and gambling. See People v Bryars, 168 Mich App 523, 526-527; 425 NW2d 125
(1988) (considering the defendant’s subsequent offenses). With regard to the nature of the offense
committed, not only did defendant force the victim to perform oral sex on him, but he did so at gunpoint.
See, e.g., People v Hunter, 176 Mich App 319, 321; 439 NW2d 334 (1989) (considering the nature
of the crime); Ross, supra (considering the circumstances surrounding the criminal behavior).
Thus, given these aggravating factors regarding the offense and the offender, the lower court did
not abuse its discretion when it resentenced defendant as a second habitual offender to a prison term of
twenty-seven to forty-five years for the CSC I conviction. As our Supreme Court has said, where an
habitual offender demonstrates that he cannot conform his conduct to the law, a sentence within the
statutory limit is proportionate. People v Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich 320, 326; 562 NW2d
460 (1997).
Defendant also argues that the lower court erred by considering the sentencing guidelines in
sentencing him because he was an habitual offender. While this Court may not consider the underlying
guidelines in reviewing the proportionality of a defendant’s habitual offender sentence, People v Edgett,
220 Mich App 686, 694; 560 NW2d 360 (1996), “nothing in the law would preclude a trial court from
taking the sentencing guidelines into consideration in the course of determining a sentence for an habitual
offender.” People v Haacke, 217 Mich App 434, 438; 553 NW2d 15 (1996). Therefore,
defendant's contention is without merit.
Defendant's convictions are affirmed. However, we remand for the ministerial task of correcting
the judgment of sentence pursuant to the footnote to this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
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Defendant's judgment of sentence erroneously indicates that he pleaded guilty to being an habitual
offender, third offense, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1082. However, our review of guilty plea transcript
reveals that defendant in fact pleaded guilty to being an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10;
MSA 28.1082. Accordingly, this case must be remanded for correction of the judgment of sentence.
See People v Avant, __ Mich App __ ; __ NW2d __ (Docket No. 206321, issued 5/14/99).
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