JOSIE BELL MOORE V SARAH CHRISTIAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOSIE BELL MOORE,
UNPUBLISHED
June 8, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206218
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-612461 NO
SARAH CHRISTIAN and
WARREN CHRISTIAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Gage and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right from an amended final judgment in favor of plaintiff following a
jury trial in this premises liability action. We vacate the amended final judgment and remand for entry of
a judgment of no cause of action.
Defendants first contend that the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that plaintiff
was an invitee when she fell in the basement of defendants’ home. For purposes of this appeal, we
need not address this issue. Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff occupied the status of an invitee on
defendants’ property, defendants are still entitled to summary disposition.
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to grant their motion for directed verdict
because plaintiff failed to adduce evidence to establish that defendants knew or should have known of
the existence of the alleged defects that caused plaintiff’s fall. In deciding if the trial court erred in
denying a motion for a directed verdict, we review the evidence and all legitimate inferences that may be
drawn in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hunt v Freeman, 217 Mich App 92, 98-99;
550 NW2d 817 (1996). Directed verdicts are generally viewed with disfavor in negligence cases. Id.
at 99. If reasonable jurors could honestly have reached different conclusions, neither the trial court nor
this Court may substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Id.
In light of our assumption that plaintiff was an invitee on defendants’ property at the time of her
accident, the following discussion of premises liability is instructive:
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The occupier [of land] is not an insurer of the safety of invitees, and his duty is
only to exercise reasonable care for their protection. He must not only warn the visitor
of dangers of which he knows, but must also inspect the premises to discover possible
defects. There is no liability, however, for harm resulting from conditions from which no
unreasonable risk was to be anticipated, or those which the occupier did not know and
could not have discovered with reasonable care. The mere existence of a defect or
danger is not enough to establish liability, unless it is shown to be of such a character or
of such duration that the jury may reasonably conclude that due care would have
discovered it. [Kroll v Katz, 374 Mich 364, 373; 132 NW2d 27 (1965), quoting
Prosser, Torts (2d ed), p 459 (emphasis in original).]
Here, there is no evidence that defendants knew or should have known of the existence of the
defective floor tile at the time of plaintiff’s accident. Plaintiff admitted that she did not notice the tile
before she fell, and that she did not know how long the tile had been defective. Rather, she only noticed
after she fell that the tile was loose, scattered in different pieces, and that the ends of the tile were
chipped off. Because absolutely no evidence established the length of time that the tile had been
defective, there was no basis for the jury to infer that the tile had been defective for a sufficient period of
time to provide constructive notice of the defect to defendants. Moreover, there was nothing about the
character of the defective tile to establish that defendants knew or should have known of its existence.
Plaintiff presented no evidence, such as expert testimony, to establish that there was some correlation
between the ease with which the tile slipped and the length of time that the tile had been loose. Also,
contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, there was no evidence that a water problem in the basement caused
the tile to deteriorate. It should be noted that plaintiff has also claimed that a plastic toy was involved in
her fall and that the toy was a defect. There is, again, no evidence that defendants knew or should have
known of the presence of the toy on the floor of the basement. Because plaintiff failed to present any
evidence that defendants knew or should have known of the existence of the alleged defects, we
conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for directed verdict.
We also note briefly that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a jury-submissible
issue regarding causation.1
[A]t a minimum, a causation theory must have some basis in established fact.
However, a basis in only slight evidence is not enough. Nor is it sufficient to submit a
causation theory that, while factually supported, is, at best, just as possible as another
theory. Rather, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence from which a jury may
conclude that more likely than not, but for the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff’s injuries
would not have occurred. [Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 164-165; 516
NW2d 475 (1994).]
Plaintiff initially explained that she fell after she stepped on a toy. She then clarified, “When I put my
feet down, the toy slipped and, you know, and the tile slipped, I did a split.” However, plaintiff
admitted that prior to her fall she saw neither the toy nor the allegedly defective tile, and acknowledged
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she had no way of knowing on which tile the toy had been located when she encountered it. Plaintiff
also failed to present any other witnesses who could offer testimony regarding the cause of plaintiff’s
accident. Because plaintiff did not see the tile before her fall and thus could not establish beyond mere
speculation or conjecture that the tile played a part in her fall, we conclude that the trial court should
have granted defendants’ motion for JNOV on this basis. Skinner, supra at 164-170.
In light of our resolution of these issues, we need not address defendants’ remaining arguments
on appeal.
The amended final judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a
judgment of no cause of action.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
Defendants raised this issue in their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and/or
new trial. The standard of review for JNOV requires review of the evidence and all legitimate
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; only if the evidence fails to establish a
claim as a matter of law should a motion for JNOV be granted. Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App
513, 524-525; 564 NW2d 532 (1997).
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