DAVID BABCOCK V DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID BABCOCK,
UNPUBLISHED
June 18, 1999
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 200992
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 96-083681 AA
STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, and MICHIGAN CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondents-Appellees.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) discharged petitioner for misconduct,
and petitioner filed a grievance. At the subsequent four-step grievance hearing, the hearing officer found
that petitioner had not engaged in misconduct, but had a performance problem that should have been
dealt with through the use of corrective discipline and not dismissal. MDOT appealed. The Michigan
Civil Service Commission Employment Relations Board agreed with the hearing officer that dismissal
was not warranted, although it found that petitioner had engaged in misconduct. MDOT again
appealed, whereupon the Civil Service Commission reinstated petitioner's dismissal. Petitioner then
appealed as of right to the circuit court, which upheld the Civil Service Commission decision. Petitioner
now appeals to this Court by leave granted, and we reverse.
The Civil Service Commission was established by the Michigan Constitution and is charged with
establishing the terms and conditions of employment for those who hold positions in the classified state
civil service. Const 1963, art 11, § 5. The Civil Service Commission is obligated to follow rules that it
has established regarding the terms or conditions of employment in the classified civil service. Battiste v
Dep’t of Social Services, 154 Mich App 486, 493; 398 NW2d 447 (1986). According to § 2-10.3
of the Civil Service Rules:
An employee in the classified service may be dismissed, demoted, or suspended
for any of the following three reasons:
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(a) Failure to carry out the duties and obligations imposed by these rules and
by agency management.
(b) Conduct unbecoming a state employee.
(c) Unsatisfactory service.
The circuit court succinctly stated the actions that led to petitioner's dismissal as follows:
The discrepancies included three incidents between December 2nd of 1993 and
June 14th of '94 where petitioner failed to report personal mileage; four incidents
between November 1st, 1993, and January 18th, 1994, where petitioner wasted state
time by failing to properly plan his travels between the Alpena office, his home, and
other work sites; and eight of nine travel reports were submitted one to eight weeks
late.
While both the hearing officer and the employment relations board rejected MDOT's decision
to dismiss petitioner for the above misconduct, the Civil Service Commission reinstated petitioner's
dismissal and the circuit court affirmed. The circuit court's review was limited to determining whether
the administrative action was authorized by law and the decision was supported "by competent, material
and substantial evidence" when reviewing the record as a whole. Boyd v Civil Service Comm’n, 220
Mich App 226, 232; 559 NW2d 342 (1996). Substantial evidence is defined as being "more than a
scintilla of evidence, although it may be substantially less than a preponderance of the evidence." Great
Lakes Div of National Steel Corp v Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379, 388; 576 NW2d 667 (1998). The
word "substantial" means "evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support the
conclusion." Id. at 389.
We review the circuit court’s direct review of the administrative agency’s action to determine
“whether the lower court applied the correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended or grossly
misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency’s factual findings.” Boyd, supra at 234.
This latter standard is indistinguishable from the clearly erroneous standard of review
that has been widely adopted in Michigan jurisprudence. As defined in numerous other
contexts, a finding is clearly erroneous when, on review of the whole record, this Court
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. [Id. at 234
235.]
Petitioner first contends that the circuit court grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test
where it concluded that petitioner had engaged in intentional misconduct. We disagree. In affirming the
Civil Service Commission conclusion that petitioner "knowingly and intentionally engaged in
misconduct", the circuit court stated:
Petitioner further argues that the Commission's decision must be reversed
because the record did not support the finding that he committed intentional misconduct.
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As noted, petitioner asserted from the outset of this matter that the second set of
discrepancies were due to his interpretation of the Department's policies or an oversight.
However, the Court is of the opinion that through the 1993 audit settlement
process and following petitioner was adequately apprised of the Department policies.
Additionally, there is no evidence that if petitioner was uncertain of the policies,
that he contacted his supervisors for clarification before he submitted the reports for
which he was disciplined.
At the hearing petitioner omitted from his testimony his interpretation of the
policies. And he failed to explain how his interpretation differed from that of the
Department. Instead he testified that he had no intent to defraud his employer.
In light of this situation, and in viewing the entire record, the Court is satisfied
that the Commission's finding of intentional misconduct was supported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence.
There was evidence on the record that petitioner was aware, following the 1993 audit report
and subsequent resolution of his grievance over MDOT’s claim for past personal mileage, that his prior
practices with regard to record keeping and mileage allocation would no longer be acceptable.
Although petitioner claims that he had generally asked for clarification of the reporting rules, there was
no evidence on the record that he asked for assistance or clarification when filing the reports for which
he was disciplined. Petitioner argues that the reporting requirements were ambiguous. However, he
was provided with MDOT operating instructions regarding the proper method of reporting mileage.
And, while there was evidence that petitioner had questions about how to apply those policies, there
was ample evidence that he took great effort to avoid any personal financial burden that he might
incidentally incur if he followed the proper reporting rules and utilized his assigned state vehicle in the
most logical manner. Thus, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the Civil Service
Commission conclusion. In light of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the circuit court grossly
misapplied the substantial evidence test in affirming that petitioner had engaged in intentional misconduct.
Petitioner next argues that the circuit court applied incorrect legal principles when it affirmed
petitioner's dismissal even though the dismissal was made by MDOT without first considering
progressive discipline. We agree.
In Battiste, supra, the petitioner was dismissed by the Department of Social Services (DSS)
for conduct unbecoming a state employee and failure to carry out the duties and obligations of his office.
The dismissal was in response to one incident wherein the petitioner and his supervisor conflicted over a
policy implemented by the director of the DSS. The petitioner had previously served the DSS for
numerous years without incident. The hearing officer, the Employment Relations Board, and the Civil
Service Commission itself affirmed the petitioner's dismissal. The circuit court, however, held that under
the circumstances, dismissal was inappropriate. A panel of this Court affirmed the decision of the circuit
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court. Id. at 492-495. This Court noted that progressive discipline may be utilized at the discretion of
the Civil Service Commission. Id. at 493. It then concluded:
A single incident of misconduct may be so gross and egregious as to warrant
dismissal. However, where an employee's previous record is unblemished, we believe
that a department's failure to consider progressive discipline renders its decision-making
arbitrary. . . . This Court does not second guess departmental decision-making.
Nonetheless, where an agency has the discretion to act in a certain manner, this Court
must see that the discretion is exercised where appropriate, and not abused in the
process of its exercise.
To the extent the record supports an inference that the department ruled out
progressive discipline as a practical alternative because of petitioner's stated intention
not to accede to legitimate authority, we must again conclude that such an exercise of
discretion is arbitrary and capricious. [Id. at 493-494 (emphasis in original).]
In this case, the circuit court was "of the opinion that there is no evidence in the record to
indicate that the Department [MDOT] failed to consider other forms of discipline." We disagree with
the circuit court, and find that the record supports an inference that MDOT did not consider other forms
of discipline at all. Petitioner's supervisor testified that prior to the disciplinary conference, "the
Department [MDOT] had made a decision to terminate Mr. Babcock unless something come [sic] up
during the course of the disciplinary conference, to change that." At the disciplinary conference,
petitioner's supervisor read from a previously prepared document, which informed petitioner of his
termination. This testimony does support an inference that other forms of discipline, short of
termination, were not considered. Petitioner was going to be fired unless he offered some unspecified
mitigating circumstances during the disciplinary conference, at which point lesser discipline might then
presumably have been considered. Where the record supports an inference that MDOT failed to
consider any discipline short of termination and where petitioner was an employee with twenty-seven
years of service and an unblemished record, MDOT's dismissal of petitioner was inappropriate.
Battiste, supra.
In making our ruling, we note that unlike the circuit court, we find that there was no evidence to
support that petitioner's service record was blemished. In fact, during plaintiff's twenty-seven year
tenure, he had never been counseled or disciplined. The fact that petitioner previously engaged in a
grievance proceeding related to reporting his mileage is not evidence that his service record was
anything less than exemplary. The grievance proceeding was not a disciplinary proceeding and while it
put petitioner on notice that his previous reporting was not acceptable and that he was required to and
expected to correct his reports and conform to the reporting rules, it had no disciplinary component to
it. We believe that by its nature, progressive discipline puts an employee on notice that failure to rectify
certain conduct will result in more severe penalties. We agree with the reasoning and rationale in
Battiste that when a change in an employee’s attitude is sought, progressive discipline is “the preferred
method in bringing about that change.” Id. at 494.
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It was clearly erroneous for the circuit court to affirm the Civil Service Commission's decision to
fail to apply the principles set forth in Battiste, supra to this case. There was not substantial evidence in
the record to support that Battiste did not apply, and our review of the whole record leaves us with a
definite and firm conviction that the circuit court erred. For that reason, we reverse the decision of the
circuit court, and remand to the Civil Service Commission for entry of an order affirming the decision of
the Employment Relations Board. The disciplinary order of the Employment Relations Board was
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence on the record.
Petitioner also contends that MDOT’s decision to terminate him, while only issuing a two-week
suspension to his Upper Peninsula counterpart for the same conduct, was improper and that the circuit
court failed to apply the correct legal principle when it upheld the penalty. Petitioner essentially argues
that MDOT had a duty to discipline employees with an equal hand for similar conduct. We note that
while petitioner presented this issue to the circuit court, the circuit court made no comparisons between
petitioner's penalty and the penalty received by petitioner's counterpart or between petitioner's penalty
and the penalties of other civil servants whose cases were pointed out by petitioner. We do not believe,
however, that the circuit court failed to properly apply the law when it decided not to accept plaintiff's
argument. While we agree that the Civil Service Commission has a duty to fairly and equitably treat
employees, we believe that there was substantial evidence in the record to conclude, as did the hearing
officer, that petitioner was not similarly situated to his upper peninsula counterpart. Petitioner's
counterpart received a two week unpaid leave for filing a late set of reports and failing to report
personal mileage on three occasions. This conduct was of a lesser extent and frequency than
petitioner's conduct.
The order of the circuit court, affirming the Civil Service Commission's decision to reinstate
petitioner's dismissal is reversed. Accordingly, we remand to the Civil Service Commission to enter an
order affirming the Employment Relations Board decision. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
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