WILLIAM BOYNE V EVELYN BOYNE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM BOYNE,
UNPUBLISHED
June 4, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 199180
Chippewa Circuit Court
LC No. 94-001288 DO
EVELYN BOYNE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Markman and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce. Defendant challenges, as inequitable,
the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate, awarding roughly sixty percent of marital assets to
plaintiff and forty percent to defendant. Defendant additionally argues that the trial court erred in
denying her request for alimony. We affirm.
The goal in distributing marital assets in a divorce proceeding is to reach an equitable distribution
of marital property in light of all the circumstances. Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 114;
568 NW2d 141 (1997). “Each spouse need not receive a mathematically equal share, but significant
departures from congruence must be explained clearly by the court.” Id. at 114-115. The factors the
trial court must consider include: “(1) duration of the marriage, (2) contributions of the parties to the
marital estate, (3) age of the parties, (4) health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties, (6) necessities
and circumstances of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties, (8) past relations and conduct of the
parties, and (9) general principles of equity.” McDougal v McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 89; 545 NW2d
357 (1996), quoting Sands v Sands, 442 Mich 30, 35; 497 NW2d 493 (1993) and Sparks v Sparks,
440 Mich 141, 159-160; 485 NW2d 893 (1992).
In reviewing a divorce judgment, this Court must first review the trial court’s findings of fact
under the clear error standard. Sparks, supra at 151. If the trial court’s findings of fact are upheld,
this Court must decide whether the dispositional ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. The
dispositional ruling regarding the division of marital property should be affirmed unless this Court is left
with the “firm conviction that the division was inequitable.” Id. at 152.
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Defendant contends that the trial court clearly erred in several of its factual determinations.
First, defendant argues that the court “inappropriately” decided the issue of fault. Although fault for the
failure of the marriage is a relevant consideration, it is “not a punitive basis for an inequitable division.”
McDougal, supra at 90 (emphasis added). The trial court concluded that defendant was sixty percent
at fault for the failure of the marriage, leaving plaintiff forty percent of the blame. The trial court arrived
at this conclusion from testimony indicating that defendant did not like plaintiff’s son and may have
driven him from the marital home, and that she had “bad-mouthed” plaintiff. The court also noted that
shortly after the divorce action was filed, defendant went to the couple’s retirement home with a truck
and removed several household items. We note that defendant’s claims that plaintiff was abusive and a
heavy drinker, and that he was involved in an adulterous relationship, were all contradicted by other
testimony. This Court defers to the trial court’s opportunity to hear witnesses and assess credibility. In
re Leone Estate, 168 Mich App 321, 324; 423 NW2d 652 (1988). Because the evidence supported
a finding that defendant was more at fault for the deterioration of the marriage than plaintiff, we find no
clear error in the trial court’s conclusions. Nor do we conclude that the court’s distribution of the assets
was tainted by an undue emphasis on the factor of fault.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred in regarding the duration of the parties’
marriage as not “particularly long.” We disagree. The court did not simply conclude that the parties’
marriage of sixteen years constituted a union of short duration. Rather, the court reasoned that because
both parties been married before, and had separated from each other before, their sixteen-year
marriage was not long in comparison with other marriages of persons of similar ages. We conclude that
the trial court’s characterization in this regard was a well-reasoned one.
Third, defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that defendant did not significantly
contribute to the growth of their marital estate. The trial court observed that defendant’s testimony that
she did the bookkeeping for the business was contradicted by other testimony, and that testimony
indicated that although defendant occasionally ran farm-related errands, she did not participate in
farming activities on a regular basis. The court noted that defendant contributed by maintaining the
marital home, but emphasized that she did not physically participate in the day-to-day work on the farm.
We agree with defendant that the maintenance of the marital home and all that this entails is too
important a contribution to any marriage to discount. However, the record indicates that plaintiff was a
successful farmer when he married defendant, that farming was essentially the couple’s sole source of
income before plaintiff retired, and that while plaintiff worked day in and day out on the farm defendant
did not actively participate in the farm’s growth and maintenance beyond taking care of the home.
Thus, although defendant did contribute to the marital estate, we find no clear error in the trial court’s
conclusion that she did not significantly contribute to the increase in the marital estate.
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by failing to address some of the factors
necessary for determining property distribution. However, a trial court is required to address only those
factors it considers relevant to the case. Sparks, supra at 159. Here, the record reveals that the trial
court did make specific findings regarding the contribution of the parties to the marital estate, their ability
to earn a living, the duration of the marriage, the lifestyle of the parties, and fault. Defendant does not
specify which relevant factors the court overlooked, let alone develop argument regarding their
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relevance or how defendant was prejudiced by any oversight. For this reason, we decline to entertain
this argument further. A party may not merely state a position and then leave it to this Court to discover
and rationalize the basis for the claim. In re Hamlet (After Remand), 225 Mich App 505, 521; 571
NW2d 750 (1997).
Defendant next challenges as inequitable the trial court’s determination that she was entitled to
only forty percent of the marital assets. We disagree with defendant’s characterization. Given the ages
of the parties when they married, that they both had been divorced, that plaintiff came to the marriage as
a successful farmer with sizable assets, that plaintiff did not significantly contribute to the increase in the
marital estate, that plaintiff had no dependents and would be able to support herself through prudent
investment of her award, and that defendant bore the greater culpability for the failure of the marriage,
we are not left with a firm conviction that the division was inequitable. Sparks, supra at 152. Instead,
we conclude that the trial court well explained the relatively minor departure from strict mathematical
equality. Byington, supra at 114-115.
Finally, defendant argues that she should have been awarded alimony. The award of alimony is
a discretionary matter for the trial court. MCL 552.23(1); MSA 25.103(1). The factors to be
considered are similar to those used in determining the disposition of marital assets. See Ianitelli v
Ianitelli, 199 Mich App 641, 643; 502 NW2d 691 (1993). Defendant requested approximately
$5,200 a month, with $1,500 going toward food, $1,500 toward clothing, and the remainder toward
other expenses. We agree with the trial court’s determination that this request was inconsistent with
defendant’s lifestyle during the marriage. Defendant testified that during most of the marriage she was a
housewife, and that she and plaintiff did not go out very much or take many vacations. She also stated
that they did not spend a lot of money because they were saving to retire early. In light of defendant’s
own account, awarding defendant the alimony she requested would not have been just and reasonable
under the circumstances. Maake v Maake, 200 Mich App 184, 187; 503 NW2d 664 (1993).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by giving undue weight to defendant’s award of
marital assets in denying alimony. She cites Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278; 527 NW2d
792 (1995), for the proposition that “alimony may not be denied on the basis that the requesting party
should dip into and devour marital assets otherwise awarded in order to maintain a comfortable
lifestyle.” In Hanaway, this Court stated that “where both parties are awarded substantial assets, the
court, in evaluating a claim for alimony, should focus on the income-earning potential of the assets and
should not evaluate a party’s ability to provide self-support by including in the amount available for
support the value of the assets themselves.” Id. at 296. In this case, the trial court properly focused on
the income-earning potential of the assets awarded to defendant, as was suggested in Hanaway. We
find no error.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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