VICTOR T BURTON V CAPITOL TRANSIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
VICTOR T. BURTON,
UNPUBLISHED
June 1, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 208944
WCAC
LC No. 95-000971
CAPITOL TRANSIT and ACCIDENT FUND
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Sawyer and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from a December 12, 1997 decision of the Worker’s
Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) which modified a magistrate’s open award of benefits
by limiting plaintiff’s benefits to differential benefits, based on the difference between the amount that
plaintiff earned at his job when injured and the amount plaintiff earned at a subsequent job, calculating
plaintiff’s average weekly wage by not including fringe benefits, and by applying the one-year-back rule.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff began working for Capitol Transit, a steel hauling company, as a truck driver in 1979.
Plaintiff’s job duties included loading and unloading his truck. On January 2, 1987, plaintiff fell at work
and suffered a herniated disc in his back. Plaintiff attempted to return to work in April 1987, but could
not continue working. Plaintiff underwent surgery in June 1987, and then returned to work from April
1988 until February 1989. His last day of work with Capitol Transit was February 2, 1989, after which
plaintiff participated in vocational rehabilitation. Plaintiff later obtained a job as a security guard on April
13, 1990, and continued to work as a security guard until he was laid off, for economic reasons, on
April 16, 1993. When he began his job as a security guard, plaintiff was earning $4 an hour, and when
he was laid off, plaintiff was earning $8.50 an hour. Plaintiff was working full-time (forty-five hours a
week), had also been promoted several times, and received pay increases by the security company.
There is no dispute that plaintiff has remained disabled from performing his job for Capitol
Transit as a truck driver. Capitol Transit voluntarily paid worker’s compensation benefits after plaintiff
was injured and paid differential benefits while plaintiff worked for the security company as required by
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MCL 418.301(5)(b); MSA 17.237(301)(5)(b). Shortly after plaintiff was laid off by the security
company, Capitol Transit stopped paying any benefits on April 22, 1993. Capitol Transit asserted that
plaintiff had established a new wage-earning capacity with the security company and, therefore, plaintiff
was not entitled to any benefits.
On June 18, 1993, plaintiff filed an application for mediation or hearing, which hearing was
conducted before the worker’s compensation magistrate on May 22, 1995. In an opinion mailed on
November 13, 1995, the magistrate granted plaintiff an open award of benefits, finding that plaintiff’s
employment with the security company for more than 100 but less than 250 weeks had not established
a new wage-earning capacity. Capitol Transit appealed to the WCAC. The WCAC modified the
magistrate’s decision. The WCAC found, contrary to the magistrate, that plaintiff had established a new
wage-earning capacity when he worked for three years for the security company, but concluded that
plaintiff was entitled to differential benefits under MCL 418.301(5)(d)(ii); MSA 17.237(301)(5)(d)(ii),
rather than under MCL 418.301(5)(d)(i); MSA 17.237(301)(5)(d)(i), as found by the magistrate. The
amount of the differential benefits depends in part upon how much more plaintiff was making as a truck
driver than as a security guard. The WCAC did not consider plaintiff’s truck driving wage to include
lost fringe benefits, because, according to the WCAC, the parties agreed to plaintiff’s average weekly
wage at trial. The WCAC also found that the magistrate erred in not applying the one-year-back rule
under MCL 418.833(1); MSA 17.237(833)(1), finding that the rule applied because plaintiff had
previously received benefits and then sought further benefits.
The net result of the WCAC’s decision was that plaintiff was entitled to differential benefits
based on the agreed-to weekly wage, but plaintiff could recover only those benefits from the date one
year before he filed his application. Because plaintiff had been receiving differential benefits for three
years while he worked for the security company, he could not recover any underpaid benefits for more
than one year before he filed his application. Plaintiff appeals from the WCAC’s decision arguing that
the WCAC erred in ruling that plaintiff had established a new wage-earning capacity, erred in not
considering the discontinued fringe benefits in calculating plaintiff’s differential benefits, and erred in
ruling that the one-year-back rule was applicable.
Plaintiff first argues that the WCAC erred in ruling he had established a new wage-earning
capacity. We find that the WCAC did not err in so ruling, thus, the WCAC properly modified the
magistrate’s ruling in this regard because the magistrate’s decision was based on erroneous legal
reasoning. Haske v Transport Leasing, Inc, 455 Mich 628, 664-665; 566 NW2d 896 (1997);
Demogola v Shellhouse Sawmill, 226 Mich App 483, 488; 574 NW2d 688 (1997). Here, it is
undisputed that plaintiff suffered from a work-related injury and that he was disabled as defined under
MCL 418.301(4); MSA 17.237(301)(4). The question for the magistrate and WCAC was whether
plaintiff was entitled to benefits under § 301(5)(d)(i) or (ii). The magistrate found that plaintiff did not
establish a new wage-earning capacity, thus plaintiff was entitled to benefits based on his wage at the
time of the injury, as provided for under § 301(5)(d)(i). The WCAC found that plaintiff was disabled,
that plaintiff had established a new wage-earning capacity, and that plaintiff had worked for more than
100 weeks as a security guard, thus plaintiff was entitled to wage loss benefits based on the difference
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between the normal and customary wages paid at the time of plaintiff’s layoff and the wages paid at the
time of injury, as provided for under § 301(5)(d)(ii).
The WCAC relied on Wade v General Motors Corp, 199 Mich App 267; 501 NW2d 248
(1993), in holding that once the magistrate found that plaintiff’s security job was “recognized regular
employment” which had “the ordinary conditions of permanency,” a new wage-earning capacity should
also have been found under § 301(d). Specifically, the WCAC accepted the magistrate’s factual finding
that plaintiff’s employment as a security guard was “recognized regular employment without any
modifications considering his disability,” and that the position “had the ordinary conditions of
permanency and was not a temporary or make shift position.” We agree with the WCAC that having
found that the security guard position was “regular employment” that had the “ordinary conditions of
permanency,” the magistrate erred as a matter of law in finding that plaintiff had not established a new
wage-earning capacity. This Court in Wade, supra, p 272, applied the “regular employment” test to
determine whether the plaintiff had established a new wage-earning capacity. Thus, the WCAC’s
reliance on Wade was proper and the WCAC correctly applied the facts as found by the magistrate to
conclude that plaintiff had established a new wage-earning capacity.1
This Court’s decision in Doom v Brunswick Corp, 211 Mich App 189; 535 NW2d 244
(1995) does not compel as different result as argued by plaintiff and as determined by the magistrate.
This Court in Doom held that the magistrate and WCAC did not err in relying on the criteria set forth in
Nairnie v General Motors Corp, 1992 WCACO 66 to determine whether the plaintiff had established
a new wage-earning capacity. Those criteria, however, do not establish a new or bright-line test to
determine the establishment of wage-earning capacity. In fact, this Court specifically stated that the
storekeeping department job that the plaintiff was in after her injury was not a regular job with
ordinary conditions of permanency, while the other job that the plaintiff performed after the injury fit
that description. Doom, supra, p 198. Accordingly, in both Wade and Doom, this Court applied the
test of “regular job with ordinary conditions of permanency” to determine whether the plaintiff had
established a new wage-earning capacity.
The WCAC, therefore, properly determined that plaintiff is entitled to differential benefits as set
forth in § 301(5)(d)(ii) because, as found by the magistrate, plaintiff’s security job is recognized regular
employment without any modifications considering his disability and the job had the ordinary conditions
of permanency.
Plaintiff next argues that the WCAC erred in refusing to include discontinued fringe benefits in
calculating plaintiff’s weekly wage with Capitol Transit. This is crucial to determining the actual rate of
differential benefits because the differential benefits are the difference between the security guard job
wages and the wages paid at the time of plaintiff’s injury. Under MCL 418.371(2); MSA
17.237(371)(2), an employee’s wages include the value of fringe benefits.
Here, the parties agreed to plaintiff’s gross wages at the hearing before the magistrate. This
amount did not include fringe benefits because, at the hearing before the magistrate, fringe benefits were
irrelevant because plaintiff’s gross wages alone exceeded two-thirds of the state average weekly wage
and put plaintiff at the maximum benefit rate. However, contrary to the WCAC’s conclusion, the
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parties did not agree to a complete average weekly wage or the amount of fringe benefits. Rather, the
stipulated amount was for gross wages excluding fringe benefits. Accordingly, the WCAC’s conclusion
that the parties agreed to or stipulated to the average weekly wage is incorrect. Since an employee’s
average weekly wage includes fringe and other benefits which are discontinued, § 371(2), and since the
average weekly wage will directly affect the amount of differential benefits to which plaintiff is entitled,
we remand to the magistrate for a determination of an average weekly wage including fringe and other
benefits.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the WCAC erred in applying the one-year-back rule as set forth in
MCL 418.833(1); MSA 17.237(833)(1). In Wozniak v General Motors Corp (After Remand), 212
Mich App 40, 43; 536 NW2d 841 (1995), this Court held that the one-year-back rule does not apply
where the plaintiff sought to recover amounts that she should have been paid originally, that is, the
difference between what the plaintiff was paid and what the plaintiff should have been paid. This Court
further recognized that both the WCAC and WCAB had consistently held that the one-year-back rule
does not apply to an employee’s request for a rate change or correction.
The rule in Wozniak is applicable to this case. Capitol Transit stopped paying benefits to
plaintiff shortly after he was laid off from his security guard job. Moreover, in its opinion, the WCAC
stated that Capitol Transit acknowledged that it should not have terminated benefits when plaintiff was
laid off by the security company and acknowledged that accrued differential benefits are due and owing
and that such benefits must continue to be paid under § 301(5)(d)(ii). Under these circumstances, we
agree with plaintiff that he was not seeking “further compensation,” but was seeking a determination of
the correct rate of benefits and the recovery of additional benefits that he was always entitled to.
Accordingly, the one-year-back rule does not apply to this case because plaintiff was seeking
benefits that he should have been paid originally and Capitol Transit acknowledged that it should not
have terminated benefits and that accrued differential benefits were owing. We reverse the WCAC’s
erroneous decision to apply the one-year-back rule to this case.
The WCAC’s decision to award plaintiff benefits under § 301(5)(d)(ii) is affirmed. We reverse
the WCAC’s decision to apply the one-year-back rule, and we reverse the WCAC’s decision to
calculate plaintiff’s average weekly wage without including fringe and other benefits. We remand to the
magistrate to determine plaintiff’s average weekly wage. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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No one disputes the magistrate’s or WCAC’s factual finding in this regard, that the security job was
regular employment with any modifications considering plaintiff’s disability and the position had the
ordinary conditions of permanency, was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on
the whole record, Goff v Bil-Mar Foods, Inc (After Remand), 454 Mich 507, 511; 563 NW2d 214
(1997), therefore this finding of fact is conclusive. MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14).
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