QUINTON J KETNER V SPECIALTY INDUSTRIES INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
QUINTON J. KETNER,
UNPUBLISHED
June 4, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 209940
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 96-025140 NO
SPECIALTY INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
ZEELAND FARM SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Murphy and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant Specialty Industries, Inc., sustained serious injuries during
the construction of a soybean receiving plant for Zeeland Farm Services, Inc., when he fell nineteen feet
through an unguarded ladder/floor opening, landed on steel mesh floor, then continued his fall twelve
more feet to the next level. Plaintiff alleged that his employer was liable under the intentional tort
exception to the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et
seq., because he and other workers had told their supervisor, Raymond Stambaugh, of the windy
conditions at the upper levels of the plant under construction. The trial court granted summary
disposition in favor of defendant because it believed that the conditions fell short of an intentional injury.
When deciding a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court must
consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence available to
it to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial. Spiek v Dep’t of
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Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Defendant is entitled to summary
disposition as a matter of law under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue of material fact and
an intentional tort did not o
ccur. MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(101)(1); James v Commercial
Carriers, Inc, 230 Mich App 533, 536; 583 NW2d 913 (1998). On appeal, we review de novo a
trial court's grant of summary disposition. Spiek, supra, 337.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendant when it found that plaintiff’s injury was not intended by defendant
because the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, creates a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether defendant deliberately acted or failed to act with the intent to inflict
injury upon plaintiff. We disagree.
The Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA
17.237(101) et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by an employee arising out of
and in the course of employment by an employer. An intentional tort is the only exception to this
exclusive remedy. The WDCA provides:
An intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a
deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury. An
employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual
knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.
[MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(101)(1).]
Whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true is a question for the trier of fact; however, whether the
facts alleged are sufficient to constitute an intentional tort within the meaning of the WDCA is a question
of law for the court. MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(101)(1); James, supra, 536; Palazzola v
Karmazin Products Corp, 223 Mich App 141, 146-147; 565 NW2d 868 (1997).
In Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich 149; 551 NW2d 132 (1996), the Michigan
Supreme Court looked to the legislative intent behind the intentional tort exclusion from the WDCA and
interpreted the meaning of the statutory language quoted above. The Travis Court concluded that a
deliberate act encompasses both commissions and omissions, such as when an employer consciously
fails to act. Id., 169-170. The Court interpreted the phrase “specifically intended an injury” to mean
that “in acting or failing to act, the employer must have determined to injure the employee; in other
words, he must have had the particular purpose of inflicting an injury upon his employee.” Id., 172.
Where there is no direct evidence of intent to injure, an employer's intent to injure may be inferred from
the surrounding circumstances, id., 172-173, where an employer has actual knowledge that an injury is
certain to occur and wilfully disregards such knowledge, id., 180.
Actual knowledge means that constructive, implied, or imputed knowledge is not enough. Id.,
173. A plaintiff can establish a corporate employer’s actual knowledge by demonstrating that a
supervisor or manager had actual knowledge that an injury would result from the employer’s deliberate
acts or omissions. Id., 173-174.
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Next, based on legislative history, the Travis Court determined that “certain to occur” sets forth
an extremely high standard, such that no doubt exists with regard to whether an injury will occur. Id.,
174. The Court continued:
Thus, the laws of probability, which set forth the odds that something will occur,
play no part in determining the certainty of injury. Consequently, scientific proof that,
for example, one out of ten persons will be injured if exposed to a particular risk, is
insufficient to prove certainty. Along similar lines, just because something has happened
before on occasion does not mean that it is certain to occur again. Likewise, just
because something has never happened before is not proof that it is not certain to occur.
[Id.]
It is not enough that the employer know of the existence of a dangerous condition; the employer must be
aware that injury is certain to occur from the employee’s actions. Id., 176. The Court provided an
example of certain injury:
When an employer subjects an employee to a continuously operative dangerous
condition that it knows will cause an injury, yet refrains from informing the employee
about the dangerous condition so that he is unable to take steps to keep from being
injured, a factfinder may conclude that the employer had knowledge that an injury is
certain to occur. [Id., 178.]
Finally, the Travis Court addressed the phrase “willfully disregards,” stating:
Because the purpose of the entire second sentence is to establish the employer's
intent, we find that the use of the term "willfully" in the second sentence is intended to
underscore that the employer's act or failure to act must be more than mere negligence,
that is, a failure to act to protect a person who might foreseeably be injured from an
appreciable risk of harm. An employer is deemed to have possessed the requisite state
of mind when it disregards actual knowledge that an injury is certain to occur. [Id.,
178-179.]
Summarizing its analysis of the construction of the statutory language regarding the intentional
tort exception to the exclusive remedy provided in the WDCA, the Travis Court explained:
If we read both sentences of the intentional tort exception together, it becomes
evident that an employer must have made a conscious choice to injure an employee and
have deliberately acted or failed to act in furtherance of that intent. The second
sentence then allows the employer's intent to injure to be inferred if the employer had
actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur, under circumstances indicating
deliberate disregard of that knowledge. [Id., 180; see Palazzola, supra, 148.]
Applying the Michigan Supreme Court’s construction of the intentional tort exception of the
WDCA in Travis to the facts of this case, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish that Stambaugh’s
actions constitute an intentional tort.
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Plaintiff argues under the Travis Court’s analysis of the first sentence of the intentional tort
exception that plaintiff’s employer consciously acted or failed to act to remedy the continuously
operative dangerous conditions because Stambaugh knew they existed but failed to correct them. Even
if the facts as alleged establish a deliberate act as defined in Travis, supra, 173, the evidence does not
support an inference that Stambaugh acted with an intent to injure. No direct evidence of intent to injure
was presented. Thus, the question becomes: did the plaintiff establish that defendant, through
Stambaugh, had “actual knowledge” of an injury that is “certain to occur” and “willfully disregarded”
such knowledge?
Here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we are unable to conclude that
Stambaugh disregarded actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur when he asked plaintiff
and other workers to hang one more sheet of metal siding, despite the workers’ reports of the windy
conditions. Even if Stambaugh had actual knowledge of the dangerous conditions, the element that an
injury was “certain to occur” is lacking. Although not factually analogous to either Travis or its
companion case, Golec v Metal Exchange Corp, the principles applied in those cases are applicable
here. We cannot say that no doubt existed with regard to whether an injury would occur. Although the
high winds may have created difficulty for the workers, plaintiff himself testified that he did not know
why or how he fell through the opening.
Plaintiff also asserts that Stambaugh knew injury was certain to occur because he created the
continuously operative dangerous conditions and that due to the wind, he was going to stop work after
one more sheet was put up. Unlike Golec, supra, 149, where the employer knew aerosol cans were
being loaded into a furnace (even though cans were not contained in every load), here it was not
inevitable that an employee would fall through an opening because of wind conditions. Employees had
been working under the same conditions for weeks. Falling through an opening is a hazard that was
encountered daily just by one’s presence by the unguarded openings. See also Bazinau v Mackinac
Island Carriage Tours, 233 Mich App __; __ NW2d __ (Docket No. 202787, issued 2/5/99), in
which the decedent drowned when the cargo pulling tractor he was driving over the ice across the
Straits of Mackinac broke through the ice and sank. Id., slip op at 1. The Court determined that the
plaintiff failed to establish that the employer had actual knowledge that injury would occur where the
decedent drove across the ice for a week without incident. Id., slip on at 6. This Court stated that
“[m]erely showing a likelihood of accident is not sufficient. The frozen straits did not present a
continuously operative dangerous condition, but rather a potential hazard.” Id., slip op at 6 (emphasis
in original). Here, as in Bazinau, the conditions—the unguarded floor openings in combination with the
wind—constitute a potential hazard. The workers had been working in the same conditions that week,
and with the wind earlier that morning before the incident. Although plaintiff’s evidence may show a
likelihood of accident, such is insufficient. Id. Regardless, the Travis Court stated that a factfinder may
conclude that the employer had knowledge that an injury is certain to occur where the employer
subjects the employee to a continuously operative dangerous condition that it knows will cause injury
without informing the employee so the employee may take steps to prevent injury. Travis, supra, 178.
Here, the employee knew of the obvious danger and testified that he was watching the opening when
walking by it.
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In Oaks v Twin City Foods, Inc, 198 Mich App 296; 497 NW2d 196 (1992), a case prior to
the Travis case, the decedent fell to his death after the defendant directed him to work while standing
on an unguarded catwalk. Id., 298. Although the defendant had been told this situation posed a certain
risk of serious injury, this Court determined that such allegations did not rise to the level of an intentional
tort because the allegations failed to establish that the defendant had actual knowledge that an injury was
certain to occur and wilfully disregarded it. Id. This Court stated:
The intentional tort exception is not triggered simply because the employer had
actual knowledge that an injury was likely to occur at some point during the
performance of a given task. See Benson v Callahan Mining Corp, 191 Mich App
443, 446-447; 479 NW2d 12 (1991). Similarly, it is not enough that the employer
acted recklessly and even envisioned the type of accident that did in fact occur.
Phillips v Ludvanwall, Inc, 190 Mich App 136, 139-140; 475 NW2d 423 (1991).
[Oaks, supra, 298.]
Although Oaks was decided before Travis, the Court utilized a similar analysis with regard to actual
knowledge that an injury was certain to occur. See Travis, supra, 173. The allegedly dangerous
condition in Oaks that resulted in the worker’s death is a condition similar to that in the present case.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, even if the workers had apprised Stambaugh of
the windy conditions, such does not rise to the level of an intentional tort.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant wilfully disregarded its knowledge of the dangerous
condition. In addition to the previously stated evidence, plaintiff presented expert testimony from
George Bowden, both a professional engineer and a consultant, that based on the number of MIOSHA
citations issued after the incident, defendant wilfully disregarded its knowledge about the dangerous
conditions. Mere conclusory statements of experts are insufficient to allege certainty that an injury will
occur. Id., 174. Although it was foreseeable that an employee could fall through an unguarded
opening, the employer’s act or failure to act must be more than mere negligence. Id., 178-179. Based
on the evidence presented, we cannot conclude that the employer deliberately acted or failed to act in
furtherance of its conscious choice to injure an employee. Id., 180. Therefore, the trial court properly
granted summary disposition where the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to
plaintiff, failed to establish an intentional tort under the WDCA, as interpreted by the Michigan Supreme
Court. MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101); Travis, supra, 149.
Because we conclude that defendant was entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law
because an intentional tort did not occur, we decline to address plaintiff’s second issue on appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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