PEOPLE OF MI V JIMMY MASS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 11, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204951
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 96-027631 FH
JIMMY MASS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Gribbs and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury of possession of less than twenty-five
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(v). The trial court, applying a
second offense habitual offender enhancement under MCL 333.7413(2); MSA 14.15(7413)(2),
sentenced him to five to eight years’ imprisonment. We affirm, but remand for resentencing.
Defendant first argues that the admission at trial of his statements that he used cocaine, owned
the cocaine in question, and lived in the apartment where the cocaine was found violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. See US Const, Am V, and Const 1963, art 1, § 17. This
Court reviews issues of constitutional law de novo. People v Pitts, 222 Mich App 260, 263; 564
NW2d 93 (1997).
Under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 478; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966),
superceded by statute as applied to federal cases as stated in United States v Dickerson, 166 F3d
667, 691-692 (CA 4, 1999), a statement made to police during a custodial interrogation is admissible in
our state courts only if the defendant was first advised of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Here, it is undisputed that defendant was in custody and that he had not been advised of his Miranda
rights at the time he made the challenged statements. The next inquiry, then, is whether he made the
statements in response to police interrogation. Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 298; 100 S Ct
1682; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980).
In Innis, supra at 301, the United States Supreme Court defined “interrogation” under
Miranda as “any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are
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reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” (footnotes omitted). In the instant
case, one of the arresting officers, before advising defendant of his Miranda rights, asked defendant if
he owned the cocaine that they found in his apartment, and defendant responded that he did.
Defendant's statement regarding his ownership of the cocaine was in direct response to a question by
the police – a question that the officer should have known was likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Therefore, defendant made the challenged statement while subject to police interrogation, id., and the
statement should not have been admitted at trial. Defendant's statement that he used cocaine, however,
was not responsive to any police questioning and was therefore admissible as a volunteered statement.
See Miranda, supra at 478. Also admissible was defendant's statement that he lived in the apartment
where the cocaine was found, since defendant made the statement at police headquarters in response to
“routine booking questions,” which are not covered by Miranda. Pennsylvania v Muniz, 496 US
582, 601; 110 S Ct 2638; 110 L Ed 2d 528 (1990).
Since we have determined that defendant's cocaine ownership statement was erroneously
admitted, we must next determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 482; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). If there is a reasonable possibility that
the statement influenced the jury’s decision to convict, the error cannot be deemed harmless. People v
Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 404-407; 521 NW2d 538 (1994). We conclude that
there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneously-admitted statement affected the outcome of the
case. Disregarding the statement, the following evidence of defendant's guilt properly came out at trial:
(1) defendant resided in the apartment where the cocaine was found; (2) the cocaine was found
underneath defendant's shirt and next to defendant's wallet on a chair in the apartment; (3) defendant's
wallet contained a razor blade with off-white residue on it; and (4) defendant admitted that he was a
cocaine user. In light of this strong evidence of guilt, defendant's statement that he owned the cocaine
could not reasonably have affected the jury’s verdict, and we therefore decline to reverse defendant’s
conviction despite the error in admitting the statement. See Anderson, supra at 406.
Next, defendant argues that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because (1) his
trial attorney did not move to suppress defendant's statements that he owned the cocaine in question
and that he used cocaine, and (2) the attorney introduced evidence of defendant's prior drug-related
convictions at trial and emphasized this criminal history in closing arguments. Because defendant did not
raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court, our review is limited to mistakes that
are apparent on the record. People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 181; 577 NW2d 903 (1998). To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that the attorney’s performance
was objectively unreasonable in light of the prevailing professional norms, and (2) that but for the
attorney’s error or errors, a different outcome could reasonably have resulted. People v Stanaway,
446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Moreover, there is a presumption that the
attorney’s actions constituted sound trial strategy. Id.
We disagree that defendant’s trial attorney acted unreasonably in failing to move to suppress
defendant's statement that he used cocaine, since, as discussed supra, this statement was properly
admitted at trial. We agree, however, that the attorney acted unreasonably in failing to move to
suppress defendant's statement that he owned the cocaine in question. The attorney should have
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realized that defendant made the statement in response to police interrogation while in police custody
and that the statement was therefore inadmissible. However, because the admission of the statement
did not affect the outcome of the trial, as explained supra, the attorney’s error did not deprive
defendant of the effective assistance of counsel and does not require reversal of his conviction. See
Stanaway, supra at 687-688.
With regard to the trial attorney’s elicitation of defendant's history of drug-related crime, we
conclude, contrary to the prosecution’s argument, that it cannot be justified as sound trial strategy. The
attorney’s closing argument made clear that his purpose in eliciting this information was to try to impeach
the investigating officers’ testimony regarding defendant's alleged confession by suggesting to the jury
that an “experienced, cocaine-using criminal” such as his client would not have told the police that he
owned the cocaine in question. However, if the attorney had moved to suppress the cocaine-ownership
statement prior to trial and if the trial court had properly granted the motion, the attorney would not have
had to portray defendant as an experienced criminal in order to counteract the believability of the
statement, since the statement would not have been admitted. Conversely, if the attorney had moved to
suppress the statement and if the trial court had erroneously denied the motion, the elicitation of
defendant's prior drug-use history would have been justified as sound trial strategy, i.e., as a way to
counteract the trial court’s erroneous ruling. We decline, however, to view the elicitation as sound trial
strategy when the attorney did not first move to suppress the cocaine-ownership statement.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the attorney’s objectively unreasonable behavior did not affect the
outcome of the trial, given the strong, untainted evidence of defendant's guilt, as discussed supra.
Accordingly, reversal is not warranted. See Stanaway, supra at 687-688.
Next, defendant argues that he must be resentenced because (1) after originally ordering that
defendant's sentence be served concurrently with a sentence defendant was serving in an unrelated case,
the trial court sua sponte and erroneously changed the sentence to run consecutively to the unrelated
sentence, without conducting a resentencing hearing; (2) the trial court did not resolve a dispute
regarding a statement in the presentence investigation report; (3) the trial court based defendant's
sentence solely on its potential to deter other offenders; and (4) the trial court denied defendant his right
of allocution at the sentencing hearing. Whether the trial court followed the proper procedure in
sentencing defendant is a question of law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. People v
Conner, 209 Mich App 419, 423; 531 NW2d 734 (1995).
We disagree that the trial court denied defendant his right of allocution at sentencing as
guaranteed under MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c), since the court, before imposing the sentence, specifically
asked if defendant had anything to say. Although defendant apparently did not verbally respond to this
inquiry, the question itself satisfied the requirement of MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c). People v Lugo, 214 Mich
App 699, 711-712; 542 NW2d 921 (1995). We also disagree that the court based defendant's
sentence solely on its potential value as a deterrent to others. The record reveals that the court
considered additional factors, such as defendant's status as a repeat offender, in imposing the sentence.
Accordingly, the court did not act unlawfully, even though it may have heavily relied on the deterrence
factor. See People v Van Epps, 59 Mich App 277, 286; 229 NW2d 414 (1975) (a court may base a
sentence primarily on its deterrence value, as long as other factors are also considered).
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The trial court did err, however, in failing to resolve the dispute regarding a statement contained
in defendant's presentence investigation report. After defendant challenged the statement, the trial judge
indicated that he found the dispute irrelevant because defendant's sentence – whether he factored in the
challenged statement or not – would be subsumed by a longer, concurrent sentence for an unrelated
offense. However, MCR 6.425 specifically states that upon a challenge to information in a presentence
investigation report, a court “
must make a finding with respect to the challenge or determine that a
finding is unnecessary because it will not take the challenged information into account in sentencing”
(emphasis added). Here, the court did neither of these things. Accordingly, a remand for resentencing
is necessary. People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 536; 462 NW2d 793 (1990). On remand, if the
court accepts defendant's challenge to the information or deems it irrelevant by concluding that the
information will not be considered, the information shall be stricken from the presentence investigation
report. See MCL 771.14(5); MSA 28.1144(5) and People v Britt, 202 Mich App 714, 718; 509
NW2d 914 (1993).
The trial court committed an additional error by changing defendant’s sentence to run
consecutively with another, unrelated sentence without first conducting a resentencing hearing. As this
Court held in People v Thomas, 223 Mich App 9, 11-12, 17-18; 566 NW2d 13 (1997), a conversion
from concurrent to consecutive sentences requires a resentencing hearing. Because the prosecution
admits that the trial court erred in ordering defendant's sentence to run consecutively with the unrelated
sentence and agrees that the sentences should instead run concurrently, we are authorized under People
v Alexander, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 207444, issued 4/2/99), slip op, p 6,
to simply order that the judgment of sentence be amended to reflect concurrent sentences. We decline
to do so, however, given that the dispute surrounding the presentence investigation report requires a full
resentencing hearing nonetheless and given the prosecution’s intimation that defendant's sentence should
run consecutively to two additional unrelated sentences. On resentencing, the trial court shall determine
whether defendant's sentence should run concurrently with or consecutively to defendant's three
unrelated sentences and shall change the judgment of sentence accordingly.
Affirmed, but remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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