LYNDA L HEATHSCOTT V NBD BANK
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LYNDA L. HEATHSCOTT, f/k/a LYNDA L.
McLEOD,
UNPUBLISHED
June 8, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 206575
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 96-014236 CZ
NBD BANK,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Markman, P.J., and Hoekstra and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order denying her motion for partial summary
disposition and granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
We affirm.
The dispute in this case centers on whether loan proceeds disbursed by defendant to plaintiff ’s
former husband, Timothy McLeod, were secured by a valid mortgage on their marital residence.
Plaintiff and McLeod graduated from law school together in 1978, were married in February 1980, and
divorced in 1990. In 1980, they bought a house, giving a first mortgage to the purchase money lender.
Subsequently, through McLeod’s representation of defendant, he developed a working relationship with
employees of defendant, including Charles Hartley, an NBD Loan Officer. On March 5, 1987, plaintiff
and McLeod borrowed $7,500 from defendant, which defendant secured by taking a second mortgage
on their house.
The gravamen of this case concerns a subsequent transaction through w
hich the outstanding
balance of the 1987 loan was rolled into a new loan and $20,000 in new money was advanced to
McLeod and purportedly secured by a new second mortgage on the same property. This mortgage is
dated November 11, 1988. According to plaintiff, McLeod forged her signature on these 1988 loan
documents without her knowledge or consent. Defendant’s employees purported to witness and
notarize the transaction, when they admittedly did not observe plaintiff sign any documents. Further, a
$20,000 cashier’s check made payable only to McLeod was used to disburse the new money
associated with this transaction.
-1
Plaintiff contended that she was unaware of the 1988 loan and mortgage until October, 1995.
However, sometime on or after November 11, 1988, plaintiff signed a document entitled “Mortgage
Amendment” which specifically referenced the 1988 mortgage.1 As with the 1988 mortgage, the
mortgage amendment offered the marital home as security for any past or future loans advanced by
defendant. The mortgage amendment, which was recorded March 16, 1990, stated that it amended the
November 11, 1988, mortgage as follows:
To secure the repayment on or before five years from the date hereof such sums of
money as mortgagee may have heretofore advanced or may hereinafter advance to
mortgagor up to the maximum sum of FORTY FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE AND 23/100.
The mortgage amendment further provided that “All other terms and conditions of the original mortgage
will remain in full force and effect.” The November 11, 1988, mortgage defined the mortgagor as
“Timothy McLeod and Lydia McLeod, jointly and severally.” No funds were given to McLeod or
plaintiff in conjunction with the execution of the mortgage amendment.
On June 1, 1990, at McLeod’s request, defendant released plaintiff from personal liability on
the 1988 loan that was secured by the mortgage on the marital home. The mortgage, however,
remained on the marital home. On July 12, 1990, as part of their divorce agreement, McLeod
conveyed his interest in the marital home to plaintiff, under terms by which it would be reconveyed to
him if he paid off or refinanced certain debts within five years. If he failed to do so, his possession and
right to reconveyance would be forfeited. Defendant was aware that McLeod did not hold title to an
ownership interest in the home and that his right to have title conveyed to him was subject to
defeasance. On April 12, 1991, defendant rolled McLeod’s debt into a new loan and advanced him an
additional $11,000. On July 6, 1992, defendant further advanced McLeod the sum of $25,735 and
took an additional mortgage from him on the marital property even though McLeod at that time held
only a contingent right of reconveyance.2
In 1995, McLeod was ordered to surrender possession of the house to plaintiff and McLeod’s
right to reconveyance was lost. On May 2, 1996, plaintiff filed her complaint seeking discharge of all
liens and mortgages on the marital home claimed by defendant. While this action was pending, plaintiff
secured a buyer for the marital home. Because the validity of defendant’s liens remained in dispute, the
parties agreed that plaintiff would escrow sums from the sale of the home until the issue was resolved.
Plaintiff moved for partial summary disposition arguing that defendant was not entitled to any of
the escrowed funds because: (1) the 1988 mortgage transaction was unenforceable under the statute of
frauds, MCL 566.108; MSA 26.908; (2) the 1988 mortgage transaction was void or voidable because
it resulted from a fraud on plaintiff in which defendant participated; and (3) even if the 1988 mortgage
was enforceable, all of the debt which it secured had been paid. Defendant brought a counter-motion
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that plaintiff had ratified the 1988
mortgage by signing the 1990 mortgage amendment. The trial court denied plaintiff ’s motion for partial
summary disposition but granted defendant’s counter-motion.
-2
This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v
Transportation Dep’t, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); Kuhn v Secretary of State, 228
Mich App 319, 323; 579 NW2d 101 (1998). On a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), “[t]he court
considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted
or filed in the action to determine whether a genuine issue of any material fact exists to warrant a trial.”
Spiek, supra. All reasonable inferences are resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor. Bertrand v Alan
Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 617-618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).
I.
First, with respect to whether the statute of frauds invalidated the mortgage transaction, we
agree with the trial court that plaintiff ’s voluntary signing of the mortgage amendment, which made
specific reference to the 1988 mortgage, resolved any dispute regarding compliance with the statute of
frauds. A mortgage is a security interest in real property and thus, its conveyance is subject to the
provisions of the statute of frauds as it applies to transactions involving interests in land. MCL 566.106;
MSA 26.906, MCL 566.108; MSA 26.908; Schultz v Schultz, 117 Mich App 454, 457; 324 NW2d
48 (1982). “All owners of jointly held property must sign a contract conveying an interest in the
property; the absence of a signature by a co-owner renders the contract void.” Forge v Smith, 458
Mich 198, 206; 580 NW2d 876 (1998). Further, “contracts conveying an interest in land made by an
agent having no written authority are invalid under the statute of frauds unless ratified by the principal.”
Id. at 208-209.
Without written authorization to sign on his wife’s behalf, McLeod could not satisfy the statute
of frauds by signing his wife’s name as her agent. Hence, absent a distinct act of ratification by plaintiff,
the 1988 mortgage would be void. Id. at 208-209. In this case, however, there was a distinct act of
ratification; the execution of a document that referenced the questionably executed writing and which,
when read together with it, satisfied the statute of frauds. When “one writing references another
instrument for additional contract terms, the two writings should be read together.” Forge, supra. at
207. Therefore, whether viewed as the written ratification of an act by plaintiff ’s agent, or as a
document which itself satisfied the statute of frauds and incorporated the earlier mortgage document by
reference, the mortgage amendment served to resolve any issue concerning the enforceability of the
1988 mortgage under the statute of frauds.
We find no merit in plaintiff’s claim that the mortgage could not be ratified as a matter of law
because it was procured through defendant’s fraud. Ratification is prohibited as a matter of law only
where the substance of the contract at issue is violative of established public policy or the criminal law.
We find this conclusion consistent with our Supreme Court’s articulation of the purpose underlying the
statute of frauds:
We think the purpose of the statute is important in determining whether certain contracts
may be ratified. If the law prohibits a contract under criminal penalty or as a matter of
general public policy or specifically denies the right to make it, of course it could not be
legalized by ratification. But, where the purpose of the statute is civil, to prevent
fraud, to fix the rights only of contracting parties, and the invalidity is not in the
-3
subject-matter of the agreement but merely in the manner of execution, there is
no good reason for denying right of ratification through subsequent observance of
the statutory requirements. If, finally, the contract is adopted or the authority of the
agent confirmed, in writing, the statutory requirements are observed, and ratification
amounts to no more than completing execution of the contract which before hand had
not been fully executed. [Fine Arts Corporation v Kuchins Furniture Mfg Co, 269
Mich 277, 282; 257 NW2d 822 (1934) (emphasis added).]3
II
Also without merit is plaintiff’s allegation that the 1988 mortgage is void as a product of fraud in
the inducement and/or execution. The mortgage amendment executed by plaintiff specifically provided:
This agreement, made November 11, 1988, between Timothy R. McLeod* and Lynda
L. McLeod, hereinafter referred to as “the Mortgagor”, whose address is 5628
Cathedral, Saginaw, MI 48603, and NBD SAGINAW, a Michigan Banking
Corporation, hereinafter referred to as “Mortgagee”, whose address is 1156 N.
Niagara Street, Saginaw, MI 48602, amends the Mortgage dated November 11, 1988
and recorded in Liber 1735, Page 1455, to read as follows:
* married man
To secure the repayment on or before five years from the date hereof such sums of
money as Mortgagee may have heretofore advanced or may hereinafter advance to
Mortgagor up to the maximum sum of FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE AND 32/100 ($44,175.32).
All other terms and conditions of the original mortgage will remain in full force and
effect. The property is described as follows:
Lot 80, Mission Park, according to the Plat thereof recorded in Liber 21, Pages 33 and
34 of Plats, Saginaw County Records.
By this mortgage amendment, not only was plaintiff put on notice of the existence of the 1988 mortgage,
she affirmed the encumbrance on the marital home in this new agreement which, while incorporating the
terms of the 1988 mortgage, also included new and different terms. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that any claim of fraud in the inducement or execution of the 1988 mortgage was waived by
plaintiff’s subsequent acts. See, e.g., Zounes v Dassios, 233 Mich 651, 653; 207 NW 868 (1926).
Plaintiff’s position that she thought that the reference to the 1988 mortgage, was actually to the
original February, 1987, mortgage of which she was aware, would not yield a different result. In Scholz
v Montgomery Ward & Co, 437 Mich 83, 92; 468 NW2d 845 (1991), the Supreme Court noted that
it is well settled that the failure of a party to obtain an explanation of a contract is ordinary negligence
which estops the party from avoiding t e contract on the ground that the party was ignorant of the
h
contract provisions. The Court further recognized that:
-4
[t]he stability of written instruments demands that a person who executes one shall
know its contents or be chargeable with such knowledge. If he cannot read, he should
have a reliable person read it to him. His failure to do so is negligence which estops him
from voiding the instrument on the ground that he was ignorant of its contents, in the
absence of circumstances fairly excusing his failure to inform himself. Sponseller v
Kimball, 246 Mich 255, 260; 224 NW 359 (1929). [Id.]
In this case, plaintiff was a sophisticated party to the transaction who was charged with the knowledge
of the contents of the contract she signed.4
III
Finally, we reject plaintiff’s alternative argument that the debt associated with the 1988
mortgage was paid in full and therefore discharged. Plaintiff relies upon the following facts. Loan
closing documents associated with the November 11, 1988, loan and mortgage indicated that of the
$25,700 loaned, defendant retained approximately $5,700 as payment in full of the balance on the
original loan in 1987 of $7,500. Plaintiff then contends that as a result of a similar transaction in April,
1991, whereby additional sums were loaned, the loan associated with the 1988 mortgage was similarly
“paid off.” This type of transaction apparently occurred again in 1992. In essence, existing loan
balances were rolled into new and larger loans. The flaw in plaintiff’s argument is that she uses the
terms “loan” and “mortgage” synonymously. However, a mortgage is an independent encumbrance on
real property. The discharge of a mortgage is dictated by its terms; not necessarily by the terms of any
loan document that may have been executed simultaneously with the mortgage. By the very language of
the mortgage amendment, plaintiff agreed to encumber the marital home to secure “such sums of money
as Mortgagee may have heretofore advanced or may hereafter advance to Mortgagor u to the
p
maximum sum of FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE AND
32/100.”
We also reject plaintiff’s claim that the mortgage did not secure the loan made in April, 1991,
because the loan proceeds were payable to Timothy McLeod and not plaintiff. The November 11,
1988, mortgage defined “the mortgagor” as “Timothy McLeod and Lynda McLeod, jointly and
severally.” The mortgage amendment executed by plaintiff on February 27, 1990, incorporated by
reference this definition of “mortgagor.” Thus, this mortgage secured loans advanced to Timothy
McLeod, plaintiff or both. Simply put, plaintiff contractually agreed that the marital home would secure
future loans. It is legally irrelevant that the mortgage secured money advanced only to Timothy McLeod
well after the 1988 mortgage was executed and/or ratified by plaintiff. Plaintiff agreed that the marital
home would be available to secure such future loans. Therefore, we find without merit plaintiff’s
argument that the loan relative to the 1988 mortgage was paid in full.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
-5
1
The document entitled “Mortgage Amendment” was purportedly made November 11, 1988, but was
not notarized until February 27, 1990. For ease of reference, this document shall be referenced
throughout this opinion as the “mortgage amendment.”
2
The trial court did not premise its grant of summary disposition to defendant upon the July 6, 1992
mortgage executed by McLeod.
3
The substance of the contract at issue in this case relates to a mortgage. Mortgaging real estate does
not violate Michigan law or public policy. Plaintiff objects to the manner in which the contract was
executed. However, plaintiff must be held accountable for the written mortgage amendment that she
freely and voluntarily signed. Scholz v Montgomery Ward & Co, 437 Mich 83, 92; 468 NW2d 845
(1991).
4
Plaintiff also argues that defendant’s judgment must be vacated because it is premised upon equity and
the doctrine of unclean hands bars defendant from invoking equity. We do not agree that defendant has
invoked equitable principles to sustain its case. Defendant relies upon a written document, signed by
plaintiff, which incorporates by reference and expressly ratifies the prior mortgage document The
documents satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Equity simply is not the basis for
defendant’s judgment.
-6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.