PEOPLE OF MI V KURT DOUGLAS FAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 1, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 205786
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 9720717 FH
KURT DOUGLAS FAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Sawyer and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to
MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a), for alleged sexual contact with his seven-year-old cousin
on two separate occasions. Although the jury found defendant not guilty of count I, it found him guilty
of count II. The trial court sentenced defendant to thirty-six months’ probation. Defendant appeals as
of right from his conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first argues the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to support a conclusion
that defendant engaged in sexual contact with the seven-year-old-victim. In the context of criminal
sexual conduct, the phrase “sexual contact” denotes
the intentional touching of the victim’s or [defendant’s] intimate parts or the intentional
touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or [defendant’s]
intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the
purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. [MCL 750.520a(k); MSA 28.788a(k).]
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented in a criminal trial, we examine the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational finder of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hoffman, 225 Mich
App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997). In this case, the victim’s mother testified that she walked into
the victim’s bedroom and saw him fondling defendant’s penis. The victim testified that he and defendant
were on his bedroom floor playing checkers when defendant fondled his penis and instructed him to
reciprocate. Viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational finder of
fact could have found the prosecution proved the contact element of second-degree criminal sexual
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contact beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s arguments relate to the credibility of the witnesses.
This Court will rarely overturn a conviction when the only issue is credibility, and we decline to do so
here. People v Crump, 216 Mich App 210, 215; 560 NW2d 640 (1996).
Next, defendant argues the trial court erred when it excluded evidence that the victim’s mother
engaged in overtly sexual conduct in front the victim and his brother. We find it wholly unnecessary to
answer this question. According to defendant, the proffered evidence “fit with [his] theory that [on
February 13, 1997,] it was the eight-year-old [sic] who was the aggressor, attempting to t uch
o
defendant while he was going to the toilet.” Even if we were to assume arguendo that the trial court
erred, the error was absolutely harmless. The jury acquitted defendant of the only charge to which he
insists the evidence was relevant. See People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 210-212; 551 NW2d 891
(1996) (holding that a trial court’s error does not require reversal unless that error prejudiced the
defendant). Accordingly, we decline to review this issue.
Finally, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to
present surrebuttal testimony. To preserve an evidentiary error for review, the aggrieved party must
make an offer of proof sufficient to convey the information necessary to evaluate the claimed error.
MRE 103(a)(2); People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 545, 553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Defendant
failed to disclose the contents of the proffered surrebuttal testimony both at trial and on appeal. Thus,
we conclude that defendant preserved this issue only to the extent t appears from the record that
i
defendant sought to buttress his claim that he did not attend school the afternoon of February 13,
1997.1 To the extent defendant preserved this issue, we review the trial court’s decision on the
admission of rebuttal evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 398;
547 NW2d 673 (1996).
Rebuttal evidence is admissible to “contradict, repel, explain or disprove evidence produced by
the other party and tending directly to weaken or impeach the same. Figgures, supra at 399. A
defendant is not entitled to present surrebuttal testimony that merely reiterates evidence he previously
presented during his case-in-chief. People v Solak, 146 Mich App 659, 675; 382 NW2d 495 (1985).
Defendant testified that he did not attend school the afternoon of February 13, 1997. In
rebuttal, Sandy Ratlidge testified that not only was defendant scheduled to attend school that afternoon,
the school’s attendance records showed that defendant was not marked absent. During cross
examination, however, Ratlidge acknowledged that she was not responsible for taking attendance. She
further acknowledged that she could not verify the accuracy of the attendance records. Thus, there was
evidence in the record which, if believed, would support a conclusion that defendant was being truthful
when he testified that he was not at school the afternoon of February 13, 1997. Defendant was not
entitled to present further evidence regarding the matter. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s request that he be permitted to retake the stand.
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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1
We note defendant’s argument that if the trial court had permitted him to retake the stand “he would
have directly disagreed with the prosecutor’s rebuttal witness.” [Defendant’s Brief, p 33 (emphasis
added).]
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