PANELCLAD INC V LAFARGE CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PANELCLAD, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
June 18, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204494
Alpena Circuit Court
LC No. 95-0001369 CK
LAFARGE CORPORATION and WATKINS
ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Gage, P.J., and MacKenzie and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants1 appeal by right from the circuit court’s order awarding plaintiff attorney fees in the
amount of $15,432.50 under the construction lien act (Act), MCL 570.1118(2); MSA
26.316(118)(2). We affirm in part and remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding the reasonableness
of the attorney fees requested.
Plaintiff filed its complaint after defendant Watkins Engineers and Constructors (Watkins), a
general contractor, and defendant LaFarge, the landowner, refused to pay for construction work
plaintiff undertook on LaFarge’s property, pursuant to a contract with Watkins. Watkins hired plaintiff
as a subcontractor, agreeing to pay $220,500.00 for plaintiff’s services. The dispute concerned the
quality of plaintiff’s work and materials, the timeliness of performance, whether Watkins was within its
rights under the contract in completing plaintiff’s work,2 and the amount of permissible backcharges.
Plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against defendants. Counts III and IV were dismissed (see
n 1). Count I alleged that Watkins breached its contract with plaintiff and demanded full payment of the
contract price plus interest, costs and attorney fees. Count II sought enforcement and foreclosure of
plaintiff’s construction lien. It alleged plaintiff’s performance under the contract and compliance with the
procedural requirements for enforcing and foreclosing the lien, and asked that the court determine the
amount due plaintiff, determine the rights, claims, liens and priorities of the parties, and, in the event of
default in payment of the amount determined, that the court order the property sold.
-1
After the complaint was filed, defendants paid plaintiff $110,500 but withheld the balance of the
contract price. An amended complaint was filed acknowledging this payment, and after some pretrial
activity, plaintiff and Watkins stipulated to submitting the matter to a special master. The special master
issued findings and conclusions determining that Watkins was entitled to complete plaintiff’s work on the
project and withhold payment after plaintiff failed to remobilize within two days of Watkins’ demand.
He also determined that Watkins was entitled to some of the backcharges claimed, but not to others,
leaving a balance of $73,838.50 due to plaintiff.
The special master awarded no attorney fees under the contract, noting that Watkins had
offered no evidence regarding attorney fees, and expressly stated that no ruling was being made
regarding attorney fees pursuant to the construction lien act (Act), or the mediation or offer of judgment
rules. The circuit court entered a partial judgment for plaintiff against Watkins based on the special
master’s findings and conclusions. The judgment awarded plaintiff attorney fees in an unspecified
amount subject to Watkins’ right to file objections. Defendants3 objected to an award of attorney fees
under the Act, arguing that attorney fees were not allowable under the Act because the fees requested
pertained only to the contract claim against Watkins and not the foreclosure claim, and also argued that
the fees proposed were unreasonable. The circuit court requested written memoranda of law explaining
the parties’ positions, and subsequently awarded plaintiff the full amount of attorney fees sought,
$15,432.50.
The construction lien act allows recovery of attorney fees:
[i]n each action in which enforcement of a construction lien through foreclosure is
sought, the court shall examine each claim and defense that is presented, and determine
the amount, if any, due to each lien claimant . . . . The court may allow reasonable
attorneys’ fees to a lien claimant who is the prevailing party. [MCL 570.1118(2); MSA
26.316(118)(2).]
The Act was intended to protect the interests of contractors, workers, and suppliers while
protecting owners from excessive costs, and is to be liberally construed to effectuate these purposes.
Vugterveen Systems Inc v Olde Millpond Corp, 454 Mich 119-121; 560 NW2d 43 (1997).
The Act permits lien foreclosure and breach of contract claims to be brought together:
(5) In connection with an action for foreclosure of a construction lien, the lien claimant
also may maintain an action on any contract from which the lien arose. [MCL
570.1117(5); MSA 26.316(117)(2).] [See also Dane Const, Inc v Royal’s Wine &
Deli, Inc, 192 Mich App 287; 480 NW2d 343 (1991) (noting that enforcement of a
construction lien through foreclosure is a cumulative remedy that may be pursued
simultaneously with an action on the contract from which the lien arose).]
The Act contemplates joining all potential lien claimants and the court adjudicating their interests. See
MCL 510.1118(2); MSA 26.316(118)(2), which states that “the court shall examine each claim and
defense that is presented, and determine the amount, if any, due to each lien claimant.”
-2
Here, Watkins and LaFarge were both defendants in Count II, the foreclosure of lien count, and
both were represented by the same counsel. The issues were intertwined in the sense that in order to
determine the amount of plaintiff’s lien, if any, it was necessary to determine the amount owed under the
contract. Although the validity of the lien was not the subject matter of the proceedings before the
special master, the parties stipulated in those proceedings that “the procedural requirements of the lien
filed by Panelclad against the LaFarge property were proper.” The disputed issue concerned the
amount of permissible backcharges, and because that dispute apparently was between plaintiff, the
subcontractor, and Watkins, the contractor, the property owner did not participate in the proceedings
before the master. Nevertheless, the foreclosure count remained pending as a means of securing
payment, and a release of lien was not filed until after the amount the special master determined was
owing was paid. Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not err in awarding fees under the
Act.4
Defendants further assert that plaintiff did not prevail on the lien claim because it was not
adjudicated and, further, that since the master determined that plaintiff was in default and that Watkins
properly completed the contract, plaintiff was not a prevailing party at all. We disagree. A “prevailing
party” is “a party who wins on the whole record.” MCL 600.2591(3)(b); MSA 27A.2591(3)(b).
When a plaintiff pleads different theories, each of which seeks to recover for the same injury, and
recovery under any theory would entitle the plaintiff to recover the full measure of its damages, the
plaintiff need only recover on one theory to be considered the prevailing party. Van Zanten v H.
Vander Laan Co, Inc, 200 Mich App 139, 141; 503 NW2d 713 (1993). Although the complaint
alleged two distinct claims and plaintiff’s claim seeking foreclosure on a construction lien was never
addressed, plaintiff prevailed on the whole record and was therefore a “prevailing party” who had
“sought” enforcement of a lien within the meaning of the Act. MCL 570.1118(2); MSA
26.316(118)(2).
Further, a party need not recover the full amount of damages prayed for to be considered a
prevailing party. VanZanten, supra at 141. We have found no authority to support that a plaintiff
cannot prevail in a breach of contract action unless it is expressly stated in a court judgment that the
defendant breached its contract. Here, although it was determined that Watkins properly completed the
work and was entitled to backcharges, it was also determined that the backcharges claimed were
excessive and that plaintiff was owed money under the contract.
Defendants provide no authority to support and did not argue below that the circuit court failed
to reserve the right to grant attorney fees other than as a result of mediation or offers of judgment. We
have found no support for the proposition that the circuit court had to reserve the right to award
attorney fees under the Act. Litigants may not expect this Court to search for authority to support their
positions. Winiemko v Valenti, 203 Mich App 411, 415, 419; 513 NW2d 181 (1994).
II
Defendants next argue that the circuit court erred when it failed to hold a hearing to consider the
reasonableness of plaintiff’s requested attorney fees. We agree.
-3
Where the opposing party challenges the reasonableness of attorney fees requested, the court
should inquire into the services actually rendered prior to approving an amount. Although a full-blown
trial is not necessary, an evidentiary hearing regarding the reasonableness of the fee request is. Wilson v
General Motors Corp, 183 Mich App 21, 42-43; 454 NW2d 405 (1990). The court must make
findings of fact on the issue whether the fees are reasonable. Petterman v Haverhill Farms, Inc, 125
Mich App 30, 32; 335 NW2d 710 (1983), citing Sturgis Savings & Loan Ass’n v Italian Village,
Inc, 81 Mich App 577; 265 NW2d 755 (1978). Although the parties submitted memoranda on the
issue of attorney fees and a hearing was held on the general issue whether fees were appropriate under
the Act, the circuit court did not state any findings on the record and did not discuss the reasonableness
of the fees sought.
When a party claims that attorney fees are excessive, and the circuit court fails to consider the
reasonableness of the fees, instead finding the bill acceptable on its face, the court has abused its
discretion. Petterman, supra at 33. We therefore remand for a determination of reasonable attorney
fees. In determining a reasonable fee, the circuit court should consider the factors set forth in Wood v
DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588; 321 NW2d 653 (1982). B & B Investment Group v Gitler, 229 Mich
App 1, 15-17; 581 NW2d 17 (1998).
We affirm the circuit court’s determination that attorney fees could properly be awarded under
the construction lien act, but remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the reasonableness of the
attorney fees requested.5 We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Helene N. White
1
Although the claim of appeal and brief on appeal were filed in behalf of both defendants, and the case
is titled in that fashion in this Court, it is unclear whether the order at issue pertained to both defendants,
or just Watkins. It is also unclear whether the case is properly before us on a claim of appeal. Plaintiff’s
amended complaint contained four counts. Count I alleged breach of contract against Watkins; Count
II asserted a statutory construction lien and sought determination of the rights of all parties; Count III
alleged unjust enrichment against LaFarge; and Count IV alleged unjust enrichment and quantum meruit
against Watkins. Count II was dismissed by an order granting partial summary disposition, as was
Count IV. Plaintiff and Watkins resolved their dispute, with the exception of the attorney fee issue,
through proceedings before a special master, and the circuit court entered a partial judgment against
Watkins leaving open the attorney fee issue. The June 17, 1997 opinion and order resolving the attorney
fee issue does not refer to either defendant specifically, but refers to “defendant” rather than
“defendants.” There is no order purporting to dispose of the lien claim. The record does contain a
notice of satisfaction of the partial judgment against Watkins, and a release of lien, but both were filed
after the claim of appeal. Recognizing that the claim of appeal may have been improper, we address the
issues as on leave granted.
-4
2
The contract called for completion of plaintiff’s work by October 7, 1994. On November 16, 1994,
Watkins sent a default notice to plaintiff and, pursuant to its rights under the contract, demanded that
plaintiff remobilize within two days and complete the project. Plaintiff did not remobilize and Watkins
completed plaintiff’s work on its own.
3
The objections appear to have been filed in behalf of both defendants.
4
We further observe that this Court has held that the right to attorney fees is not defeated by payment in
response to a lien foreclosure action. See Bosch v Altman Const Corp, 100 Mich App 289, 296
297; 298 NW2d 725 (1980), (noting that “it would clearly violate the spirit of the mechanics’ lien
statute to permit a lienee to force a lienor to accept payment of a lien claim just before the
commencement of a lien foreclosure trial and thereby avoid a possible assessment for attorney fees,”
and concluding that “a lienor is not required to accept tender of payment after a complaint has been filed
if he wishes to pursue his statutory right to attorney fees.”) When plaintiff first filed this action, the
amount owed under the contract and asserted as a lien amount was $220,500. Defendants tendered
$110,500 of it after the complaint was filed. The balance determined to be owing was later paid in
satisfaction of the partial judgment. Defendants argue that because the lien claim was never adjudicated
and the lien was never foreclosed, fees were not incurred under the Act. However, it was only
defendants’ payment in response to the action that obviated the need for further proceedings to
foreclose the lien.
5
The court shall make clear whether the order entered on remand applies to both defendants or only
one.
-5
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