TOPPS CO INC V DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TOPPS COMPANY, INC,
UNPUBLISHED
June 11, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 203495
Court of Claims
LC No. 96-016324 CM
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Saad and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right a Court of Claims order denying its motion for reconsideration of an
order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
I
Prior to 1993, the Department of Treasury did not assess taxes under the Single Business Tax
Act (SBTA), MCL 208.1 et seq.; MSA 7.558(1) et seq., unless the taxpayer’s business activities had
a sufficient nexus with the state of Michigan pursuant to PL 86-272, codified at 15 USC 381. Syntex
Laboratories v Dep’t of Treasury, 233 Mich App 286, 288; __ NW2d __ (1998). In Gillette Co v
Dep’t of Treasury, 198 Mich App 303; 497 NW2d 595 (1993), this Court held that PL 86-272 did
not apply to taxes imposed under the SBTA, and that the proper test is the Due Process/Commerce
Clause test set forth in Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 US 298; 112 S Ct 1904; 119 L Ed 2d 91
(1992). In accordance with the Gillette decision, defendant determined that plaintiff was liable for the
SBT for fiscal years 1990-1993.1 Defendant paid the assessment under protest, but filed a complaint in
the Court of Claims for return of the money. Applying Gillette retroactively, the Court of Claims
granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff now appeals.
II
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously gave retroactive application to this Court’s 1993
decision. This Court has already held that Gillette is properly applied retroactively. Syntex, supra,
233 Mich App 292-293.
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III
Plaintiff further argues that defendant should be estopped from collecting past single business
taxes. We disagree.
Estoppel arises when “a party, by representations, admissions, or silence intentionally or
negligently induces another party to believe facts, the other party justifiably relies and acts on that belief,
and the other party will be prejudiced if the first party is allowed to deny the existence of those facts.”
Westfield Companies v Grand Valley Health Plan, 224 Mich App 385, 390-391; 568 NW2d 854
(1997). Here, plaintiff paid taxes under the SBTA in fiscal years 1990 and 1991, before Michigan
collected this tax from businesses in plaintiff’s circumstances. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot now argue
reliance on defendant’s prior position. Additionally, defendant never misrepresented facts; rather it
asserted a legal position that was subsequently deemed contrary to Michigan law. Furthermore,
defendant’s representation of the law was neither intentional nor negligent. Rather, its position was
based on a good-faith understanding of Michigan law. See Adams v Detroit, 232 Mich App 701,
708; __ NW2d __ (1998), holding that “[e]quitable estoppel arises where one party has knowingly
concealed or falsely represented a material fact, while inducing another's reasonable reliance on that
misapprehension, under circumstances where the relying party would suffer prejudice if the representing
or concealing party were subsequently to assume a contrary position.”
Additionally, estoppel is inapplicable because defendant did not change its position regarding
plaintiff’s immunity from taxation under the SBTA, but rather was required by this Court to change its
policy. Defendant’s reliance on In re D’Amico Estate, 435 Mich 551; 460 NW2d 198 (1990), is
misplaced. In D’Amico, the Treasury Department first changed its position, and later had its change
endorsed by the courts. Id., 559 n 11. Thus, the Department changed its position before being
required to do so pursuant to a court order. Id., 564. Conversely, in this case, defendant changed its
position only after it was forced to do so by an order of this Court. Gillette, supra, 198 Mich App
311. Estoppel therefore does not apply.
IV
Finally, plaintiff contends that defendant’s retroactive application of the due process/commerce
clause test violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause, US Const, Am V,
XIV. We disagree.
The Supreme Court has held that retroactive application of a tax does not violate due process
simply because taxable events transpired before the taxing statute was passed. In Welch v Henry, 305
US 134; 59 S Ct 121; 83 L Ed 87 (1938), the Supreme Court stated:
[t]he objection chiefly urged to the taxing statute is that it is a denial of due process of
law because in 1935 it imposed a tax on income received in 1933. But a tax is not
necessarily unconstitutional because retroactive. . . . Taxation is neither a penalty
imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of
apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged
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to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from
that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process, and to
challenge the present tax it is not enough to point out that the taxable event, the receipt
of income, antedated the statute. [Welch, supra, 305 US 146-147 (citations omitted).]
More recently, the United States Supreme Court held in United States v Carlton, 512 US 26;
129 L Ed 2d 22; 114 S Ct 2018 (1994), that a retroactive amendment to a tax statute did not violate
due process where the retroactive period was of reasonable length (slightly more than one year) and
where the government’s purpose was neither illegitimate nor arbitrary. Id., 32-33. In Carlton, the
executor of a decedent’s estate challenged an amendment which restricted the availability of an estate
tax deduction. The executor of a decedent’s estate had engaged in a particular transaction for the sole
purpose of taking advantage of the deduction. Id., 28-29. The Court rejected the executor’s due
process argument, noting that there was “no plausible contention that Congress acted with an improper
motive, as by targeting estate representatives such as Carlton after deliberately inducing them to engage”
in the transactions at issue. Id., 32. The Court further noted that the executor’s reliance, by itself, was
insufficient to establish a constitutional violation because “[t]ax legislation is not a promise, and a
taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code.” Id., 33. Finally, the Court stated that the
executor’s lack of notice regarding the amendment was not dispositive because “a taxpayer ‘should be
regarded as taking his chances of any increase in the tax burden which might result from carrying out the
established policy of taxation.’” Id., 34, quoting Milliken v United States, 283 US 15, 23; 51 S Ct
324; 75 L Ed 809 (1931).
Relying on Carlton, the Third Circuit held in Tate & Lyle, Inc v Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Service, 87 F3d 99 (CA 3, 1996), that a retroactive application of a tax regulation did not
violate the Due Process Clause although the six-year retroactive application period was longer than that
contemplated by Carlton. Id., 107. The Court found that Carlton was distinguishable because
“Carlton involved the retroactive application of a statute, and here we are dealing with the retroactive
application of a regulation.” Id. (emphasis in original).
In the case before us, we find no basis for plaintiff’s contention that the retroactive application of
Gillette violated due process. There is no indication that defendant’s conduct in collecting back SBTA
taxes was arbitrary or capricious. Additionally, the circumstances here present a less compelling case
against retroactive application. Carlton involved retroactive application of a statutory amendment; Tate
& Lyle, a regulation. Here, the SBTA has been in existence throughout the relevant period; only the
interpretation of that statute is being applied retroactively. Accordingly, we find no due process
violation in the retroactive application of Gillette, notwithstanding lack of notice or plaintiff’s alleged
reliance.
Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Plaintiff cites Welch, supra, 305 US
134, and United States v Hemme, 476 US 558; 106 S Ct 2071; 90 L Ed 2d 538 (1986), and then
states that
[c]learly, Topps could not have altered its behavior to avoid incurring SBT under the
Gillette jurisdictional standard because it could not have anticipated application of the
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Gillette standard prior to Gillette. Second, tax should not be retroactively applied if
the taxpayer did not have notice of the tax when the taxpayer engaged in the
transaction.
Plaintiff refers to a “transaction” because it relies on a case involving gift taxes, wherein a
specific gift was made and taxed two years later on the death of the donor. Hemme, supra, 476 US
563. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the analysis applicable to gift taxes, which
might affect vested rights, is not the same analysis to be applied to other taxes, which generally do not
affect vested rights:
In the cases in which [the Supreme] Court has held invalid the taxation of gifts made
and completely vested before the enactment of the taxing statute, decision was rested
on the ground that the nature or amount of the tax could not reasonably have been
anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular voluntary act which the statute
later made the taxable event. [Welch, supra, 305 US 147 (emphasis added).]
The case at bar does not involve a gift tax; therefore, plaintiff’s reliance on the Hemme case is
misplaced.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
1
Plaintiff paid the SBT in 1990 and 1991, though it later sought return of that money.
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