RICHARD BIGGS V CITY OF JACKSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD BIGGS, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF JAMES
WESLEY RIPPLE, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
June 11, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 211254
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 94-068301 NZ
CITY OF JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Gribbs and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s final judgment and order finding that
defendant violated the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act,1 MCL 37.1302; MSA 3.550(302),
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended, 29 USC 794, and § 202 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12132, and ordering defendant to install a handicap parking sign in front of
plaintiff’s home. We reverse.
Plaintiff purchased his home located at 141 West Mason Street in the City of Jackson in May
1993. At the time he purchased the house, plaintiff had previously tested positive for the human
immunodeficiency virus [HIV]. Although plaintiff had not developed acquired immune deficiency
syndrome [AIDS] at the time of purchase, he suffered from leg pain and dizziness as well as asthma and
shortness of breath. Plaintiff complained that these ailments made it extremely difficult for him to walk
more than thirty to fifty feet without taking a rest. Plaintiff’s difficulty walking long distances eventually
prompted his physician to fit him with a cane and provide him with documentation necessary to obtain a
handicap parking permit.
Defendant’s parking program2 allows for unrestricted, curbside parking throughout the City of
Jackson including West Mason Street where plaintiff resides. The public parking spots on West Mason
Street, including the spot directly in front of plaintiff’s apartment, are accessible to all drivers. A lack of
available parking on plaintiff’s individual property required him to park his vehicle along the street which,
at its closest, was approximately thirty feet from his front door. Shortly after he moved into his house,
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however, plaintiff discovered that the traffic generated by neighboring businesses often made it difficult
for him to find an available parking spot within reasonable walking distance from his home. As a result,
plaintiff twice requested that defendant post a handicap parking sign on the street in front of his home
that would increase his chances of being able to park closer to his home. Defendant refused both of
plaintiff’s requests, despite plaintiff’s offer to pay for the sign. Instead, defendant proposed that a bus
stop be designated in front of plaintiff’s house so that the bus could transport plaintiff, or that plaintiff
pay to have the curb near his house cut down and install a small driveway on what was plaintiff’s
existing front lawn.
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL
37.1302; MSA 3.550(302) [PDCRA], § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12132
[ADA], and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended, 29 USC 794, alleging that defendant
deprived him of an equal opportunity to benefit from its curbside parking program when it refused to
modify its parking policies and install a handicap parking sign in front of his home. Defendant moved for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) on the basis that its refusal to honor
plaintiff’s request was based on safety concerns, and did not have a discriminatory motive or effect.
The trial court dismissed the case finding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of handicap
discrimination under Michigan and federal law.
On appeal, a panel of this Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further
proceedings before a different judge. Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
August 9, 1996 (Docket No. 181678). This Court found that plaintiff had stated claims on which relief
could be granted under both Michigan and federal law, and that factual questions existed which
precluded summary disposition on these claims. Id. at 3-4. Accordingly, summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) was inappropriate, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. Id. at 6.
Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that plaintiff proved handicap discrimination by
defendant under the PDCRA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In particular, the court
found that defendant “violated each of these three acts by not reasonably accommodating Mr. Biggs
and Mr. Ripple when he was alive by not installing the sign at nominal expense.” The court explained
the basis for its ruling as follows:
I don’t think I find that it was a reasonable accommodation to eliminate the parking on
the other side of the street, that disrupts the parking for everybody, the businesses, the
other people that live there. I don’t think I find that that is a reasonable alternative. I
also think in making the streets one way is really much more complex, it affects traffic
patterns, and disrupts what people want to do in the neighborhood and I don’t know
that I would find that that is a reasonable accommodation.
I’m also concerned about if you really have to do the expensive repairs . . . is it 14 or
$15,000 of construction. . . . I think the city could be, you know, required to be doing
lots of modifications to roadway that I tend to think I would find if that much is required
that would not be a reasonable accommodation. But I think they can simply do it and
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put the sign up there. I don’t find - I think it’s marginally affecting the safety and I think
the city should have done that. I think that was unreasonable for the city not to have
complied with that request.
Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and ordered defendant to place a handicap
parking sign on the public street in front of plaintiff’s home.
This case is now before us for the second time. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred
in denying its motion for involuntary dismissal under MCR 2.504(B)(2)3 because plaintiff failed to prove
handicap discrimination by defendant under federal law.
The trial court made factual findings and legal conclusions in its ruling, and therefore, this issue
presents mixed questions of law and fact. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Burt Twp v Dep’t
of Natural Resources, 227 Mich App 252, 255; 576 NW2d 170 (1997). Findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error. Featherstone v Steinhoff, 226 Mich App 584, 588; 575 NW2d 6 (1997).
To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, plaintiff must prove (1) that he is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of
some public entity’s services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by the public
entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of plaintiff’s
disability. 42 USC 12132.; Weinreich v Los Angeles Co Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
114 F3d 976 (CA 9, 1997), cert den ___ US ___; 118 S Ct 423; 139 L Ed2d 324 (1998); Darian v
University of Massachusetts Boston, 980 F Supp 77 (D Mass, 1997).
Defendant contends that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of discrimination under the
ADA because he did not introduce any medical testimony that he had a mobility impairment which
limited his ability to walk long distances, and did not present any evidence that he was a disabled person
who, with or without reasonable accommodations, met the eligibility requirements for participation in the
public program. Defendant’s argument is without merit. Both federal and state courts have determined
that AIDS and the related HIV, symptomatic or asymptomatic, are included within the term “physical or
mental impairment” as used to define a “disability.” 28 CFR 35.104; Hamlyn v Rock Island Co
Metropolitan Mass Transit Dist, 986 F Supp 1126 (CD Ill, 1997); Sanchez v Lagoudakis (After
Remand), 458 Mich 704, 713; 581 NW2d 257 (1998). Given plaintiff’s limited ability to walk,
attributable to the HIV, we are satisfied that he has established a substantial limitation of a major life
activity that renders him a “qualified individual with a disability” under 42 USC 12131(2). In addition,
plaintiff produced a valid Michigan driver’s license, and testified that he o
wned a vehicle and was
capable of driving at the time he made the request for the handicap parking spot. Therefore, we find
that plaintiff met the eligibility requirements for the public parking program.
However, we find no support in the record for the trial court’s finding that plaintiff was denied
the benefits of the public program solely because of his disability. Plaintiff did not produce any evidence
that the alleged discrimination occurred because of his disability. On the other hand, defendant
presented evidence by witnesses found credible by the trial court, that defendant’s refusal to post a
handicap sign was occasioned by safety concerns and attempts to comply with the applicable federal
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regulations, and had no relation whatsoever to defendant’s disability. Because the record is devoid of
any evidence to counter defendant’s position that its decision was not illegally motivated, but instead
motivated by its good faith attempt to comply with the law, we must therefore conclude as a matter of
law that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to prove a cause of action for handicap
discrimination under the ADA.
Similarly, in order to establish a cause of action under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, after
which Title II of the ADA was expressly modeled, plaintiff is required to prove that (1) he is a
handicapped individual; (2) he is “otherwise qualified” for participation in the program; (3) he is being
excluded from participation in or denied benefits or being subjected to discrimination under the program
solely due to a handicap; and (4) the relevant program or activity is receiving federal financial assistance.
29 USC 794; Landefeld v Marion General Hospital, Inc, 994 F2d 1178, 1180-1181 (CA 6, 1993).
The principal distinction between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is that coverage under the
Rehabilitation Act is limited to entities receiving federal financial assistance while the ADA extends to
purely private entities as well. McPherson v Michigan High School Ass’n, Inc, 119 F3d 453 (CA 6,
1997).
For the same reasons that we find plaintiff failed to prove a cause of action under the ADA, we
conclude that he has likewise failed to prove a claim for relief under the Rehabilitation Act. As already
noted, plaintiff’s difficulty walking, attributable to his HIV, renders him a qualified individual with a
disability, who is otherwise eligible to participate in the curbside parking program. However, we find no
support in the record for plaintiff’s allegation that defendant’s refusal to honor his request for a handicap
parking spot was due solely to his disability. As noted above, defendant presented expert testimony
that that its decision to refuse plaintiff’s request was based exclusively on safety concerns and the
mandates of federal regulations, not on plaintiff’s HIV status. Plaintiff did not present any evidence to
rebut defendant’s position, and the trial court expressly stated that it “found all the witnesses credible.”
Given defendant’s uncontroverted evidence that its decision n to post a handicap parking sign was
ot
predicated on nondiscriminatory motives, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action
under the Rehabilitation Act as a matter of law.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that defendant violated the
PDCRA by failing to reasonably accommodate plaintiff’s handicap by posting a handicap parking sign in
front of his residence. We agree. To establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination under the
PDCRA, plaintiff must prove that (1) he is “handicapped” as defined in the statute; (2) the handicap is
unrelated to his ability to use and benefit from a place of public accommodation or service; and (3) he
has been discriminated against in one of the ways set forth in the statute. Rollert v Dep’t of Civil
Service, 228 Mich App 534, 538; 579 NW2d 118 (1998). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for
the action. Id. If the defendant meets the burden of production, the plaintiff must then prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant was a mere pretext.
Id.
First, we reject plaintiff’s contention that the law of the case doctrine precludes this Court from
engaging in a de novo review of this claim of error because a prior panel of this Court, by reversing the
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trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendant and remanding for further proceedings,
already concluded that federal regulations, specifically 28 CFR 35.151, did not preclude posting a
handicap parking sign as a reasonable accommodation.
The law of the case doctrine provides that “if an appellate court has passed on a legal question
and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate
court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain
materially the same.” CAF Investment Co v Saginaw Twp, 410 Mich 428, 454; 302 NW2d 164
(1981); City of Kalamazoo v Dep’t of Corrections (After Remand), 229 Mich App 132, 135; 580
NW2d 475 (1998). Likewise, a trial court may not take any action on remand that is inconsistent with
the judgment of the appellate court. Kalamazoo, supra at 135. Thus, as a general rule, a ruling on a
legal question in the first appeal is binding on all lower tribunals and in subsequent appeals. Id. The law
of the case doctrine applies only to questions specifically decided in the prior decision and to those
questions necessary to the court’s prior determination. Id.
In Docket No. 181678, the first appeal of this case, this Court held that plaintiff had stated
claims for relief under §202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and that fact
questions existed on whether defendant reasonably accommodated plaintiff’s disability or whether the
requested accommodation posed an undue hardship under the PDCRA. When this Court reverses a
case and remands it for a trial because a material issue of fact exists, the law of the case doctrine does
not apply because the first appeal was not decided on the merits. Brown v Drake-Willock, Int’l, Ltd,
209 Mich App 136, 144; 530 NW2d 510 (1995). Thus, the first appeal was not decided on the
merits, and we are not precluded from reviewing this issue. Id.; Borkus v Michigan Nat’l Bank, 117
Mich App 662, 666; 324 NW2d 123 (1982).
Defendant does not directly contest the trial court’s finding that plaintiff established a prima facie
case of discrimination based on disability under the PDCRA. Rather, as noted, defendant contends the
trial court erred by finding that it was a reasonable accommodation for defendant to place a handicap
parking sign on the street in front of plaintiff’s house.
Defendant introduced uncontroverted evidence that federal regulations require that, in order for
handicap parking to be made available on a public street, there must be at least thirteen feet of area
designated for the parking spot -- eight feet for parking and five feet for maneuverability into and from
the parked vehicle. Defendant also introduced uncontroverted evidence that the requisite space for a
handicap parking spot did not exist on West Mason Street, if maintained as a two-way street, and
therefore, a handicap parking spot would be both unsafe and in violation of federal regulations. In the
face of this uncontroverted evidence provided by witnesses, found to be credible by the trial court, we
must conclude that as a matter of law, satisfaction of the reasonable accommodation requirement under
the PDCRA cannot include circumstances which require violations of federal regulations. In this regard,
we find the trial court’s finding clearly erroneous. Hall v Hackley Hosp, 210 Mich App 48, 55-56;
532 NW2d 893 (1995).
Plaintiff introduced no evidence to counter the defendant’s evidence that West Mason Street
was not sufficiently wide to safely designate as a handicap parking space under federal regulations and
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that the posting of such a sign to designate such a space would essentially create a “defective highway”.
Therefore, plaintiff failed to meet his burden to show that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
established by defendant for its refusal to post a handicap sign in front of plaintiff’s house were
pretextual, and judgment in favor of plaintiff was improper.
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff as well as
the order requiring defendant to post the handicap parking sign, and remand for entry of judgment in
favor of defendant and an order dismissing plaintiff’s claims.
Reversed and remanded for action consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
The Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101; MSA 3.550(101), was amended by
PA 1998, No. 20, effective March 12, 1998, and shall now be known and cited as the Persons with
Disabilities Civil Rights Act.
2
Defendant challenges the trial court finding that it runs an actual curbside parking “program”, instead of
simply permitting unrestricted, curbside parking to occur throughout the city. Because the evidence
established the existence of city ordinances which regulate on-street parking, however, for purposes of
this opinion we will simply assume without deciding that such a parking “program” exists.
3
At the close of plaintiff’s presentation of evidence, defendant moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant
to MCR 2.504(B)(2), which provides in pertinent part:
In an action tried without a jury, after the presentation of the plaintiff’s evidence the
defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence if the motion is not granted, may
move for dismissal on the ground that on the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render judgment against the
plaintiff, or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence.
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